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Today’s environment is filled with the proliferation of cyber-attacks that result in losses 
for organizations and individuals. Hackers often use compromised websites to distribute malware, 
making it difficult for individuals to detect. The impact of clicking through a link on the Internet 
that is malware infected can result in consequences such as private information theft and identity 
theft. Hackers are also known to perpetrate cyber-attacks that result in organizational security 
breaches that adversely affect organizations’ finances, reputation, and market value. Risk 
management approaches for minimizing and recovering from cyber-attack losses and preventing 
further cyber-attacks are gaining more importance. Many studies exist that have increased our 
understanding of how individuals and organizations are motivated to reduce or avoid the risks of 
security breaches and cyber-attacks using safeguard mechanisms. The safeguards are sometimes 
technical in nature, such as intrusion detection software and anti-virus software. Other times, the 
safeguards are procedural in nature such as security policy adherence and security awareness and 
training. Many of these safeguards fall under the risk mitigation and risk avoidance aspects of risk 
management, and do not address other aspects of risk management, such as risk transfer. 
Researchers have argued that technological approaches to security risks are rarely sufficient for 
providing an overall protection of information system assets. Moreover, others argue that an 
overall protection must include a risk transfer strategy. Hence, there is a need to understand the 
risk transfer approach for managing information security risks. Further, in order to effectively 
address the information security puzzle, there also needs to be an understanding of the nature of 
the perpetrators of the problem – the hackers. Though hacker incidents proliferate the news, there 
are few theory based hacker studies.  Even though the very nature of their actions presents a 
 
difficulty in their accessibility to research, a glimpse of how hackers perpetrate attacks can be 
obtained through the examination of their knowledge sharing behavior. Gaining some 
understanding about hackers through their knowledge sharing behavior may help researchers fine-
tune future information security research. The insights could also help practitioners design more 
effective defensive security strategies and risk management efforts aimed at protecting information 
systems. Hence, this dissertation is interested in understanding the hackers that perpetrate cyber-
attacks on individuals and organizations through their knowledge sharing behavior. Then, of 
interest also is how individuals form their URL click-through intention in the face of proliferated 
cyber risks. Finally, we explore how and why organizations that are faced with the risk of security 
breaches, commit to cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. Thus, the fundamental research 
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Today’s environment is filled with the proliferation of cyber-attacks and security breaches 
that result in the subsequent losses that organizations and individuals suffer. The ability to manage 
those risks is becoming an important approach for not only minimizing and recovering from the 
loss of damage, but also for helping prevent further cyber-attacks. Hackers often use compromised 
or legitimately looking fake websites to distribute malware, making it difficult for individuals to 
detect (Abbasi, Zhang, Zimbra, Chen, & Nunamaker Jr, 2010). The impact of clicking through a 
link on the Internet that is malware infected can wreak havoc for the individual, including the 
stealing of private information (Dinev, 2006) and storing of surveillance software on individuals’ 
computers in order to observe their behavior (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000). 
Hackers are also known to perpetrate cyber-attacks that result in organizational security 
breaches. A security breach refers to the compromise of security, confidentiality, or integrity of, 
or loss of data that result in the unauthorized acquisition of sensitive data, applications, services, 
and networks. Security breaches have adversely affected organizations’ reputation and market 
value (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Mukhopadhyay et al. 2013). A survey of 2,000 consumers found 
that nearly 87 percent are unlikely to do business with organizations impacted by security breach 
(NCI 2016). Many studies exist that have increased our understanding of how individuals and 
organizations are motivated to reduce or avoid the risks of security breaches and cyber-attacks 
using safeguards. The safeguards are sometimes technical in nature, such as intrusion detection 
software and anti-virus software (Lee and Larsen 2009; Mookerjee et al. 2011). Other times, the 
safeguards are in the form of  procedural safeguards such as security policy adherence and security 
training and awareness (e.g., Boss et al. 2015; Herath and Rao 2009a; Posey et al. 2015). These 
safeguards fall under the risk mitigation and risk avoidance aspects of risk management, and do 
2 
not address the risk transfer aspect of risk management. Researchers have argued that 
technological approaches to security risks are rarely sufficient for providing an overall protection 
of IS assets (Herath and Rao 2009b; Ifinedo 2014; Vance et al. 2012a). Hence, there is a need to 
understand other risk management approaches for managing information security risks.  
Further, in order to effectively address the “puzzle of information security”, there needs to 
be an understanding of the nature of the perpetrators of the problem – the hackers.  Though hacker 
incidents proliferate the news and popular press,  “few rigorously conducted hacker studies have 
been published, and most of our understanding about computer hackers comes from descriptive 
accounts and reporting” (Crossler et al. 2013, p. 93).  Even though the very nature of their actions 
presents a difficulty in their accessibility to research, a glimpse of how hackers perpetrate attacks 
can be obtained through the examination of their knowledge sharing behavior. In general, 
knowledge is a critical resource that provides a sustainable competitive advantage, and information 
sharing is a key to understanding that knowledge (Wang and Noe 2010). Hence, gaining some 
understanding about hackers through their knowledge sharing behavior may help researchers fine-
tune future information security research (Crossler et al. 2013). The insights gained from 
understanding hacker behaviors could also help practitioners design more effective defensive 
information security strategies, and risk management efforts aimed at protecting information 
systems resources.    
Hence, this dissertation is interested in understanding hackers through their knowledge sharing 
behavior. Then, of interest also is how individuals form their URL click-through intention in the 
face of proliferated cyber risks. Finally, we explore how and why top managers who are 
increasingly accountable for security breaches in their organizations, commit to cyberinsurance as 
a risk management strategy. Thus, the fundamental research question of this dissertation is, “How 
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do individuals and organizations manage information security risks?” To answer this research 
question, this dissertation investigates three sub-research questions: 
(1) Why do hackers share knowledge used in perpetrating cyber-attacks on individuals and 
organizations? What types of information do they share?  
(2) Given a risky Internet environment, what factors shape the individual's decision 
towards clicking through links on the Internet?  
(3) What are the salient factors that determine the top manager’s commitment towards 
managing information security risk through cyberinsurance? 
  
Three Essays in this Dissertation 
Essay 1 
The term hacker used to refer to computer programmers that are exceptionally skilled at 
exploring the boundaries of computer systems. Nowadays, the term has negative connotations and 
refers to cyber-criminals who break into information systems to compromise and steal information 
(Young et al. 2007). Today, hackers are known to perpetrate cyber-attacks that result in 
organizational security breaches which  cost the global economy $445 billion annually (Reuters 
2014). Hackers continue to wreak havoc on organizations information systems and these hacker 
incidents proliferate the news and popular press. However, there is a dearth of studies examining 
their culture and behavior. “Few rigorously conducted hacker studies have been published, and 
most of our understanding about computer hackers comes from descriptive accounts and 
reporting” (Crossler et al. 2013, p. 93).  Hence, the call for research in hacker communities and 
behavior (Crossler et al. 2013). In responding to the call, the aim of this essay is to understand the 
nature of the hacker.  The notion is that an understanding of the hacker behavior will provide 
insights into emerging cyber threats (Benjamin et al. 2016). Further, research that  elucidates 
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hacker cybercriminal activities will be beneficial to building information security defenses 
(Mahmood et al. 2010).  
A challenge in examining hacker behavior is that the illegality of their activities render 
access to this population difficult (Crossler et al. 2013; Young et al. 2007). Even though the very 
nature of their actions presents a difficulty in their accessibility to research, a glimpse of how 
hackers perpetrate attacks can be obtained through the examination of their knowledge sharing 
behavior. Knowledge is a critical resource that provides a sustainable competitive advantage, and 
knowledge sharing is a key to understanding that knowledge (Wang and Noe 2010). Hence, 
gaining some understanding about hackers through their knowledge sharing behavior may help 
researchers fine-tune future information security research (Crossler et al. 2013).  
The theoretical lens utilized in this research is social capital theory. Social capital theory 
(SCT) is a framework for understanding knowledge sharing (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). 
Scholars of the theory of social capital define social capital as an embedded resources in social 
networks that can be accessed or used in a purposeful manner (Lin 1999).  
Hackers congregate in online forums to share knowledge about hacking tools  (Benjamin 
et al. 2016; Motoyama et al. 2011) and information about their targets (Hausken 2015). Hackers 
need information, not only about their target organizations or about individuals, but also software, 
source code, and techniques employed to successfully break into and access their target’s 
information system. Hence, hackers engage in online forums in order to interact with other hackers 
to exchange knowledge.  
Hacker forum archival data is utilized and is accessed from a forum called hackhound.org 
(Samtani 2016). Using data from 4,242 messages posted by 794 participants in a hacker forum in 
the US, this study hopes to reveal how hackers approach knowledge sharing and exchange in online 
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networks. Text mining is performed in order to extract topics of interest from forum posts. Content 
analysis of the posts is performed to explore, understand, and classify the knowledge shared by 
hackers in the forum. The measures and operationalization of the constructs in this study are based 
on the literature. To assess knowledge sharing we examined two variables based on the postings: 
(1) the severity of the shared knowledge to victims and (2) the volume of shared knowledge.  
We contribute to research by not only evaluating the hackers’ knowledge sharing behavior 
through the volume of post, but also how the content of the shared knowledge stacks up against 
known cybercrime attacks. Doing so goes a step further in shedding light on how hacker 
knowledge sharing behavior is detrimental to individuals and firms (Hausken 2015). Lastly, 
considering the criminal nature of hacker activities, and the hacker culture that extols the virtues 
of freely sharing information – “information wants to be free” – this research empirically validates 
knowledge sharing in the hacker community context. For practitioners, the insights gained could 
help in the design of more effective defensive information security strategies, and risk management 
efforts aimed at protecting IS. 
 
Essay 2 
The Internet supports different services and functionalities, and has served as a mechanism 
for the delivery of services, communication and entertainment. Many individuals and 
organizations now depend on the Internet and applications (Keller, Powell, Horstmann, Predmore, 
& Crawford, 2005; Knapp & Boulton, 2006) such as search engines for business opportunities and 
information gathering.  As a result, about 88 percent of adults in the US currently use the Internet, 
and spend more than 20 hours a week on the Internet (GO-Gulf, 2015; Pew Research, 2015). It is 
no wonder the Internet has become a popular attack vector for malware infections (Financial 
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Services Rountable, 2011). Attackers often use compromised or legitimately looking fake websites 
to distribute malware, making it difficult for users to detect (Abbasi et al., 2010). According to a 
recent vulnerability assessment by Symantec, malware was found on 1 in 566 websites (Symantec, 
2014). This supports the prevalence and elevated ranking of malware among the threats to 
cybersecurity: malware attacks rank highest (Computer Security Institute, 2011). The financial 
impact of cybercrime is estimated at over $500 billion worldwide each year (Reuters, 2014), and 
can cause business, personal and social damage (Dinev, 2006). The impact of clicking through a 
link on the Internet that is malware infected can wreak havoc for the individual, including the 
stealing of private information (Dinev, 2006) and storing surveillance software on the individuals 
computer in order to observe their behavior (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000). Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 
(2003) argue that deceptions on the Internet threatens the sustainability of e-commerce. 
The Internet enables deeper, broader and faster information searches (S. M. Smith & 
Whitlark, 2001). Attackers exploit search engine sites and e-commerce sites to distribute and 
spread malware. Given the consequences of clicking on a link that is malware infected, individuals 
may be discouraged from clicking on legitimate links and completing e-commerce transactions. 
Thus, endangering e-businesses that depend on click-through to complete online transactions (e.g. 
e-commerce, search engine results). Hence, in order to retain the Internet as a safe, efficient and 
effective platform for business transactions, it is important to understand how Internet users form 
their decisions to click-through URL links in a risky environment. Hence, this study addresses the 
research question: "given a risky Internet environment what factors shape the individual's decision 
towards clicking through links on the Internet?" Our interest is in understanding why individuals 
click-through in the presence of the risks involved. We do so using the e-commerce transaction 
context, while specifically integrating malware risk perception, the risk propensity of using the 
7 
Internet and computers, trust, familiarity and self-efficacy of information security as key 
determinants in online transactions. Using Sitkin and Pablo's  (1992) theoretical framework in 
risky decision making, we show the factors affecting click-through intention. We find that the 
individual’s intention to click-through is significantly affected by their risk propensity, risk 
perception, trust of the site, familiarity and self-efficacy of information security. 
The individual's interaction with Internet click-through and their perceptions around click-
through is under-developed in IS research.  Click-through is considered as both a reliable means 
for showing user preference (Joachims, Granka, Pan, Hembrooke, & Gay, 2005) and a behavioral 
response  (Briggs and Hollis 1997). With respect to a person's decision process, clicks also depict 
a person's relative preference (Joachims et al., 2005). URL click-through has been used for 
customer referral, decision judgements, marketing and advertisements (Jansen, Brown, & Resnick, 
2007). Click-through represents implicit feedback and indicate relevance judgements and has been 
used to measure advertising response, and indicate individuals’ immediate interest in a brand  
(Briggs and Hollis 1997). Thus, this study uses click-through intention to measure the individual's 
judgement towards a link. If URL links are perceived as unsafe, individuals may not click on them. 
This represents a huge loss for search engine companies (e.g. Google, Yahoo, and MSN) and e-
commerce sites that depend on click-through for revenue (Jansen et al., 2007). Grier, Thomas, 
Paxson, and Zhang (2010) found that 8% of 25 million URLs posted on Twitter point to malware 
sites, and suggests that about 0.13% of links on Twitter are clicked on, representing higher URL 
clicks than clicks from email spam. 
Considering the prevalence of cybersecurity threats and the risks of malware on the 
Internet, studies investigating malware risks on the Internet are sparse. In addition, the coalescing 
of e-commerce and security research is an important aspect that requires further research. This 
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study applies risky decision making theoretical framework to understand the individual's click-
through intention. We also examine the effects of trust and familiarity on the individual’s intention, 
in the presence of these risks.  
This study makes the following contributions to theory and practice. First, it proposes a 
research model and a set of theory-based hypotheses addressing why individuals click-through and 
what factors contribute to this behavior. Trust has been used extensively in e-commerce research 
to explain “how” and “why” individuals engage in e-commerce transactions, but has not been used 
in understanding risky decision making in the information security context. Second,  our study 
answers the critical question of how trust affects secure behavioral intentions from a cybersecurity 
standpoint (Pfleeger and Caputo 2012). It does so by integrating trust in the risk framework and 
by applying the “where” aspects of theory building (Whetten, 1989). The hope is that this research 
advances information security context-related research, and increases the importance and 
specificity of trust, risk and security research. In addition, this study provides insights for 
managerial practices that help enhance click-through of genuine and legitimate links on the 
Internet.   
 
Essay 3 
Security breaches are adversely affecting organizations’ reputation and market value 
(Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Mukhopadhyay et al. 2013). According to a Forbes report, 46 percent of 
companies have suffered reputational damage due to a data breach (Forbes 2014). In addition, a 
recent survey of 2,000 consumers found that nearly 87 percent are unlikely to do business with 
organizations impacted by data breach (NCI 2016). Ponemon (2015) notes that the average cost of 
each stolen record is $217. The cost of data breaches include notification of individuals impacted 
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by the breach, legal fees, regulatory fines, and the cost of recovery. These costs can be damaging 
and difficult to recover from, especially for small and medium sized organizations. These costs are 
also one of the reasons organizations are driven to protect their businesses from the impact of data 
breaches by using cyberinsurance. Cyberinsurance as a risk transfer approach is one of the many 
security risk management strategies used by organizations. Cyberinsurance is an insurance product 
used to protect organizations from risks derived from the use of the internet and information 
systems. Cyberinsurance is defined as the transfer of financial risk associated with security/data 
breaches to a third party (Böhme and Schwartz 2010).  
Traditional approaches to security risk management through technology (e.g., Lee and 
Larsen 2009), policies (e.g., Vance et al. 2012b) and procedures (Spears and Barki 2010) are 
limited in preventing or eliminating security risks.  It is widely understood that identifying and 
protecting against cyberattacks by technical approaches alone do not provide an overall solution 
(Majuca et al. 2006; Siegel et al. 2002). Insurance risk management has since focused on reducing 
the impact and severity of damage through financial means (Siegel et al. 2002). Hence, Majuca et 
al. (2006) argue that an overall risk management strategy must include cyberinsurance.  
Cyberinsurance risk management minimizes the impact of financial losses from security and data 
breaches, allowing organizations to recover quickly from devastating losses and business 
interruption, thereby contributing to the economic stability of the business environment as a whole.  
Consequently, since we know relatively little about how top managers in organizations 
form estimates of cyberinsurance commitment, this study identifies the determinants and outlines 
a nomological network that top managers follow in their commitment towards cyberinsurance as 
a security risk management strategy. Our focus is on the top managers’ assessment of the use of 
cyberinsurance to protect the organizations information assets. There are two reasons this research 
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seeks the top managers perspective. First, organizations consists of individuals that may account 
for the performance of organizations. Strategic management literature notes that the omission of 
the individual factors in examining organizations has prevented a thorough understanding of the 
role individuals actually play in determining firm performance (Mollick 2012). Specifically, it has 
been shown that top managers are considered to be important in determining firm performance 
(Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Hambrick et al. 1996; Mollick 2012). The notion is that top managers 
have a strong influence on how their organizations respond to external and internal events that 
affect routines, resources and performance (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Kettinger et al. 2013).  In 
addition, Goodhue and Straub (1991) argue that an organization’s protective measures should 
require managerial careful attention. Second, there is a shifting of accountability in industry, such 
that top managers - and no longer technology departments - are under increased scrutiny for 
security breaches (Experian 2015). Top managers are nowadays required to understand and 
perform recommended actions that prevent and manage the threat of security breaches with 
cyberinsurance. Hence, this study is interested in understanding the top manager’s perspective for 
the use of cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. We intend to answer the research 
question, what are the salient factors that determine the top manager’s intention to use 
cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy?  
Using the valence framework of risk and benefits perspective, we identify factors that are 
inherent in the top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance. By dimensionalizing the risk 
and benefit factors along the lines of situational relevant factors and product relevant factors, we 
seek to extend the valence framework.   Situation factors are factors specific to the risks and benefit 
driving the top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance. The product factors are specific 
to the cyberinsurance product. We test the model through a survey of top managers in various 
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organizations.  This study seeks to highlight the important role of cyberinsurance as an information 
security risk management approach. Contributions to research include, theoretically identifying 
and outlining the factors that determine the top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance in 
a nomological network. For practice, by drawing attention to the relationships between the 
antecedents and commitment, we hope to spur businesses to consider cyberinsurance as a security 





HACKERS DELIGHT: KNOWLEDGE SHARING MOTIVES 
1.1 Introduction 
Hackers have been identified as primary threats to information systems (IS) and its users 
(Furnell 2003). They are known to perpetrate cyber-attacks that result in organizational security 
breaches, which cost the global economy $445 billion annually (Reuters 2014). As hacker exploits 
continue, researchers (e.g., Abbasi et al. 2014; Crossler et al. 2013; Mahmood et al. 2010) call for 
more studies examining their culture, characteristics and behaviors. The notion is that an 
understanding of the nature of hackers will provide insights into emerging cyber threats (Benjamin 
et al. 2016), and elucidate cybercriminal activities, which are beneficial to building information 
security defenses (Mahmood et al. 2010). In responding to the call, the goal of this study is to 
understand the hackers through their knowledge sharing behavior. Even though the very nature of 
hacker activities present a difficulty in their accessibility to research (Crossler et al. 2013; 
Mahmood et al. 2010; Young et al. 2007), a glimpse of how hackers perpetrate attacks could be 
obtained through the examination of their knowledge sharing behavior. Knowledge is a critical 
resource that provides a sustainable competitive advantage. Knowledge sharing has been described 
as a key to understanding that knowledge (Wang and Noe 2010). Hence, gaining understanding 
about hackers through their knowledge sharing behavior may help researchers fine-tune future 
information security research (Crossler et al. 2013).  
While prior studies have contributed to our understanding of traditional knowledge sharing 
in organizations, we still have much to learn about knowledge sharing within deviant behavior 
communities. Although knowledge sharing has been studied in online communities (e.g., Faraj 
and Johnson 2011; Johnson et al. 2015; Wasko and Faraj 2005), the hacker context represents a  
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uniqueness that differentiate it from knowledge sharing in other online communities.  First, 
members of hacker communities are generally known to be hackers who are aware of their illegal 
activities (Young et al. 2007), and who are seen as threats to information systems (Furnell 2003). 
Second, the results of the knowledge shared (malware, vulnerabilities, hacking tools, stolen data 
etc.) can be severe and harmful to individuals and organizations. Hence, it is important to gain a 
better understanding of the types of knowledge shared in terms of their severity, and the factors 
that drive sharing of knowledge with different severity. Mahmood et al. (2010) argue that this type 
of insight will not only help slow the spread and impact of security breaches, but also help in the 
design of countermeasures that may lessen their damage. By exploring the types of knowledge 
shared in hacker forums, organizations and security firms may be able uncover advances in 
security violations, malware distribution, and anti-malware evading techniques. Correspondingly, 
it is equally important to understand the types of knowledge that are withheld from other hackers, 
and the conditions for such behaviors. When certain types of knowledge are withheld in the forum, 
it is possible that it reduces the availability and spread of malicious content.  
Knowledge sharing is important in the development of hackers (Jordan and Taylor 1998), 
and so they congregate to share knowledge (Odabas et al. 2015). In a game theory analysis of 
knowledge sharing between hackers, Hausken (2015) finds that as the effectiveness of information 
sharing among hackers increases, information sharing levels and hacker profits increase. 
Mookerjee et al. (2011) argues that in certain situations, hackers benefit from disseminating 
security knowledge among one another. In addition, they find that a firm’s cost increases when 
hackers become more knowledgeable through knowledge sharing within the hacker population. 
Hence, they conclude that knowledge sharing and dissemination between hackers is damaging to 
the firm because it increases the firm’s cost.  
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Even though researchers have identified knowledge sharing in online hacking communities 
as a key activity for hackers, and that firms’ cost increases when hackers share knowledge, there 
is a gap in the literature investigating why, how, and what types of knowledge hackers share in 
online hacker communities. A perspective that is also limited is the understanding of the conditions 
that foster the withholding of knowledge. Hence, we seek to answer the following research 
questions: Why do hackers share knowledge in a hacking forum? Under what condition will 
hackers withhold knowledge in a hacking forum? 
Using social network analysis, social capital theory, a framework for understanding 
knowledge sharing (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), and data from 4,242 messages posted by 794 
participants in a hacker forum called hackhound.org, this study explores how hackers approach 
knowledge sharing, the patterns of knowledge sharing among hackers, and the types of knowledge 
shared. We also incorporate coopetition literature (e.g., Tsai 2002) to understand withholding 
behaviors when there is simultaneous cooperation and competition between members of a group. 
Following recommendations from Wasko and Faraj (2005), this study incorporates additional 
measures of centrality such as betweenness centrality and boundary spanning using a set of data 
based on 3 ½ years of sharing in its evaluation of the network structuring. We use an instrumental 
variable approach to control for endogeneity between the structural variables and dependent 
variables (e.g. Gu et al. 2012). Furthermore, following Ransbotham and Mitra (2009) that depict 
hackers attack topology and its severity, we map the content of the knowledge shared in the hacker 
forum to an existing classification of attack severity.  
Our findings suggest that the most influential participants of the online hacker community 
are those with high degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and boundary span share knowledge 
in the forum. We also find that individuals with high degree, betweenness, and boundary spanning 
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characteristics withhold sharing knowledge that may be deemed severe in the forum. We 
contribute to research and practice. First, our main contribution to IS research is in clarifying how 
forms of social capital facilitates knowledge withholding. By assessing withholding behaviors 
using forms of social capital, we extend how social capital theory is used in studying knowledge 
contribution and exchange in IS research. Second, contrary to most research on knowledge sharing 
in legitimate organizations or online communities, this study contributes to research by providing 
a finer-grained analysis on how deviant characters such as hackers in an online hacker community 
interact with each other, and specifically, their knowledge sharing and withholding behaviors. 
Third, we contribute methodologically to the literature by conceptualizing and categorizing 
severity of hacking activities, making it possible to conduct quantitative analyses. By quantifying 
the severity of the shared knowledge, we increase our understanding of the types of knowledge 
shared by hackers. Lastly, we not only evaluate hackers’ knowledge sharing behavior through the 
volume of post, but also show how the content of the shared knowledge stacks up against existing 
classification of attack topology (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009). For practitioners, the insights 
gained could help in the design of more effective defensive strategies and in building adequate risk 
management capacity.   
 
1.2 Background  
Hackers have been described in different ways in the literature (e.g., Décary-Hétu and 
Dupont 2012; Dupont et al. 2016; Holt et al. 2012; Mookerjee et al. 2011; Thomas 2002). In the 
1970s, the concept of hacker was used to describe computer enthusiasts and ardent programmers 
who explore the limits of computer systems (Thomas 2002). In recent times, the meaning of 
hacking has evolved to one that denotes hackers and members of hacker communities as threats to 
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information systems and its users (Furnell 2003) and as criminals. Specifically, they are individuals 
who deliberately gain unauthorized access to systems. Hackers are well aware that their activities 
are illegal in nature (Young et al. 2007). As argued, an understanding of hackers in online 
communities must acknowledge the significance of the context that differentiates them from other 
online communities.  Our work builds on few streams of research such as hacker culture, 
knowledge sharing using social capital theory, and coopetition in explaining the simultaneous 
collaboration and competition that exists in groups. In the following section, we provide a 
background of hacker knowledge sharing and the types - in terms of severity - of knowledge shared 
in the forum.  
 
1.2.1 Hacker Culture and Knowledge Sharing 
The hacker culture is driven by the belief that knowledge should be free and that the quest 
for such knowledge is a human right (Cross 2006).  Indeed, studies suggest that the attraction for 
hackers is the quest for knowledge (Thomas 2005). Even though it makes their illegal activities 
difficult to hide from law enforcement, knowledge sharing is important in the development of 
hackers (Jordan and Taylor 1998). Hence, hackers are known to congregate for the purpose of 
sharing knowledge (Odabas et al. 2015). Given that the primary motivation for hacking is to 
acquire knowledge (Holt and Kilger 2008; Sarma and Lam 2013), it seems appropriate to gain a 
good understanding of hackers through an activity that is central to their culture: knowledge 
sharing behaviors. It has been shown that hacker attacks and knowledge sharing are complements 
of each of other, such that an increase in one activity leads to an increase in the other (Hausken 
2015). 
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Because hacker community has been seen as heterogeneous (Chantler 1995), a few studies 
have categorized hackers based on their knowledge transfer capabilities (Zhang et al. 2015). In 
early hacker days, knowledge sharing was exercised through the physical sharing and exchange of 
computer tapes and  disks upon which the code was recorded (Hippel and Krogh 2003). These 
days, hackers’ knowledge sharing is primarily accomplished through online communities such as 
online forums and Internet Relay Chat (e.g. Benjamin et al. 2015, 2016). Online communities have 
been studied in IS specifically to examine why and how individuals share knowledge (e.g., Faraj 
et al. 2011; Mein Goh et al. 2016). Online communities are known as open collectives of members 
who are not easily identifiable by others, yet share common interests, the community attends to 
both the welfare of the collective as well as the individual (Faraj et al. 2011; Sproull and Arriaga 
2007). Many online communities have specific focus areas such as social collaborations  (Pi et al. 
2013), peer-to-peer networks (e.g., Xia et al. 2012), healthcare (e.g., Mein Goh et al. 2016; Yan et 
al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2017), and open source and innovation (Ho and Rai 2017). Knowledge 
sharing in traditional online communities involves individuals “offering knowledge to others as 
well as adding to, recombining, modifying, and integrating knowledge that others have 
contributed” (Faraj et al. 2011, p. 1). Contrary to traditional online community forums where 
communication is typically open allowing all members  to read all postings (e.g Johnson et al. 
2015), the hacker forum posts are not visible to all its members. Different members are allowed 
access to different subforums and activities based on their social status in the forum. Hence, 
community members can engage in differentiated knowledge sharing, and have the ability to 
broker knowledge or span boundaries in the forum increases. In a community that is somewhat 
closed to the public or that supports exclusive sections, there is usually an opportunity to control 
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information. Thus, it is impossible for all information to be shared with all members of the 
community (Fleming and Waguespack 2007). 
Following previous definitions of knowledge sharing, we define knowledge sharing in 
hacker context as the provision of task information and know-how about different attack types to 
help others and to collaborate with others to solve problems and develop new ideas about 
cyberattacks (Cummings 2004; Wang and Noe 2010).  Though Adler and Kwon (2002) argue that 
the knowledge shared through social relations is tacit rather than explicit in nature, we note that 
the knowledge shared in this study can be both tacit and explicit. Its tacit nature is due in part to 
knowledge that may be in bits and pieces making it difficult to transfer to another hacker. It is also 
explicit because hackers in the forum do share knowledge with each other in the form of source 
code, programs, or documented formula.  
In this study, we theorize how hackers engage in knowledge sharing. Understanding the 
patterns of hacker knowledge sharing in online communities is important not only because of its 
prevalent use (open and underground) for training and cultivating more hackers, but also because 
of the uniqueness of the hacker context which makes the manner in which they share knowledge 
important for understanding hackers in general and the types of knowledge they share, specifically. 
Though similar, the unique difference between knowledge sharing in general online communities 
and “online offender communities” is that participants in the offender communities are aware of 
their illegal activities (Young et al. 2007) and also try to protect their anonymity in order to avoid 
criminal evidence and arrest (Benjamin and Hsinchun Chen 2012). Hackers are known to operate 
under some disguise and anonymity, where their identities are hidden from others.  In most online 
communities, the type of knowledge shared could be described as helpful to the members and for 
the society in general. For example, in a health-related forum (e.g., COPD-Support.com, 
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patient.info, and ehealthforum.com) members share diagnosis of diseases, prevention, and 
knowledge to help each other get better or gain more understanding of their health situation. 
Whereas, in online hacker communities, the knowledge shared is mostly about vulnerabilities, 
malware, hacking tools, and stolen data (Holt et al. 2012). Most of which are potentially harmful 
to individuals, organizations, and the public. As a whole, the elements of anonymity, illegality of 
activities, coupled with the exchange of potentially damaging knowledge create a degree of 
uniqueness in knowledge sharing rarely seen in traditional online communities. 
 
1.2.2 Attack Severity and Knowledge Sharing 
Severity has been used to understand attack types and assess its risks related to security 
threats and vulnerabilities (Borges Hink and Goseva-Popstojanova 2016; DeLooze 2004; 
Symantec 2006). Indeed, security authorities such as Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(CERT) and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are known to use classifications 
of severity as the basis for determining the urgency and immediacy of information dissemination 
to its users. Hence, an understanding of the severity of knowledge shared in hacker forums related 
to attacks may be important to help organizations protect their information assets. In addition, 
information sharing organizations (ISACs) share cybersecurity threats and attacks information 
with participating members based on the severity of cyber incidents and attacks (McCarthy et al. 
2014). The United States government also follows a classification of severity known as Cyber 
Incident Severity Schema in its assessment and commination of cyber-attacks (DHS 2016).   
Cyber-attack severity has been categorized in many ways including (1) the extent to which 
malicious programs spread among computer users, (2) the extent of damage a malicious program 
causes if encountered (Symantec 2006), and (3) the extent that the attack is targeted at a specific 
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system or organization (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009). Using Ransbotham’s and Mitra’s (2009) 
approach which is grounded on theory and rigor, we classify attack severity using the extent an 
attack is targeted at a specific system or organization. Whether an attack is targeted and the extent 
of targeting is more informative, especially as the attack relates to the motives and identities of the 
hackers (Kim and Kim 2014). Prior hacker related literature also categorize attacks based on 
whether they are targeted (e.g. Dey et al. 2012; Png and Wang 2009). 
Ransbotham and Mitra (2009) reviewed the literature for attack categories and abstracted 
the categories into two dimensions in terms of their target specificity and compromise effort. Using 
these dimensions, Ransbotham and Mitra develops a topology  of  four attack classifications: 
information scans, attack scan, targeted probes, and targeted attacks. These four attack types are 
further classified based on their severity, which hinges on their target specificity. Their 
conceptualization of severity based on whether attacks are targeted or non-targeted lies on two 
dimensions: high severity and low severity. Although we follow this conceptualization, we scale 
the degree of severity from (1) not severe to (5) extremely severe. There are a few reasons we do 
this. First, since computer security community uses 5 severity points (e.g., Symantec 2006) to 
describe and alert its users of the severity of attacks in an attempt to help victims protect themselves 
and mitigate the consequential damage (DeLooze 2004), it seems useful to employ similar scale 
points. Second, it makes it easier to report and communicate findings using such scales to 
practitioners (Straub and Ang 2008). Third, there is a progression of attacks going from 
information scans (i.e., information gathering),  targeted probes, to target attacks (i.e., system 
compromise) (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009). Moreover, it has been argued that the extent of 
targeted attacks is best viewed as degrees of severity rather than dichotomous (Kim and Kim 2014). 
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Hence, rather than using 0 to 1 (low and high), it seems beneficial to scale these from 1 to 5 to 
represent a progression of severity.  
In order to understand the types of knowledge shared by hackers and classify their severity 
using the attack types, we performed content analysis of postings in the hacker forum utilizing a 
text mining method named latent semantic analysis (LSA) (Deerwester et al. 1990). LSA analyzes 
the textual descriptions of knowledge shared by the hackers. Using the topology of attack severity, 
a severity score is assigned to extracted topics. The following describes how topics are mapped to 
attack severity. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show extracted topics, the attack types, the degree of severity, 
relevance to knowledge sharing, and example posts. More information on the coding and 
assignment of topic to severity using Q-Sort is provided in Appendix A. 
The topic extraction reveals programming language as a topic in the hacker forum. Hackers 
share knowledge related to the types of programming languages that newer hackers should learn 
in order to become proficient. Although learning programming is not an apparent attack, learning 
through a hacking forum could represent a potential for future attacks. In addition, learning is non-
targeted at an organization or information system. Therefore, this topic is designated with a 
severity degree of 1. Information scans refer to the gathering of information about systems. Also 
referred to as foot-printing,, information scans include the tools and processes to ascertain IP 
address, open ports, and services running on systems (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009). Information 
scans are non-targeted and therefore, are low severity attacks. Topics related to tools, processes, 
and technologies (e.g. IP, proxy, API1) for performing information scans are designated with a 
                                                 
1 An application programming interface (API) is a set of tools (libraries) that allow communications between different 
software applications. When used for scans, hackers could provoke APIs with ‘unexpected input’ in order to gather 
information about running services, system capabilities through any error messages, and software version information. 
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severity degree of 2. The topics depicts problem solving knowledge related to system connectivity, 
networking, and traffic.  
Attack scans are widespread, indiscriminate attempts to damage systems by using malware 
such as a self-replicating worms (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009) or other types of malware 
embedded within software programs and documents that are easily downloaded from the internet. 
The objective of the attack scan is to damage systems. Given that this type of attack is 
indiscriminate, it is non-targeted at specific systems. Topics related to tools, processes, and 
technologies for performing attack scans are cracked versions of commercialized software 
applications and key generators. These tools are used for bypassing licensing and activation 
mechanisms and for creating product keys of software (Gantz et al. 2006). Crack software are 
freely available on various websites. Since there is little evidence that hackers are altruistic, the 
cracked software must fulfil some other purpose.  A purpose of cracked software is to exploit 
program flaws that allow hackers to write Trojan horses, worms, and other malicious code into the 
software. Attack scans have higher compromise effort than information scans, and are designated 
a severity degree of 3.  
Targeted probes refer to tests of specific information systems for vulnerabilities for the 
purpose of a later attack. Topics related to tools, processes, and technologies for performing 
targeted probes are tests for vulnerabilities of specific anti-virus software (e.g. ESET, Kaspersky, 
Norton). Specifically, hackers test specific antivirus software to ensure the anti-virus bypasses 
(does not detect) their malware during scan. Topics related to targeted probes are designated with 
a severity degree of 4.  
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Table 1.1: Topic Extraction and Example Posts (Essay1) 
Topic Extraction Description Example Posts 




"Q: How should I ask programming question when my ***t-code is not 
working? A: First of all try to understand that you need to learn to walk before 
you are able to run, so take time to learn your programming language of 
choice…” 
server, IP, problem, 
proxy, check 
Connectivity to 
server IP, TCP, 
proxy 
“It has nothing to do with the api itself. Comment the function that uses the api, 
and the detection will be gone.” 
crack, version, update, 
delphi, install 
Crack versions 
and updates  
 
“The 3.8 is cracked, the version i have here is cracked with keygen I work with 
it, its great...” 
“Here is the keygen source..nice I’ll [paste] the keygen here” 
found, virus, antivirus, 
security, scan Antivirus testing 
“I checked it and It is clean... No outgoing connections. No injection 
attempts...”  
“Yeah…what makes this virus special is that it uses zero-day vulnerabilities…” 
source, code, rat, sell 
Remote 
administration 
tool (RAT)  
“Selling source code of bozok rat. It is the newest version (1.6 not released), 
contains full pe features” 
 “Hey HH members here is another VB.NET sources RAT.. as usual enjoy”  














programming  Foundation Not severe: 1. 
Basic hacking knowledge including general programming is not an 


















Attack scan Moderately severe: 3.  
Cracked version of software and key generators. Hackers use crack 







probe Very severe: 4.  
Targeted probes of specific anti-virus software (e.g., Kaspersky, 










severe: 5.  
Tools, techniques, and processes to compromise targeted systems 
(e.g. RAT).  
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Targeted attacks are attempts to compromise specific systems. Topics on tools, processes, 
and technologies for performing targeted attacks are remote administration tools (RAT). RATs are 
“system control tools [that] enable the attacker to control sessions and hosts” (Ransbotham and 
Mitra 2009, p. 128). They are used by cybercriminals to remotely control computer systems 
(McAfee 2015). Tools such as these are targeted at specific information systems. Targeted attacks 
are designated with a severity degree of 5. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Foundation 
1.3.1 Social Capital Theory 
Early review of the social capital literature suggests that social capital is the aggregate of 
resources held in a network of relationships of “mutual acquaintances or recognition” (Bourdieu 
1986, p. 248). Coleman (1988) and Burt (2000) suggest that social capital is the ability of actors 
in a network to gain advantages and obtain benefits as a result of their membership in a social 
network (Inkpen and Tsang 2005). At an individual level, these benefits include privileged access 
to hacking knowledge, tools, enhanced understanding of hackers’ norms, and increased reputation. 
Researchers have noted that access to new sources of knowledge is an important and direct benefit 
of social capital (Inkpen and Tsang 2005). According to Adler and Kwon (2002, p. 17), social 
capital is the “goodwill that is engendered by the fabric of social relations and that can be mobilized 
to facilitate action”. Social capital theory has informed our understanding of families, 
communities, governance, and other collective actions.  Scholars have argued that social capital 
develops in groups that have a shared history, frequency of interaction, and are interdependent on 
each other (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In this study, social capital theory is used to understand 
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and explain how the goodwill, ability, characteristics of the actors (i.e., hackers)2, and the “function 
of their location in the structure of the social relations” (Adler and Kwon 2002, p. 18) facilitate 
patterns knowledge sharing behavior. In particular, we adopt Nahapiet’s and Ghoshal’s (1998) 
framework for understanding knowledge sharing through social capital. This framework suggests 
that knowledge sharing is enabled when (1) individuals are motivated to share knowledge, (2) 
there are structural ties between the individuals (structural capital), (3) individuals are cognitively 
capable of applying knowledge (cognitive capital), and (4) they have positive relational 
characteristics (relational capital). These forms of social capital enable the sharing of knowledge 
between individuals in a group. Although the framework was based on a group level analysis of 
knowledge sharing, studies have expounded the importance and relevance of its application in 
individual level knowledge sharing (Wasko and Faraj 2005).  
There are two aspects of knowledge sharing: cooperative and competitive. The cooperative 
side of knowledge sharing is the collective use of shared knowledge to pursue common goals. On 
the other hand, the competitive side refers to the use of shared knowledge to make private gains in 
an attempt to outperform one’s partners (Khanna et al. 1998). According to Khanna et al. (1998), 
these two sides represent the common benefit and the private benefit. Furthermore, these two sides 
represent two patterns derived from an early comprehensive review of social capital theory (Adler 
and Kwon 2002). The first pattern originates from social network theory and suggests that actors 
derive personal benefits from their social capital (Belliveau et al. 1996; Burt 1997). This pattern 
views social capital as a private good held by individuals (Inkpen and Tsang 2005). The second 
pattern views social capital as a public good maintained and enjoyed by a social group. Researchers 
have argued the need to integrate both aspects of collective and individualist good especially as it 
                                                 
2 In this study, actors are hackers in hacker communities. We use actors and hackers interchangeably.   
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relates to knowledge sharing (Krogh 2009) through social capital theory (Inkpen and Tsang 2005). 
Consequently, definitions of social capital have incorporated both the private and public good 
perspectives of social capital. In combining both perspectives, previous studies have increased our 
understanding of knowledge sharing for the public good. For example, after their review of the 
organizational knowledge sharing literature, Wasko and Faraj (2000) maintains that it is only when 
knowledge is considered a public good, owned and maintained by a community, will knowledge 
sharing be motivated by “community interest rather than by narrow self-interest”. 
However, there is still much to understand about the conditions under which the 
individualistic or competitive aspects are enacted. That is, what are the conditions for actors to 
withhold knowledge? By incorporating the hacker culture context in this study, we assess the 
individualistic or competitive aspects and do so in terms of the type (severity) of knowledge shared. 
The notion is that individuals through social capital theory, ceteris paribus, will share knowledge 
in a social network. Conversely, individuals may withhold or not share knowledge depending on 
the type (severity) of the knowledge. Prior research highlights the importance of context in 
understanding how social capital factors influence conditions for knowledge sharing  (Cohen and 
Prusak 2001; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In the next section, we explain the context that allows 
the competitive aspects of knowledge sharing. 
 
1.3.2 Cooperation 
The hackers’ online forum is a context where there is simultaneous cooperation and 
competition among members of the forum. On one hand, the hacker ethos compel them to 
cooperate and share knowledge. In this case, knowledge sharing is done as a public good. On the 
other hand, hackers also compete with each other for higher recognition. In this case, individuals 
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perform knowledge sharing activities in order to increase their private benefit, or they may 
withhold knowledge in order to increase their uniqueness or stock. An environment where there is 
simultaneous cooperation and competition is referred to as coopetition  (Tsai 2002). Coopetition 
is common in knowledge sharing environments. Given that hackers cooperate and compete, 
coopetition exists in a hacker community. Coopetition suggests that people will share but also 
compete to use the knowledge to outperform others, or withhold information. When members of 
a group compete against one another, knowledge sharing may be reduced (Inkpen and Tsang 
2005). Social capital and collective action theories informs our understanding of why and how 
individuals share knowledge. However, there is little about why and how knowledge is withheld 
based on public or private good.   
In this study, we identity structural capital and cognitive capital as two forms of social 
capital that affect withholding behaviors. In terms of structural capital, we focus on actor centrality 
(degree centrality, betweenness centrality) and boundary span. This understanding can yield 
insights into how social capital influences private gain in a community. Social network theorists 
argue that the mechanism for control of knowledge diffusion underlies social capital and draws 
from actor centrality (Burt, 1992) and boundary spanning (Fleming and Waguespack 2007). In IS 
literature, these structural capital measures have been used to assess knowledge sharing in social 
networks (e.g., Johnson et al. 2015; Wasko and Faraj 2005), but not knowledge withholding. It has 
been argued that factors such as loss of power reduce knowledge sharing behavior and that when 
individuals share some of their unique knowledge, they relinquish exclusive claim to benefits 
emanating from such knowledge (Gray 2001; Kankanhalli et al. 2005). Power is inherent in social 
networks and exists only in relation to others in a network – structural capital (Hanneman and 
Riddle 2005). In other words, power exists when there are others in the relationship who can be 
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dominated. Degree centrality and betweenness centrality are measures of power in a social network 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005).  In terms of cognitive capital, we focus on tenure.  
Tenure refers to the experience, skill, and expertise possessed by the individual (Wasko 
and Faraj 2005). The notion is that an individual with a longer tenure, experience, and perhaps 
more understanding of the impact of severe hacking knowledge is less likely to share higher 
severity knowledge. Past research suggests that even in the scientific research community, senior 
researchers tend to withhold knowledge (Haas and Park 2010).  
In summary, even though past research argues that loss of power enacted through actor 
centrality and tenure are barriers to knowledge sharing, we go a step deeper to explore the nature 
of withholding. First, we suggest that the extent of knowledge withholding is based on the type of 
knowledge being shared. In other words, when the type of knowledge is general in nature, it can 
be shared without the fear of losing power. However, when the type of knowledge is more unique 
or severe, the tendency to withhold (share) increases (reduces). Prior literature tells us that while 
some types of knowledge can be shared, people are not necessarily willing to share all types of 
knowledge (Constant et al. 1994). We are also aware that in the hacker community, knowledge 
that is deemed severe can sometimes be withheld from other members in order to keep that 
knowledge from “unskilled” hackers (Meyer 1989, p. 44).  
Hence, the extent to which an actor shares or withholds knowledge may depend on the type 
of knowledge shared. Second, even though previous IS research have studied the factors that 
facilitate knowledge sharing, there is a dearth of research covering knowledge withholding factors 
through social capital. Therefore, following the theoretical model proposed by Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998), we develop hypotheses to examine how hacker’s characteristics and the forms of 
social capital (cognitive, relational and structural) relate to knowledge sharing activities. We 
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incorporate simultaneous competitive and cooperative behavior into the knowledge sharing 
framework, identifying social capital factors that affect withholding behaviors in terms of severity 
of knowledge.  
 
1.4 Hypotheses Development 
1.4.1 Structural Capital 
The structural aspect of social capital deals with the pattern of relationships between the 
individuals in the network. Social capital theory suggests that network connections between 
individuals predict interaction (Wasko and Faraj 2005). In social networks, it is argued that when 
individuals regularly interact with each other, the more likely they are to share information. Social 
networks of relationships play an important role in social, economic, and political interactions and 
exchanges (Jackson 2008). It has been used to uncover the roles and significance of individuals in 
a hacker community (e.g., Lu et al. 2010). Structural capital can and is often measured by actor 
centrality and boundary span in the network. The two most widely used actor centrality metrics 
are degree centrality and betweenness centrality (Jackson 2008). 
 
1.4.1.1 Degree Centrality 
Social networks are comprised of actors and the relationships between the actors. The 
actors in this study are the individual hackers engaged in criminal activities in a forum. Actor 
centrality is used to quantify the importance of actors and indicates that the most prominent actors 
are strategically located in the social network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Actors with high 
degree centrality are known as the experts or leaders in the network. They are the individuals who 
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are “more likely to diffuse new information” (Lu et al. 2010, p. 35). In other words, hackers with 
high degree of centrality are more likely to share knowledge in the hacker forum.  
Another aspect of knowledge sharing related to the type (severity) of knowledge being 
shared is the evaluation of conditions under which hackers are unwilling to share. For example, 
knowledge deemed severe can be withheld from other members in order to keep that knowledge 
from “unskilled” hackers or enforcement agents (Meyer 1989). This is illustrated by a hacker’s 
account discouraging another hacker from sharing knowledge of a highly severe nature on an 
online forum:  
…not smart … ‘that computer’ is a system which can be quite powerful if used to its 
potential. I don't think that information on programming the switches should be released to 
anyone. Do you realize how destructive [that computer] could really be if used by someone 
who is irresponsible and intends on destroying things? Don't even think about releasing 
that file…” (Meyer 1989, p. 44).  
 
Thus, supporting the argument that although some types of knowledge can be shared, people are 
not necessarily willing to share all types of knowledge (Constant et al. 1994). A hacker with high 
degree centrality represents a leader with a large proportion of direct ties and in turn, access to a 
variety of information that can be withheld. Hence, it is possible that hackers with high degree 
centrality will choose to withhold knowledge with potentially high severity from being available 
to unskilled hackers. 
H1a: Higher degree centrality is positively associated with more knowledge sharing 
volume 
H1b: Higher degree centrality is negatively associated with higher severity of knowledge 
sharing  
 
1.4.1.2 Betweenness Centrality 
It is the extent to which an actor lies between nodes in a social network, and captures 
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information flows that occur through an individual. Betweenness centrality can represent a broker 
who passes information between actors or a gatekeeper who withholds information from passing 
between actors in a network. When it comes to knowledge sharing in terms of the volume of 
knowledge, the tendency to withhold knowledge is less present. Consequently, a hacker with high 
betweenness centrality is more likely to pass along information to others in the network, and allow 
knowledge sharing between others. However, the tendency to withhold knowledge can be 
noticeable when hackers consider the types of knowledge being shared. Indeed, individuals may 
be unwilling to share all types of knowledge (Constant et al. 1994). This is especially the case in 
environments where there is both competition and cooperation among the actors, as is the case in 
hacker communities. Thomas (2005) argues that the growth of online forums created a competition 
for social status among participants. Although hackers share knowledge in forums in a cooperative 
style, competition for status and recognition also creates incentives to withhold knowledge from 
other hackers (Décary-Hétu et al. 2012; Raymond 2000). Coopetition is common in knowledge 
sharing among competitors (Tsai 2002). Individual will cooperate in knowledge sharing for the 
collective use of shared knowledge for common interests. Whereas, they compete to use the shared 
knowledge in order to outperform others (Khanna et al. 1998; Tsai 2002).  
Betweenness centrality characterizes actors as having an advantage due to their position 
between other pairs of actors. The notion is that actors that are between other actors will exercise 
their power to broker ties between other actors. Hence, other actors will depend on the broker to 
share knowledge. Betweenness centrality has been described as a measure of communication and 
knowledge control, and an important network position that is crucial for knowledge sharing in a 
community (Trier 2008). Individuals with high betweenness centrality are known as brokers and 
gatekeepers who control the flow of knowledge between sections of the network.  This person has 
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control and competitive advantage with respect to access to different types of knowledge and in a 
position to choose whether to share the knowledge between disconnected actors (Burt 2000).  
Brokers are characterized as calculating, politically savvy (Burt 1992), and primarily seeking their 
private gain. Due to the nature of exerting both positive and negative influence, the broker is 
challenged with balancing the need to simultaneously fill different roles (Fleming and Waguespack 
2007; Podolny and Baron 1997). The different roles are the role of diffusing knowledge for the 
collective benefit and the role of withholding knowledge for private benefit and advancement. 
Brokers – individuals in a social network that connect disconnected actors – can exploit their 
network position to advance their private gain. Hence, hackers with high betweenness centrality 
will not only share knowledge for the collective benefit of others in the forum, but also withhold 
knowledge with potentially high severity for competitive advantage and private gain.  
H2a: Higher betweenness centrality is positively associated with more knowledge sharing 
volume 
H2b: Higher betweenness centrality is negatively associated with higher severity of 
knowledge sharing  
 
1.4.1.3 Boundary Span 
A simple definition of a group is the distinction between members and non-members, with 
the group existence depending on the extent to which some individuals are admitted, and others 
excluded, which allows an observer to create a boundaries around the group (Aldrich and Herker 
1977). The boundaries within a hacker forum correspond to interfaces between subforums and 
threads where each boundary is a demarcation between distinct subforums. Such that admittance 
to specific subforums are restricted to certain individuals. These boundaries in and of themselves 
could represent barriers to knowledge diffusion due to the difficulty of sharing different types of 
knowledge across boundaries (Sorenson et al. 2006). Prior to the Burt’s (1992) classic study on 
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brokering, boundary spanning literature describe boundary spanners as individuals who diffuse 
knowledge within and across networks (Allen 1977; Tushman 1977). Though measures of 
betweenness centrality (brokering) and boundary spanning empirically correlate, their concepts 
are known to differ theoretically. Individuals high in betweenness centrality (brokers) can span 
boundaries, but not all boundary spanners are brokers (Fleming and Waguespack 2007). In other 
words, an individual does not need to be a broker in order to control knowledge. A hacker with 
high boundary spanning qualities is one who can connect knowledge from one thread/subforum to 
another. Thus, as a function of their role as information processors and external representation 
(Aldrich and Herker 1977), boundary spanners can diffuse knowledge across multiple subforums.  
As part of their role in controlling the diffusion of knowledge, the boundary spanner may enact 
withholding behaviors depending on the type of knowledge. For example, a boundary spanning 
hacker presented with knowledge that is highly severe in one subforum may choose to withhold 
and not share that knowledge in another subforum. In contrast to brokers who are more calculating 
and may withhold for private gains, the literature suggests that the boundary spanners are 
“guardians who redirect crucial information” (Fleming and Waguespack 2007, p. 166), and may 
choose to withhold severe knowledge for the collective good.  
H3a: Higher boundary spanning is positively associated with more knowledge sharing 
volume 
H3b: Higher boundary spanning is negatively associated with higher severity of knowledge 
sharing  
 
1.4.2 Hacker Characteristics 
Hierarchy in hacker communities is based on knowledge and expertise, where the most 
senior members are experts or the most technically proficient (Yuwei 2005).  Hierarchy is reflected 
through a hacker’s social or expertise status (e.g., expert, intermediate, beginner etc.) in the forum.  
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Status is defined as an individual's relative position in a social system (Rindova et al. 2006; Stewart 
and Daniel 2005). Status, in this paper is based on the achievement or experience-oriented status 
that uses titles such as expert, intermediate etc., to signal competence and superiority. It is not 
related to the position of situations at particular points in time, as is the case for social media status. 
Higher status demonstrates prowess and confers many benefits. For example, hackers can use the 
recognition of a higher social status in one community to join a more established hacking group 
(Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2013). It is important for hackers to be viewed by other hackers as 
technically proficient (Andrew Watson). Hence, there is a strong desire to gain a higher social 
status in the hacker community. In hacker communities, gaining status and recognition is important 
to hackers (Jordan and Taylor 1998) and the quest for higher status has been known to motivate 
individuals to participate in knowledge sharing (Hippel and Krogh 2003). A higher status signals 
that a hacker has demonstrated proficiency.  
In addition, social exchange theory suggests that individuals interact with others based on 
their expectation of social rewards such as recognition, status, and respect (Wasko and Faraj 2005). 
The hacker culture has been described as a gift culture, where status is gained by giving away 
source code, participating in testing other hacker’s source code, and growing the group through 
questions and answers (Raymond 2001). Forum administrators are known to assign status to 
individuals based on their contributions (volume), as well as the quality and type of knowledge 
shared. Administrators could also downgrade or upgrade individuals’ status, which also acts as a 
behavioral control mechanism (Monsma et al. 2013). Hence, a hacker may share knowledge 
deemed more severe in its consequences in order to garner higher status. This is further illustrated 
by a hacker’s account: “a good hack is a bigger thrill when shared and can contribute to a hacker 
gaining status and access to more communal expertise” (Jordan and Taylor 1998, p. 764). Previous 
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research found that individual motivations such as reputation and status affect knowledge sharing 
(Wasko and Faraj 2005; Yan et al. 2016). Based on these arguments, we expect that higher status 
hackers will have more knowledge sharing posts and share knowledge with higher severity. 
H3a: Higher status is positively associated with more knowledge sharing volume 
H3b: Higher status is positively associated with higher severity of the knowledge sharing 
 
1.4.3 Cognitive Capital 
Previous studies have found that cognitive capital – measured as tenure – predicts 
knowledge sharing and contribution in a social network (e.g., Wasko and Faraj 2005). Cognitive 
capital consists of the individual’s expertise, their experience with using the expertise, and their 
mastery of the application of that expertise (Wasko and Faraj 2005). Wasko and Faraj (2005) argue 
that an individual’s cognitive capital increases over time as they interact with others and share 
knowledge and norms of the group in which they belong. They further argue that tenure in a shared 
practice serves as a measure of cognitive capital. In a hacker forum, even when a hacker is 
motivated to share knowledge, sharing is unlikely unless the hacker has the necessary cognitive 
capital. For example, a hacker who does not have expertise in malware re-engineering targeted at 
a specific software would not be able to share knowledge related in that subject matter irrespective 
of his/her structural capital, motivation, or relational capital.  Hackers with longer tenure in the 
hacker forum are more likely to better understand how to apply their expertise and the relevancy 
of their expertise. Therefore, hackers with longer tenure are better able to share knowledge with 
others. Tenure in a hacker community impacts interaction with other members because tenure 
generally amplifies an individual’s expertise (Benjamin and Hsinchun Chen 2012).  
In addition, hackers with longer tenure and more experience understand the impact of 
higher severity knowledge. Hence, it is possible that a member who has longer tenure, experience, 
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and perhaps more understanding of the impact of severe hacking knowledge is less likely to share 
higher severity knowledge; more especially when this type of knowledge is shared with the general 
hacker population in the forum. The same rationale may hold when senior level personnel, for 
example, knowingly withhold sensitive information from junior officers over concerns of leaks or 
of fear of inappropriate use. Even in the scientific community where sharing of knowledge is 
seemingly the norm – for the advancement of science – it is often common for the more senior 
researchers to withhold information from others. Hass and Park (2010) in their research regarding 
withholding in the scientific community describe such withholding tendency as -  “The PI 
[principal investigator] was afraid I’d maybe say something I shouldn’t [about details of the 
technology that might enable others to replicate it]. He asked to review the slides. He said, “Don’t 
talk too much about this—don’t give too much detail” (2010, p. 878). Hence, we posit that higher 
tenured hackers not only share more knowledge in the forum, they also withhold sharing higher 
severity knowledge.  
H4a: Longer tenure is positively associated with more knowledge sharing volume 
H4b: Longer tenure is negatively associated with higher severity of knowledge sharing  
 
1.4.4 Relational Capital  
Knowledge sharing in a network also results from the affective nature of relationships 
within a collective  (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This affective aspect, called relational capital 
exists when individuals trust others, develop an identity with the collective (Wasko and Faraj 
2005), or adhere to the norms of the group (Putnam 1995). We focus on the relational capital of 
norms of hacker communities. A norm has been described as the extent to which consensus is held 
in a social system (Coleman 1990; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). We view norms as regulated 
expectations (e.g., a rule) for members of a group (Haas and Park 2010). Norms of sharing create, 
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transform, and invoke shared interest and a commitment of a common goal. Without shared norms 
of behavior, sharing knowledge would be challenging (Coleman 1988). Norms require 
maintenance and periodic renewal in order for it to retain efficacy (Adler and Kwon 2002). In 
addition, the effectiveness of norms is often maintained through sanctions. Put together, for norms 
to be effective, there needs to be periodic exposure to the norms and a sanctioning mechanism for 
non-adherence. Effective norms in hacker communities require its members to share knowledge. 
The influence of exposure of written norms on behavior has been studied in previous research 
(Campo and Cameron 2006; Perkins and Craig 2006). Such exposure include print messages and 
emails that encourage certain behaviors. 
The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977) suggests that subjective norms 
influence behavioral intentions. For example, studies found that norms have a significant effect on 
knowledge sharing intentions (Hau and Kim 2011). Most communities share norms that guide 
what constitutes acceptable behaviors and activities. The same is true in hacker communities where 
members are exposed to written norms (i.e., written rules) that encourage members’ posting. 
Members of the hacker forum share membership norms to help new hackers learn appropriate 
behavior, and help older members teach  beginners (Raymond 2000). For example, a hacker’s 
exposure to norms of behavior in the hacker forum inform members about how many posts are 
required in order to advance in status or utilize other forum functions. The most common written 
rules appearing on posts are “please login or register to see this hidden content, you cannot view 
this content”, for which a member asks, “Why does it say [you] can not view the hidden content?” 
Another member responds, “You need more posts. Minimal amount needed to view urls and other 
content is 2.” From this account, we see both the exposure to norms and the sanctioning mechanism 
that limits the type of content one can access when norms are not followed. 
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Norms can also encourage posts that have higher severity. An example of written norms 
that may affect severity of posts is in this account, “[I] tried to pm3 you but [I] need at least 5 
posts... I can't pm you and don't want to spam few topics just to bypass the forum rules….Which 
crypters work with netwire?” In this example, the member acknowledges the norm, abides by the 
norm (i.e., posting of relevant rather than spam topics), and at the same time initiates a post that is 
potentially severe (e.g., crypters, netwire). Netwire is a remote RAT used by cybercriminals to 
remotely control computer systems (McAfee 2015). When other members respond to the question 
about ‘netwire’, they abide by the norm of posting relevant knowledge while at the same time 
posting knowledge with higher severity. Because forum norms capture the written rules of 
expected behavior, we argue that increased exposure to the norms will increase knowledge sharing 
in the forum and increase sharing of knowledge with higher severity.  
H5a: Increased exposure to hacking forum norms is positively associated with more 
knowledge sharing  
H5b: Increased exposure to hacking forum norms is positively associated with higher 
severity of knowledge sharing  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
1.5.1 Data  
In this study, we use a set of secondary archival data from a hacker forum accessed from  
hackhound.org (Samtani 2016). We obtained multiyear archival data with 4,242 messages posted 
by 794 community members in a hacker forum in the United States. Participation in hackhound.org 
is anonymous. The forum only allowed browsing of some information without registration. 
However, full participation requires users to register with the forum using a pseudonym. Since all 
                                                 
3 PM means private message 
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members of the hacker forum share similar interests, we refer to members of the forum as hackers 
(Zhang et al. 2015). The data includes messages, message postdate, threads, user status, 
pseudonyms, and user start date in the forum. The data is from October 2012 to September 2015. 
Table 1.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the archival data. Table 1.4 depicts the frequency 
of knowledge severity, which shows that knowledge related to RATs garnered the most posts 
(30%). It also shows that 57% of discussions in the forum center on antivirus software testing for 
malware evasion and malicious remote administration tools. 
Table 1.3: Hacker Forum Descriptive Statistics (Essay1) 
Hacker Forum Statistics 
Number of hackers 794 
Number of messages 4,242 
Number of Threads 697 
Average tenure (Number of weeks in forum) 513 
Span of posts (in days) 1074 periods 
 
Table 1.4: Severity of Knowledge Frequency (Essay1) 
Severity Knowledge Frequency Percent 
1 Learning 850 26.0 
2 Connectivity, server, API, IP, proxy 418 12.8 
3 Crack versions and updates  129 4.0 
4 Antivirus testing 874 26.8 
5 Remote administration tool (RAT)  993 30.4 




1.5.2.1 Dependent Variables  
We measure knowledge sharing using two variables: (1) the total number of posts by each 
hacker – PostCount, and (2) the severity of the knowledge posted – PostSeverity. For PostSeverity, 
we performed content analysis using text-mining techniques to extract topics from the message 
posts. The extracted topics are then mapped using attack topology – information scans, attack 
scans, targeted probes, and targeted attacks. Then, the extracted topics are coded based on whether 
the knowledge share related to Ransbotham and Mitra’s (2009) attack topology is severe on a scale 
of not at all severe (1) to extremely severe (5).  (See Appendix A). The text-mining tool also 
provides a text (post) to topic association. In other words, it maps each hacker’s post to an extracted 
topic. Since each topic has been given a severity score, it follows that each hacker’s post is mapped 
to a topic’s severity. Severity is rated and scored for each post using the mapping from Table 1.2. 
 
1.5.2.2 Independent Variables  
Status is derived from the member’s hierarchical status in the forum. Status usually consists 
of multiple status groups (e.g., expert, intermediate, newbie, beginner, banned). Hence, it is 
conceptualized as items on an ordinal scale (Bitektine 2011). Members may hold 2 – 3 different 
titles during their tenure in the forum. For example, a user might have had a status of ‘beginner’ at 
the start of their membership to the forum. Further posts by this same user will also have ‘expert’ 
or ‘member’ as their status, indicating that their status changes as their activities evolve in the 
forum. The status titles are coded based on expertise on a scale of 1 – 4, where 4 is the highest 
status and 1 is the lowest. The following are guidelines for coding the status. Advanced member, 
advanced, and expert titles are coded as 4. Hackers coded with this status scale act as moderators 
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of the forum and represents how much experience the user has in the forum. Intermediate member, 
intermediate and member titles are coded as 3. Hackers coded with this status scale have been 
verified and upgraded from beginner or newbie status, have provided valued knowledge to other 
members. For example, when a member receives a ‘verified’ status from a moderator, it is 
indicative of the members credibility (Radianti 2010). Newbie and beginner titles are coded as 2. 
Hackers coded with this status scale are new users in the forum and are yet to be verified. Banned, 
suspended, retarded and Ub3noob4 are coded as 1. Hackers coded with this status have either had 
some unresolved conflict with other members or failed to follow the norms and rules of the forum. 
The banned status signifies a hacker who is no longer allowed to participate (Radianti 2010).  
Degree centrality and betweenness centrality are calculated using R program and UCINET 
6 program (Borgatti et al. 2002) for the analysis of social network data. Degree centrality can be 
separately calculated and analyzed as in-degree and out-degree. In-degree is the number of ties 
received and the out-degree is the number of ties initiated by an actor. Our calculation consists of 
both in and out degree, which means the data consist of the sums of the values of the ties (in and 
out).  Boundary span is measured as the ratio of the number of unique message threads posted, 
divided by total number of posts (Johnson et al. 2015). Tenure in the forum is a proxy for 
experience. Following Wasko and Faraj  (2005), hackers tenure  is used as a measure of cognitive 
capital and is measured by the number of days in the hacker forum (Benjamin and Hsinchun Chen 
2012). Norm is a shared consensus held in the forum and is measured by the frequency of a 
hacker’s exposure to the written rules that guide acceptable behaviors.  It is a count of the total 
                                                 
4 Individuals who are inexperienced and yet not interested in learning. It is often used as an insult. Many variations 
include n00b, noob (Calka 2006). 
43 
number of times that written rules (e.g., you cannot view this content, please login or register to 
see this hidden content) are displayed on a member’s post.   
Table 1.5 summarizes the definition of each variable and Table 1.6 provides the summary 
statistics of the pooled data, depicting the within and between variations of the variables. In terms 
of betweenness, there are large variations (1488.72) over time for individual hackers and a large 
variation across individuals (319.21). Given that the within variation is larger than the between 
variation, this indicates that hacker’s brokering characteristics vary throughout. Similarly, the 
within (135.69) and between (46.42) variations in degree centrality are pronounced but less so 
than betweenness centrality. The structural capital of boundary span shows no variation over time 
for individual hackers (0) and very little variation across individuals (.24). Another variation that 
can be noticed is tenure, which has a large variation across individuals (285.62). 
Table 1.5: Variable Definitions (Essay1) 
Variable Type Description 
PostCount Count Volume of posts of each member 
PostSeverity Scale 
Severity of the knowledge posted derived from the message 
content and scaled from not severe (1) to extremely severe 
(5) 
Degree  Structural Degree centrality of a member 
Betweenness  Structural Betweenness centrality of a member  
Boundary 
spanning Structural 
Ratio of number of unique message threads posted divided 
by total number of posts 
Tenure Cognitive A proxy for experience 
Norms Relational Frequency of a hacker’s exposure to the written rules that guide acceptable behaviors 
Status Individual Member’s hierarchical status in the forum (e.g. beginner, member etc.)  
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of Within and Between Variations of Key Variables (Essay1 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PostCount 
overall 104.45 164.38 1 490 
between  23.02 1 490 
within  0 104.45 104.45 
PostSeverity 
overall 2.08 .98 0 5 
between  1.60 0 5 
within  0 2.08 2.08 
Betweenness 
overall 1286.71 2480.50 0 10765.84 
between  319.210 0 5952.22 
within  1488.72 -4515.19 6100.33 
Degree 
overall 182.22 254.65 0 1147 
between  46.42 0 680.29 
within  135.69 -407.07 648.92 
BoundarySpan 
overall .62 .21 .13 1 
between  .24 .13 1 
within  0 .62 .62 
Norm 
overall 4.66 9.05 0 29 
between  1.38 0 29 
within  0 4.66 4.66 
Status 
overall 2.75 1.08 0 4 
between  .84 0 4 
within  .20 -.95* 3.68 
Tenure 
overall 700.18 289.94 1 1073 
between  285.62 1 1073 
within  0 700.18 700.18 
Note: Observations (N) = 4,236, participants (n) = 794  
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1.6 Model and Data Analysis 
Using Stata 14.2, we regress both PostCount and PostSeverity on correlates of degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, boundary span, norm, status, and tenure. Even though it is 
possible that the independent variables used in this study are endogenous, we mainly rely on theory 
to model the variables (e.g., degree and betweenness centrality) as independent variables, and 
PostCount and PostSeverity as the dependent variables. Social capital theory suggests that social 
structure (e.g. degree centrality and betweenness centrality) facilitates actions taken by individuals 
within a structure or network (Coleman 1988, 1990; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In addition, 
previous studies using social capital theory have confirmed the relationships between structural 
capital and knowledge sharing.  For example, Wasko and Faraj (2005) found that degree centrality 
is positively associated with knowledge contribution. Other studies also note that knowledge 
transfer and sharing are facilitated by network positions and social interactions (Inkpen and Tsang 
2005; Yli-Renko et al. 2001). Nevertheless, to alleviate possible bias concerns we use multiple 
models. First, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Then, we use an instrumental variable 
approach to address potential endogeneity biases.  
Corrections are made for potential autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the data. To 
correct for heteroscedasticity,  we use White standard errors (White 1980). To control for 
autocorrelation, we use Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent estimators 
(Newey and West 1987). Furthermore, we formally assess multicollinearity by examining the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics and find that degree and betweenness centrality are both 
above 10, which is the rule of thumb for multicollinearity (Kennedy 2003). To overcome 
multicollinearity issues, we calculate centrality measures per six months (e.g. Yaraghi et al. 2015). 
This not only brought the VIFs below 10, it also increased the dynamic nature of the variables. 
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The highest VIF values for the independent variables is 3.24. The VIF values are shown in Tables 
1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10. Table 1.7 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables. The 
correlations among the variables are significant. Though some of the measures are highly 
correlated, we note that social capital measures tend to be highly related (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998).  
Table 1.7: Correlation of Key Variables  (Essay1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Betweenness 1      
(2) Degree -0.4388 1     
(3) Norm -0.3172 0.4098 1    
(4) Status -0.0265 -0.3035 -0.2590 1   
(5) Tenure 0.0789 -0.0705 -0.6170 -0.3882 1  
(6) BoundarySpan -0.2400 0.3452 -0.0348 -0.0519 -0.0610 1 
 
1.6.1 Regression Model 
We first estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. The models 
for PostCount and PostSeverity are similar except for the dependent variable names. Formally, we 
estimate the following model: 
PostCountit 
= β0 + β1. Degreeit + β2.Betweennessit + β3.Normit + β4.Statusit   
+ β5.Tenureit + β6.BoundarySpanit + εit      (M1) 
 
PostSeverityit 
= β0 + β1. Degreeit + β2.Betweennessit + β3.Normit + β4.Statusit   
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+ β5.Tenureit + β6.BoundarySpanit + εit      (M2) 
The OLS results for PostCount and PostSeverity are summarized in Tables 1.8 and 1.9, 
respectively. The OLS estimator uses both between and within variation to estimate the 
parameters. Similar to results found by Gu et al. (2012), we also find that the estimation results for 
White and Newey-West are qualitatively similar. Hence, we report only White’s estimation results. 
Appendix B shows both White and Newey-West results. The results show that PostCount and 
PostSeverity are significantly affected by degree centrality and betweenness centrality, thus, H1a, 
H1b, H2a, and H2b are supported. Boundary span is also significant in its relationships with 
PostCount and PostSeverity. Hence, H3a and H3b are supported. Status is significant in its 
relationship with PostCount; however, it is not significant with PostSeverity. Thus, H4a is 
supported whereas H4b is not. Tenure positively affects PostCount and negatively affects 
PostSeverity, supporting H5a and H5b. In addition, norm positively affects PostCount and 
PostSeverity. Thus, H6a and H6b are supported. 
Table 1.8: Result of the OLS estimation for PostCount of M1 (Essay1) 
Independent 
Variables Estimate Std. Err. t value P>|t| VIF 
Betweenness 0.0024692 0.00052 4.75 0.000 3.24 
Degree 0.2028047 0.0027029 75.03 0.000 2.43 
Norm 11.50776 0.1523463 75.54 0.000 2.33 
Status 13.46421 0.7669202 17.56 0.000 1.53 
Tenure 0.0359135 0.0019154 18.75 0.000 1.40 
BoundarySpan 7.544179 2.452652 3.08 0.002 1.12 
Observations: 4,236; Sample: 794; R-square: 0. 9146 
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Table 1.9: Results of the OLS estimation for PostSeverity of M2 (Essay1 
Independent 
Variables Estimate Std. Err. t value P > |t| VIF 
Betweenness -0.0000057 0.0000020 -2.87 0.004 3.24 
Degree -0.0002107 0.0000323 -6.52 0.000 2.43 
Norm 0.0044392 0.0010086 4.40 0.000 2.33 
Status 0.0159207 0.0177701 0.90 0.370 1.53 
Tenure -0.0004434 0.0000723 -6.13 0.000 1.40 
BoundarySpan -0.6473392 0.0942528 -6.87 0.000 1.12 
Observations: 4,236; Sample: 794; R-square: 0. 0323 
 
1.6.2 2SLS - Instrumental Variables 
Although the theoretical relationships in our model are established based on social capital 
theory (e.g. Burt 2000; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Wasko and Faraj 2005), we ensure the 
robustness of the model by accounting for endogeneity using the two stage least squares (2SLS) 
method, which implements instrumental variable estimation. To control any possible endogeneity 
between degree centrality and PostCount and PostSeverity, we conduct an instrumental variables 
(IV) analysis using ThreadStarted and ThreadCount (e.g. Gu et al. 2012). The rational for using 
these variables as instruments is as follows. In the hacker forum that we studied in this paper, 
ThreadStarted refers to whether a hacker ever started a thread (i.e. conversation). ThreadCount 
refers to how many threads a hacker started in the forum. The default behavior in a forum is to 
follow a conversation that is already started and post messages in response in the thread. However, 
starting a new thread where a hacker creates a new topic and controls the conversation can increase 
the degree centrality of the individual. Values of 1 and 0 signify a yes and no for ThreadStarted, 
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while ThreadCount is the total number of threads started.  The instrument variables meet three 
requirements. First, they are correlated with degree centrality (see Appendix C). Second, they are 
uncorrelated with the error term, meaning that they are not endogenous. Third, they are not a direct 
cause of the dependent variables (PostCount, PostSeverity). Since their relationships to the 
dependent variables and aspects of their characteristics are similar (Fleming and Waguespack 
2007; Johnson et al. 2015) in our model, we estimate using only boundary span, rather than 
boundary span and betweenness centrality. Formally, we estimate the following models for 
PostCount and Post severity: 
PostCountit 
= β0 + β1.Degreeit + β2.BoundarySpanit  
+ β3.Normit   + β4.Statusit + β5.Tenureit + εit    (M3) 
 
PostSeverityit 
= β0 + β1.Degreeit + β2.BoundarySpanit  
+ β3.Normit   + β4.Statusit + β5.Tenureit + εit    (M4) 
We formally test for endogeneity relying on Hausman (1978), which compares OLS and 
2SLS estimators. For the PostCount model, we identify and use only the ThreadStarted instrument. 
The null hypothesis that the degree centrality is exogenous, is not rejected. We do not find evidence 
of endogeneity of (Du-Wu-Hausman F (1, 4228) = .0196; p = 0.8885). We also test for weak 
instruments, which relies on F statistics for an estimate of the joint significance of the instruments 
used. The F statistics of 295 is larger than 10, which is the rule of thumb threshold  for weak 
instrument (Staiger and Stock 1997). Therefore, the instrument is not weak. For the PostSeverity 
model, we only use the ThreadCount instrument. When we test for endogeneity, we fail to reject 
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the hypothesis that degree centrality is exogenous (Du-Wu-Hausman F (1, 4228) = .23876; p = 
0.6251). The weak instruments test results in an F statistics of 137. Tables 1.10 and 1.11 report the 
results of the 2SLS estimation. The result of the 2SLS estimation supports the OLS results. 
Furthermore, we acknowledge that the R-square is low but has been deemed acceptable for such 
data (Hinz and Spann 2008). 
Table 1.10: Result of the 2SLS Estimation for PostCount of M (3) 
Independent 
Variables Estimate Std. Err. z P>|z| VIF 
Degree 0.2218746 0.0215576 10.29 0.000 1.60 
Norm 0.0351525 0.002478 14.19 0.000 1.66 
Status 13.15918 1.362766 9.66 0.000 1.53 
Tenure 11.74429 0.2492913 47.11 0.000 1.40 
BoundarySpan 10.34322 4.4646 2.32 0.021 1.11 
Observations: 4,236; Sample: 794; R-square: 0. 9142 
 
Table 1.11: Result of the 2SLS Estimation for PostSeverity of M (4) 
Independent 
Variables Estimate Std. Err. z  value P>|z| VIF 
Degree -0.0003804 0.0001784 -2.13 0.033 1.60 
Norm -0.0004326 0.0000708 -6.11 0.000 1.66 
Status 0.023356 0.0214893 1.09 0.277 1.53 
Tenure 0.0051806 0.002046 2.53 0.011 1.40 
BoundarySpan -0.6723746 0.1030009 -6.53 0.000 1.11 
Observations: 4,236; Sample: 794; R-square: 0. 0313 
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1.6.3 Robustness Checks 
We performed robustness checks to ensure confidence in our results. First, we performed 
an OLS estimation model, and then we ran a 2SLS model and got similar results. Also, after 
comparing estimates and standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using 
White (1980) and Newey-West (1987), we use White’s (see Appendix C). Overall, the robustness 
checks suggest that the findings from our data analyses are robust and hold well using different 
models and estimators. 
 
1.7 Discussion  
As hackers’ exploits continue to threaten information systems (Furnell 2003),  researchers 
call for studies examining their  behaviors (Abbasi et al. 2014; Crossler et al. 2013; Mahmood et 
al. 2010) in hopes that an understanding of their behavior will provide insights into emerging cyber 
threats (Benjamin et al. 2016).. In responding to the call, we seek to better understand hacker 
behavior by examining why they share knowledge, the types of knowledge shared, the patterns of 
knowledge sharing among hackers, and the condition under which knowledge is withheld from 
others.  
In terms of knowledge sharing volume, our findings suggest that degree centrality and 
betweenness centrality of hackers lead to increased knowledge sharing. Thus, the links between 
members of the forum spur interactions. This supports knowledge sharing literature that suggests 
structural ties lead to knowledge sharing (e.g. Wasko and Faraj 2005). Boundary spanning, another 
form of structural ties, is also found to increase knowledge sharing volume. This supports the 
literature in online social networks (e.g. Johnson et al. 2015) that suggest that because boundary 
spanners are present in multiple threads or conversations in the forum, they tend to share more 
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knowledge. In addition, we find that norms, status, and tenure lead to increased knowledge sharing 
volume.     
In terms of knowledge sharing severity, our results support our hypotheses. Degree 
centrality and betweenness centrality are significantly negative in their relationship with 
knowledge sharing severity. In addition, boundary span is also negative in its relationship with 
knowledge sharing severity. Degree centrality suggests that well-connected leaders in the forum 
might not share knowledge deemed severe in the forum. The result of the relationship between 
betweenness centrality and severe knowledge also suggests that actors in between nodes in a social 
network will enact their gatekeeper role by withholding knowledge deemed severe from passing 
through. The same is true for boundary spanners who engage in multiple conversations, they may 
also withhold knowledge from passing from one thread to another. We also found a negative 
relationship between tenure and knowledge sharing severity. This suggests that hackers who have 
stayed in the forum for a longer time and perhaps understand the impact of severe knowledge, may 
not be inclined to readily share that type of knowledge. Lastly, knowledge sharing severity is 
affected positively by status and norms. A hacker forum is an expertise-based environment where 
social status is gained based on one’s display of expertise. Given that hackers always seek 
recognition and status (Décary-Hétu et al. 2012; Raymond 2000), these relationships suggest that 
hackers have a tendency to share knowledge that is severe in nature in order to demonstrate their 
expertise.  
 
1.7.1 Research Implications 
This study makes several unique contributions to the understanding of hacker behaviors 
through social capital theory. First, contrary to most research on knowledge sharing in legitimate 
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organizations or online communities, this study contributes to research by providing a finer-
grained analysis of how deviant characters of hackers in an online hacker community interact with 
each other, and specifically, their knowledge sharing and withholding behaviors. Beyond the types 
of knowledge hackers share in the hacker communities, we also gain some understanding of the 
types of knowledge they withhold from others. From a theoretical perspective, this provides a 
balanced viewpoint of knowledge sharing in hacker communities. Second, our findings lend 
support to the oft-proposed (e.g. Burt 2000) but hardly explored link between structural ties and 
knowledge control. By extracting structural capital measures (degree centrality, betweenness 
centrality, and boundary span) and incorporating them as variables in our model, we are able to 
assess the relationships between these measures and knowledge sharing and withholding 
behaviors. In so doing, we offer a deeper understanding of knowledge withholding behaviors. For 
example, we are able to show the likelihood that leaders (degree), well-connected gatekeepers 
(betweenness), and senior hackers (tenure), will withhold highly severe hacking knowledge in a 
forum. Third, by assessing withholding behaviors using forms of social capital, we extend how 
social capital theory is used in studying knowledge contribution and exchange in IS research. 
Methodologically, this also provides an avenue for assessing knowledge sharing and withholding 
behaviors in other network structures in general. For example, the method used in this study can 
be applied in other areas to identify how and why leaders or connected members share or withhold 
knowledge in online communities. Fourth, we contribute to the literature by conceptualizing and 
categorizing severity of hacking activities, making it possible to conduct quantitative analyses. By 
elucidating the methods used in the research, we show the effectiveness of using text mining and 
social network analysis. Using similar tools, security researchers could continuously identify the 
content of interest to hackers, and benefit from gaining more understanding of the hacker culture. 
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Perhaps, this will help researchers identify real threats and provide insights to how they can be 
addressed. Lastly, by using existing classification of attack topology and severity, we contribute 
to research by not only evaluating the hackers’ information sharing behavior through the volume 
of post, but also how the content of the shared knowledge stacks up against known cyber-attacks.  
In conclusion, our main contribution to IS research is in clarifying how forms of social 
capital can lead to knowledge withholding. We found reasonable empirical support for the 
possibility of certain social capital effects explaining the distinctive nature of knowledge sharing 
and withholding behaviors. 
 
1.7.2 Managerial Implications 
Our results can inform information security managers regarding whether knowledge with 
high severity is shared in hacker forums. First, our findings provide a glimpse of the positive 
externalities of patterns of behavior that may have an overall benefit to individuals and 
organizations. For example, the results show that higher tenure and highly connected individuals 
tend to withhold highly severe knowledge. Although this behavior may be due to private good 
competitiveness, it nonetheless results in the reduction of severe knowledge in the general forum 
where nonskilled hackers - who do not fully understand its impact – can access. Second, the 
literature on knowledge sharing tells us that new discoveries and innovation emerge when 
individuals share and contribute knowledge in a group (Krogh 2009). By exploring the types of 
knowledge shared in the hacker forums, organizations and security firms might be able uncover 
innovations in security violations, trends in malware distribution, and anti-malware evading 
techniques. For example, Table 1.4 shows that 57% of discussions in the forum center on antivirus 
software testing for malware evasion and remote administration tools. Thus, the indication that 
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hackers in the forum are interested in these topics may spur or increase risk management capacity 
for security software vendors and security managers. 
Furthermore, the interest in RATs in the hacker forum should also inform security 
managers’ focus on specific security awareness training for users and detection software geared 
towards identifying and removing RAT software. Third, social capital is located in the 
relationships that actors share with others, rather than in the actors themselves. When an actor is 
removed from the network of relationships, the social capital that exists in the relationships held 
by that actor disappears. By using social capital theory and network analysis in this study of 
hackers’ forum, we identify hackers with the most social (structural) capital. Methodologically, 
this process could potentially be used to identify bad actors in criminal networks. The withdrawal 
of such actors (by law enforcement) may serve to dissolve the social capital they wield.  
 
1.7.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
This study has some limitations that create multiple opportunities for future research. First, 
since this is the first study in IS to empirically explore the relationship between structural capital, 
cognitive capital, and knowledge withholding behaviors, more research is needed to validate the 
effects. In addition, more research is warranted to identity other social capital measures associated 
with withholding behaviors. This study validates that social capital measures usually assessed in 
legitimate organizations also work in the deviant character communities such as a hacker forum – 
as far as knowledge sharing volume is concerned. Hence, it is quite possible that the factors 
affecting withholding behaviors in hacker forum may also hold in certain communities and under 
specific conditions where knowledge may be sensitive, private with severe consequences if 
exposed, confidential, or tagged with specific classifications. Second, although this research 
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contributes to our understanding of hacker behavior and provides an exploratory starting point for 
understanding the hacker knowledge sharing behaviors, it is possible that the hacker forum used 
in this study is not representative of all hacker forums. Hence, incorporating more hacker forums 
in the data analysis may improve generalizability of the findings.  Lastly, as is the case with 
archival data this research is limited to the available variables that can be assessed for a better 
understanding of the phenomena. On the other hand, using archival data perhaps gives this research 
higher generalizability due to the fact that it does not suffer from perception based survey methods.  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
In responding to the call to better understand hacker behavior, this study uses social capital 
theory, social network analysis, and data from hacker forum participants over a 3-year period to 
explore how hackers approach knowledge sharing and withholding behaviors. To investigate how 
social capital factors lead to withholding of knowledge, first, we map the content of the knowledge 
shared in the hackers forum with existing classification of attack severity. Then, we regress social 
capital factors on knowledge sharing severity. Our findings indicate that hackers share knowledge, 
but will withhold some knowledge based on its severity. As organizations express concern about 
cyber-attacks and the hackers that perpetrate these attacks, there is increased interest in gaining 
insights into hacker’s activities against which organizations can protect, or for which capacity can 
be built.  Researchers may also use the insights from this research to fine tune future information 
security research (Crossler et al. 2013). It is the hope that the implications of this research serves 




JUST HOW RISKY IS IT ANYWAY?: THE ROLE OF RISK PERCEPTION AND  
TRUST ON CLICK-THROUGH INTENTION 
2.1 Introduction 
The Internet supports different services and functionalities, and has served as a mechanism 
for the delivery of services, communication and entertainment. Many individuals and 
organizations now depend on the Internet and applications  (Keller et al. 2005; Knapp and Boulton 
2006) such as search engines for business opportunities and information gathering.  As a result, 
about 88 percent of adults in the US currently use the Internet, and spend more than 20 hours a 
week on the Internet (GO-Gulf 2015; Pew Research 2015). It is no wonder the Internet has become 
a popular attack vector for malware infections (Financial Services Rountable 2011). Attackers 
often use compromised or legitimately looking fake websites to distribute malware, making it 
difficult for users to detect (Abbasi et al. 2010). According to a recent vulnerability assessment by 
Symantec, malware was found on 1 in 566 websites (Symantec 2014). This supports the prevalence 
and elevated ranking of malware among the threats to cybersecurity: malware attacks rank highest 
(Computer Security Institute 2011). The financial impact of cybercrime is estimated at over $500 
billion worldwide each year  (Reuters 2014), and can cause business, personal and social damage 
(Dinev 2006). The impact of clicking through a link on the Internet that is malware infected can 
wreak havoc for the individual, including the stealing of private information (Dinev 2006) and 
storing surveillance software on the individuals computer in order to observe their behavior 
(Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2000).  Grazioli and Jarvenpaa (2003)  argue that deceptions on the 
Internet threatens the sustainability of e-commerce. Attackers exploit search engine sites and e-
commerce sites to distribute and spread malware. Given the consequences of clicking on a malware 
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infected link, individuals may be discouraged from clicking on legitimate links and completing e-
commerce transactions. Thus, endangering e-businesses that depend on click-through to complete 
online transactions (e.g. e-commerce, search engine results). Hence, in order to retain the Internet 
as a safe, efficient and effective platform for business transactions, it is important to understand 
how Internet users form their decisions to click-through URL links in a risky environment. Hence, 
this study addresses the research question: "given a risky Internet environment what factors shape 
the individual's decision towards clicking through links on the Internet?"  
Our interest is in understanding why individuals click-through in the presence of the risks 
involved. We do so using the e-commerce transaction context, while specifically integrating 
malware risk perception, the risk propensity of using the Internet and computers, trust, familiarity 
and self-efficacy of information security as key determinants in online transactions. Using Sitkin 
and Pablo's (1992) theoretical framework in risky decision making, we show the factors affecting 
click-through intention. We find that the individual’s intention to click-through is significantly 
affected by their risk propensity, risk perception, trust of the site, familiarity and self-efficacy of 
information security. 
The individual's interaction with Internet click-through and their perceptions around click-
through is under-developed in IS research.  Click-through is considered as both a reliable means 
for showing user preference (Joachims et al. 2005) and a behavioral response (Briggs and Hollis 
1997). With respect to a person's decision process, clicks also depict a person's relative preference 
(Joachims et al. 2005). URL click-through has been used for customer referral, decision 
judgements, marketing and advertisements (Jansen et al. 2007). A click-through represents an 
implicit feedback and indicates relevance judgements, and has been used to measure advertising 
response and to indicate individuals’ immediate interest in a brand (Briggs and Hollis 1997). Thus, 
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this study uses click-through intention to measure the individual's judgement towards a link. If 
URL links are perceived as unsafe, individuals may not click on them. This represents a huge loss 
for search engine companies (e.g. Google, Yahoo, and MSN) and e-commerce sites that depend 
on click-through for revenue (Jansen et al. 2007). Grier et al. (2010) found that 8% of 25 million 
URLs posted on Twitter point to malware sites, and suggests that about 0.13% of links on Twitter 
are clicked on; representing higher URL clicks than clicks from email spam. 
Considering the prevalence of cybersecurity threats and the risks of malware on the 
Internet, studies investigating malware risks and Internet click-through are sparse. In addition, the 
coalescing of e-commerce and security research is an important aspect that requires further 
research. This study applies risky decision making theoretical framework to understand the 
individual's click-through intention. We also examine the effects of trust and familiarity on the 
individual’s intention, in the presence of these risks.   
This study makes the following contributions to theory and practice. First, it proposes a 
research model and a set of theory-based hypotheses addressing why individuals click-through and 
what factors contribute to this behavior. Trust has been used extensively in e-commerce research 
to explain “how” and “why” individuals engage in e-commerce transactions, but has not been used 
in understanding risky decision making in the information security context. Second,  our study 
answers the critical question of how trust affects secure behavioral intentions from a cybersecurity 
standpoint (Pfleeger and Caputo 2012). It does so by integrating trust in the risk framework and 
by applying the “where” aspects of theory building (Whetten 1989). The hope is that this research 
advances information security context-related research, and increases the importance and 
specificity of trust, risk and security research. In addition, this study provides insights for 
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managerial practices that help enhance click-through of genuine and legitimate links on the 
Internet.   
The rest of the essay is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the conceptual and 
theoretical background of this research. Section 3 develops the research model and hypotheses. 
Section 4 describes the research method, measurement instruments, and data collection procedure. 
Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 then discusses the contributions, implications, limitations 
and finally the conclusion of this study.  
 
2.2 Conceptual Background 
Today, individuals' decision regarding clicking through URL links on the Internet for e-
commerce transactions (Furnell 2004), information search, downloads and social media (Grier et 
al. 2010) is characterized as risky. Click-through is a behavioral response on the web that indicates 
immediate response  (Briggs and Hollis 1997) or an action from a user (Richardson et al. 2007). 
In advertisement, click-through rate has been considered the best measure of advertising response 
on the Internet (Briggs and Hollis 1997). In terms of click-through in security,  Akhawe and Felt 
(2013) found that users click-through Google chrome’s warnings about 70% of the time and that 
users who click-through also chose to remove a default setting on their computers. Thus, indicating 
the user’s cognitive choices. The study highlights the notion that click-through is an indication of 
individuals’ security behavior. When individuals click-through an insecure HTTP or link on a 
website, it can compromise the user’s session cookies, allowing an active attacker to hijack an 
individual’s session and steal confidential information or perpetrate other activities (Jackson & 
Barth, 2008). Most online social networks are targeted by malware where attackers have been 
known to experience higher click-through rates by luring individuals to click-through malware 
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because of the individuals’ perception of authenticity or shared content (Gao et al. 2011). In other 
words, the attacker takes advantage of the individuals’ familiarity with the content. As search 
engine advertising becomes a significant part of internet browsing (Richardson et al. 2007), the 
importance and financial implications of click-through for online advertising giants such as Google 
and MSN cannot be underestimated. To the best of our knowledge, research that empirically 
evaluates the individual’s click-through intention in an information security context is scarce. 
Hence, we believe that exploring the cognitive evaluations that individuals go through to click-
through links on the Internet is an important and meaningful research from theoretical and practical 
viewpoints, especially as it concerns information security.  
Given the rise of new technologies and mobile infrastructures, as well as the eager adoption 
and use of search tools, search volumes are expected to grow at an unprecedented scale  (Im et al. 
2016), and in turn increase click-through. Recent cybercrime activities have prompted individuals 
to consider security and privacy risks as they navigate the Internet and click-through several URLs. 
Criminals use links on e-commerce sites, even legitimate websites as attack vectors to attack 
individuals with malware, exposing individuals to credit card fraud, identity fraud, and 
unauthorized surveillance.  Individuals not only evaluate the risks in e-commerce stemming from 
product defects, defecting retailers – which have been extensively researched in prior e-commerce 
studies  (Featherman and Pavlou 2003; Kim et al. 2008; Pavlou 2003), but they also evaluate the 
risks that stem from Internet threats in e-commerce transactions, such as web-based malware, 
phishing, ransomware. In this study, risk in Internet click-through decision is defined as the extent 
to which there is uncertainty of potentially negative outcome from the decision to click-through a 
URL link in e-commerce and search engine platforms.  
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Sitkin and Pablo (1992) developed a risk decision model that has been used in many studies 
on decision making under risky situations  (e.g., Chen et al. 2011; Cho and Lee 2006; Panzano and 
Billings 1997). The model posits that risk perception and risk propensity are strong determinants 
of risky behavioral intention. Risk propensity is defined as an individual's tendency to take or avoid 
risks (Sitkin and Pablo 1992). Individuals who have a high risk taking propensity are more likely 
to make risky decisions and take risky actions. According to Sitkin and Pablo (1992), risk 
propensity is a dynamic individual characteristic – a trait, which means that a person’s risk 
propensity may change over time. Risk perception is defined as an individual’s assessment of the 
risk inherent in a certain situation (Sitkin and Pablo 1992), in terms of the degree of uncertainty. 
The impact of risk perceptions on decision makers have been known to lead to uncertainty denial, 
overstatement or underestimation of risks, or even unjustified confidence in judgements. Sitkin 
and Pablo (1992) framework also posits that risk perception has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between risk propensity and risky behavior. The framework has been used in 
organizational and individual contexts and suggests that risk averse individuals will avoid risk as 
their perception of risk rises.  
In order to explain the individual’s risky decision making in an e-commerce context, we 
extend risk framework to include trust as a determinant of click-through intention. Given that trust 
is a major determinant in an e-commerce environment and that this study intends to capture the 
individual’s behavioral intention in an e-commerce transaction context, we include trust in order 
to understand the role it plays in click-through behavior. There is established literature that 
supports and explains trust in online environments. The literature includes the dynamics of trust 
(Zahedi and Song 2008), trust and risk  (Kim et al. 2008) , trust and product uncertainty (Gefen 
and Straub 2004), and trust and its various outcomes. By including trust, we examine the role that 
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trust plays in inhibiting or encouraging risk based click-through decision. Gefen et al. (2008, p. 
280) note that “…adding a trust perspective to other management information systems (MIS) 
theories could present intriguing and interesting insights…” Hence, we contribute to the trust 
literature by integrating trust in a cybersecurity risk environment.  
 
2.3 Research Model and Hypotheses 
Drawing upon the literature of risky decision making, we propose that risk propensity is a 
determinant of click-through intention. Adopting and extending Sitkin and Pablo (1992) risk 
framework to explore the impact of risk propensity on risk perception and behavioral intention, 
we propose that trust impacts risk perception and behavioral intention. Following past research, 
we also propose familiarity as impacting both trust and intention (Gefen 2000; Van Slyke et al. 
2006). To clearly illustrate the proposed relationships, we formulate a nomological network to link 
malware risk severity as an antecedent of risk perception, and  self-efficacy of information security 
as a determinant of intention (Rhee et al. 2009) . The constructs of interest are presented in Figure 
2.1. 
2.3.1 Computer Risk Propensity 
Risk propensity has been defined as the individual’s tendency to take or avoid risks (Sitkin 
and Pablo 1992). Specific to the use of computers and the Internet, and especially with the 
proliferation of Internet and computer based crimes, Chen et al. (2011) conceptualized risk taking 
propensity that focuses on risks inherent in using the Internet and computers. The use of computers 
and Internet indicate that individuals are vulnerable to threats related to computers and information 
systems. Hence, following Chen et al. (2011) we define computer risk propensity as an individual’s 
tendency to take or avoid risks in the use of computers and the Internet. Malware infection have 
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been known to compromise the security of information systems. Security of information systems 
consists of the protection of individuals’ personal information with three goals; confidentiality, 
integrity and availability  (Smith et al. 2011). Confidentiality requires that an individual’s private 
information is restricted to only authorized users for authorized uses, integrity requires that such 
information remains unaltered, and availability requires that information is accessible to the user 
























Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model (Essay 2) 
 
Malware infection can lead to the loss of confidentiality, in which case an individual’s 
private information such as credit card numbers, passwords, social security number, and medical 
information become available to unauthorized individuals. Integrity can also be compromised such 
that an individual’s information is altered without their knowledge. Availability is affected when 
as a result of malware, the individual’s computer becomes unusable and unavailable. However, 
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given that individuals with high computer risk taking propensity are likely to engage in activities 
that are likely to encounter risks, these individuals are more likely to click-through potentially 
risky URL links when compared with individuals with low computer risk taking propensity. In this 
study, we argue that computer risk taking propensity is positively associated with an individual’s 
tendency to click-through URL links on the Internet. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1: Computer risk taking propensity positively influences click-through intention 
 
2.3.2 Malware Risk Perception 
Risk perception has been defined as a decision maker’s assessment of the risk inherent in 
a situation (Sitkin and Pablo 1992), and involves the consideration of the context (Mayer et al. 
1995). In this study, malware risk perception is defined as the individual’s assessment of the risk 
of malware. Risk perception may lead individuals to deny the outcome, overestimate or 
underestimate the risks from malware. We posit that the outcome of the perception of risk is risk 
aversion (Sitkin and Weingart 1995). According to risk theory, the presence of risks will result in 
risk-averse tendencies in individuals (Sitkin and Pablo 1992). Malware risk involves the potential 
disruption of normal operations of computers or mobile devices. Malware is often used by 
criminals to monitor or control a user’s online activities, steal personal information or access 
networks. Given that the human judgment is limited, resulting in the overestimating or 
underestimating of malware risks; a persons’ subjective perception of the risk will influence their 
behavior. Risk perception has been studied in different situations with results consistently showing 
that risk perceptions influences attitudes and behavior (Dillard et al. 2012; Janz and Becker 1984; 
Keil et al. 2000). For example, an individual who thinks her computer system is vulnerable to or 
may be under some malware attack activity may exhibit negative attitude towards malware, and 
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an aversion towards a risky behavior. Malware risk perception is expected to have a negative 
influence on behavioral intention. Risk framework posits that risk perception negatively influences 
willingness to carry out risky behavior (Sitkin and Pablo 1992), and other studies provide support 
for the relationship between risk perception and behavioral intention  (Chen et al. 2011). Hence, 
given that clicking through links is considered risky, malware risk perception is likely to negatively 
affect an individual’s intention to click-through. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2a: The higher the malware risk perception, the lower the click-through intention 
We expect that the relationship between computer risk taking propensity and click-through 
intention will be moderated by malware risk perception, making it weaker. Only when risk is 
present does risk propensity influence decision making. Therefore, when an individual does not 
perceive malware risk, the influence of risk propensity on click-through intention may be non-
existent. However, when an individual has a high perception of malware risks, then their computer 
risk propensity may influence click-through intention, making it weaker. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H2b: The positive relationship between computer risk taking propensity and click-through 
intention will be weaker with malware risk perception  
Furthermore, we argue that computer risk taking propensity impacts malware risk 
perception. An individual’s risk taking propensity may lead them to limit the links that an 
individual is willing to click-through. Additionally, their risk propensity may alert them to the risks 
inherent on the Internet or on clicking through links that may lead to undesired results. Sitkin and 
Weingart (1995) support this notion when they suggest that risk propensity can influence the 
relative salience of situational threats (e.g. cybercrime, malware infection) and that this leads to a 
biased perception of risk. For example, an individual with low computer risk taking propensity 
(i.e., risk–averse, risk avoiding), “...is more likely to attend to and weigh negative outcomes, thus 
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overestimating the probability of loss relative to the probability of gain. As a consequence, a risk-
averse decision maker tends to overestimate the level of risk inherent in a decision situation’’ 
(Sitkin and Pablo 1992, p. 19) . Conversely, individuals with high computer risk taking propensity 
(i.e., risk seeking) are more likely to give more weight to positive outcomes, and therefore 
overestimate the possibility of gains than losses (i.e., underestimate the risks of malware). Cho and 
Lee (2006) found that individuals with higher risk-taking propensity concerning investment 
decisions tend to have a lower risk perception towards stock market investments. As did Keil et 
al. (2000), in their study of software project where they found that risk-taking managers tend to 
perceive lower levels of risk than managers who are risk averse. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: The higher the individual’s computer risk taking propensity, the lower the level of 
malware risk perception 
 
2.3.3 Malware Risk Severity 
We posit that an individual’s perceived severity of malware risk determines their 
assessment of the risk. Existing evidence (e.g., Herath and Rao 2009b; Liang and Xue 2010) 
concerning the effect of severity of Internet and computer based threats (e.g. security breaches, 
malware, spyware) suggests that as the severity of risk increases, the likelihood that decision 
makers will have higher perception of risk increases correspondingly. Risk based decision 
literature also suggests that risk severity affects an individual’s assessment of risks (Fischhoff et 
al. 1978; Mitchell 1999). Prior studies in information security protective behaviors have defined 
perceived severity as the degree of harm associated with a threat (Herath and Rao 2009b), and the  
extent to which an individual perceives that negative consequences caused by a malicious 
technology will be severe (Liang and Xue 2009). In relation to sanctions, severity has been defined 
as the degree to which the sanction is perceived as harsh or problematic (Johnston et al. 2015). 
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Following prior studies, we therefore define malware risk severity as the degree of harm associated 
with malware risks  (Herath and Rao 2009b). When an individual believes that the harm associated 
with malware is insignificant, it is more likely that their perception of risk will be reduced.  
Conversely, when an individual believes the harm associated with malware is significant, their 
perception of risk increases. Workman  (2007) notes that one’s assessment of risk is based on the 
severity and cost of the damage associated with a threat. Thus, individuals who have a high 
perception of the severity of malware (e.g. loss of private information due to malware infection), 
will more likely have a high level of malware perception.  In other words, the individual sees the 
potential harm from malware risk as significant. Therefore, we hypothesize: 




Over a decade of e-commerce research in information systems  (Mayer et al. 1995; Pavlou 
and Gefen 2004; Zhou et al. 2009) identifies trust as a major determining factor in behavioral 
intentions. Trust is unquestionably an integral part of social interaction, allowing individuals to act 
under the risk of negative consequences  (Artz and Gil 2007).  However, with recent growth in 
cybercrimes, a question that must now be asked is this: how does trust affect secure behavioral 
intentions (Pfleeger and Caputo 2012)? Thus, leveraging what we know about trust and purchase 
behavior in the e-commerce environment, we explore the effect of trust in terms of secure 
behaviors.  
Trust has been defined in many ways, including the expectation that the trustee will behave 
ethically (Hosmer 1995), behave in a dependable manner, and also as a factor in the presence of 
uncertainty (Gefen 2000; Mayer et al. 1995). Trust refers to the belief or willingness to believe 
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that one can rely on the fairness, goodness, strength, and ability of another (Fukuyama 1995). Trust 
has also been described as both a complex and multi-dimensional construct with many inter-related 
aspects that include its trusting beliefs – competence, benevolence, and integrity, as well as its 
trusting intentions – the willingness to depend (Gefen 2000; McKnight et al. 2002).  McKnight et 
al. (1998) define trust as an individual’s beliefs about the extent to which a target is likely to behave 
in a way that is benevolent, competent, honest, or predictable in a situation. Building on a 
combination of earlier trust definitions and using the context of this study, we define trust in a 
website as an individual’s subjective belief about the extent to which the website is likely to behave 
in a way that is benevolent, competent, reliable or predictable in a situation.  
The willingness to depend refers to an individual’s volition to be vulnerable to another 
(McKnight et al. 2002). That is, the individual’s conscious choice to cast aside doubts and proceed 
with a relationship with another (Holmes 1991). In the context of click-through, when an 
individual is willing to depend on a website, then the individual “… is more likely to accept the 
specific vulnerabilities associated with using the site” (McKnight et al. 2002, p. 303). Hence, 
individuals assured of a website’s dependable manner will develop a reduced notion of uncertainty 
and click on links displayed on the website. An individual who has developed a higher level of 
trust in a website (e.g. Amazon.com, search engines like Google, Bing, Yahoo!), is more likely to 
click on links on the website in order to go about their business.  Based on these arguments and 
previously tested relationship between trust and intention (Kim et al. 2009; Pavlou 2003; Pavlou 
and Gefen 2004), we expect that trust in a website will influence the individuals’ intention to click-
through links on such website. Therefore, we hypothesize:    
H5: Trust positively influences intention to click-through 
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The relationship between trust and risk perceptions has been given much attention in e-
commerce and trust literature (e.g., Gefen et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2008; Pavlou 2003). The view 
from the literature suggests that decision makers in a risky situation will hedge against uncertainty 
by engaging trust. The notion is that risk perception is a situational factor that necessitates trust. 
That is, trust only arises in risky situations (Mayer et al. 1995).  Thus, an outcome of trust is the 
reduction in risk perception. When an individual trusts an online vendor or a website in which he 
or she is transacting, it is likely that the individual’s perception of malware risk is reduced. It is 
expected that individuals would rarely transact with websites/online vendors known to have 
malware infection. Hence, the trust the individual has of the website should reduce the perception 
of malware risk. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H6: Trust negatively influences malware risk perception 
 
2.3.5 Familiarity 
Familiarity has been defined as an individual’s understanding of another’s behavior based 
on prior experiences (Bhattacherjee 2002). Following this definition, we refer to familiarity as the 
individual’s understanding of the website based on the individual’s prior experience of the website. 
For example  individuals who have developed a favorable understanding of an e-commerce site 
and as a result estimated their likelihood of a desired future favorable behavior  (Bhattacherjee 
2002; Gefen 2000) will form a relationship with the site. This relationship tends to reduce the 
uncertainties the individual may have, and influence the individuals’ trust in the website. Hence, 
familiarity is an antecedent of trust (Gefen 2000). We expect that the effects of familiarity in e-
commerce context extend to information security contexts. A common notion in the proliferation 
of fake websites and phishing attempts that seek to entice individuals to divulge their private 
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information, is that these fake website are created to look very similar to the ones the individual is 
familiar (Abbasi et al. 2010; Sasse and Kirlappos 2011). When an individual is at a fake website 
that looks very similar to the one s/he had previously transacted, the individual’s familiarity may 
lead them to trust this site (even though may be fake).  
We also expect that familiarity will influence intention to click-through (Van Slyke et al. 
2006). Similar to the e-commerce context, an individual who is familiar through previous 
interactions with a website will tend to trust the site, and click through links on the website. In the 
same vein, attackers may exploit the individual’s familiarity with websites to entice click-through, 
distribute malware, and extract individuals’ private information (Sasse and Kirlappos 2011). 
Consistent with previous studies that have tested the relationship between familiarity, trust and 
intention (Bhattacherjee 2002; Gefen 2000; Van Slyke et al. 2006) we hypothesize: 
H7: Familiarity positively influences intention to click-through 
H8: Familiarity positively influences trust 
 
2.3.6 Self-Efficacy of Information Security 
Self-efficacy is a determinant of individual behavior (Bandura 1998). When an individual 
has a high level of self-efficacy, they tend to have a strong sense of their ability to perform a task. 
Derived from the general concept of self-efficacy, computer self-efficacy (CSE) refers to one’s 
efficacy beliefs involving diverse computer applications and domains. CSE is defined as an 
individual’s judgment of their capability to use a computer  (Compeau and Higgins 1995). Previous 
studies have validated its effect on many computers related behaviors (Chang et al. 2015; Hong et 
al. 2013; Venkatesh et al. 2003). Agarwal et al. (2000) and Compeau and Higgins (1995) have 
since argued for the importance of exploring specific concepts of CSE. They also argued for the 
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necessity to be more precise in the definition of the study domain. Hence, Rhee et al. (2009) 
proposed and validated the specific concepts of CSE in the domain of information security, named 
self-efficacy of information security. Self-efficacy of information security (SEIS) is defined as the 
individual’s capability to protect information and information systems from unauthorized 
disclosure, modification, loss, destruction (Rhee et al. 2009). This form of self-efficacy is 
manifested when individuals believe that they can accurately assess information security risks 
related to malware. When individuals believe in their capabilities to identify websites with 
malware, or their ability to handle issues that arise as a result of malware, it is plausible that this 
belief can influence their decision to click-through links on the website. Rhee et al. (2009) found 
that SEIS is positively related to behavioral intention. On the basis of this previously tested 
relationship, as well as other specific concepts of CSE on intention (Chang et al. 2015), we expect 
that SEIS will influence the individuals’ intention to click-through. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H9: Self-efficacy of information security positively influences intention to click-through 
 
2.4 Research Methodology 
This study employed a scenario-based survey to test our model. We developed hypothetical 
scenarios (Weber 1992) describing  shopping situations and a questionnaire based on the 
situations. See Appendix B2. Scenario-based techniques, also known as vignettes “... present 
subjects with written descriptions of realistic situations and then request responses on a number of 
rating scales that measure the dependent variables of interest” (Trevino 1992, pp. 127–128).   Other 
studies have used similar techniques to empirically test their models (Malhotra et al. 2004; Webster 
and Trevino 1995), and most especially for testing behavioral intentions in situations involving 
ethics and computer abuse (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Siponen and Vance 2010), software piracy issue 
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(Moores and Chang 2006),  privacy concern (Malhotra et al. 2004).  For example, in their study, 
Siponen and Vance (2010) used a hypothetical scenario-based survey method to ascertain the 
employee’s violation of security policy. The scenario method affords many advantages for 
research, especially research on behaviors that may be deemed undesirable. First, scenarios 
integrate specific situational facts that are important in decision making geared towards deviant 
behaviors in a manner that survey questions that do not reference situations are unable (Siponen 
and Vance 2010). Second, scenarios provide an indirect way to measure intention to perform 
behaviors that that may be unexpected or unethical, which are difficult to directly measure because 
respondents may want to respond in a socially desirable manner (Trevino 1992).  
 
2.4.1 Scenario Design 
In order to generalize our findings to many Internet environments, we developed two 
hypothetical scenarios describing different situations. Each survey includes a scenario and 
subsequent questions. In each survey, respondents are instructed to read the scenario and complete 
the questionnaire. The first scenario-based survey (A) considers Amazon.com as the source site, 
while the second scenario-based survey (B) considers a generic search engine site as a source site, 
where respondents were asked to select a search engine site of their choice. Studies have shown 
that search engines are effective at returning relevant listings for e-commerce search  (Jansen et al. 
2007). In addition, previous studies have utilized similar scenario approaches. For example, Pavlou 
(2003) designed multiple surveys with scenarios to test e-commerce adoption, where respondents 
in one group complete a survey based on Amazon.com, and another group was based on a selected 
web retailer of their choice. The rationale behind the use of different scenarios with predetermined 
and self-selected sites is to test several contextual bases in order to assess its robustness and 
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generalizability across targets (Pavlou 2003). Given that Amazon has been heavily used in several 
e-commerce studies  (e.g., Gefen 2000; Pavlou 2003),  we designed these two scenarios to access 
whether click-through intention differs on the basis of trust of the source sites and malware risk 
perception. In administrating the scenario-based survey, a survey link was made accessible to 
respondents, so that when clicked, one of the scenario-based surveys is presented to the 
respondents. The determination of which of the scenario-based surveys (A) or (B) is presented to 
the respondent was based on time of day. For example, if respondents click on the survey link in 
the morning, scenario-based survey A is presented, and if in the evening, then B is presented. 
 
2.4.2 Measurement 
All the measurement scales have been used and validated in previous research, and all 
constructs used a minimum of three measurement items. In addition, all constructs were measured 
on a 7-point Likert scale. All measurement items are included in Appendix B1. The dependent 
variable, click-through intention (INT) was measured using  five items adapted from  Davis (1989) 
and Ajzen (1991). The items assessed whether respondents intend to click-through URL links to 
websites suggested to them by the source site, and whether they would purchase from the target 
site that was suggested by the source site. The notion is that the respondent’s intention to purchase 
the item also means that the respondent will click-through in order to do so. Other items accessed 
the individual’s risk propensity (PRO), their risk perception (PER), trust (TRU) of the source site, 
perception of risk severity (SEV), familiarity (FAM), and self-efficacy of information security 
(SEIS). In addition to the items measuring the latent constructs, we captured appropriate 
demographic variables including age, gender an education level.  
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Prior studies have shown that age  (Gardner and Steinberg 2005) and gender (Jianakoplos 
and Bernasek 1998; Sunden and Surette 1998) may influence risky decision making. Therefore, in 
order to exclude the variance explained by age and gender, we control for their influence on click-
through intention. In addition, since data was collected from two different scenarios, we control 
for the influence of type of scenario. This was done following previous  information security 
studies that employed scenarios  (e.g., Vance et al. 2012b). The instrument was pretested with 
graduate business students, where students were asked to review the instrument and make 
comments about any items that seemed ambiguous or incomplete. The test revealed that questions 
related to trust of website and intention needed changes to improve clarity.   
 
2.4.3 Data Collection 
Primary data for this study was collected from students from a large university in southwest 
of the United States, through an online survey engine. Students voluntarily participated in this 
study in exchange for course credit. Since students represent a large population of the Internet 
users, who are as susceptible to potentially malicious links as any other individual using the 
Internet for searches and purchases. Their perceptions and behavioral intentions provide valuable 
insight into the research questions of this study. Data collection was done over a two-week time 
period.  
The questionnaires received 401 responses: 205 and 196 for scenarios A and B 
respectively. Fifty responses were deleted for reasons including incomplete responses and same 
answer to all questions (e.g. all 7’s).  The final sample consisted of a valid 347 responses.  The 
samples’ demographic distribution is presented in Table 2.1.  The sample depicts that a majority, 
69% of the student sample also work full time or part time while attending school.  
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Table 2.1: Demographic Distribution of the Sample (Essay 2) 





Less than 21 28.2 
21- 25 53.6 
26 - 30 9.5 
31- 35 4.6 
36 and above 4 
Highest education 
completed 
High school 73.2 
Bachelors 26.8 
Work Status 
Full time 21 
Part time 49 
Do not work 30 
 
2.5 Data Analysis and Result 
2.5.1 Measurement Model Analysis 
Using Wilks's lambda, the results of the two groups were similar and statistically 
inseparable. (T-tests reveals that there were no significant differences between the groups on any 
constructs in the model. Therefore, the data was combined for an inclusive statistical analysis. 
Partial least square (PLS), specifically SmartPLS Version 2.0 was used in this study. To investigate 
the adequacy of the measures, reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of the 
instruments were examined. Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics, while Table 2.3 shows the 
result of an exploratory factor analysis, where all loadings are larger than the suggested threshold 
of 0.70 (Chin 1998).  Table 2.4 shows that all the composite reliabilities are larger than the 
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suggested value of 0.70 and all AVE values are greater than the suggested 0.50, indicating a good 
convergent validity and measurement model.   
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (Essay 2) 
   Construct   Mean S.D. 
Intention to click-through (INT) 3.830 1.425 
Malware risk perception (PER) 4.471 1.373 
Computer risk propensity (PRO) 3.441 1.754 
Malware risk severity (SEV) 4.626 1.332 
Trust (TRU) 4.737 1.318 
Familiarity (FAM) 5.368 1.296 
Self-efficacy  (SEIS) 4.152 1.432 
Note: constructs are seven-point scales 
 
Discriminant validity is reached if AVE for each construct is greater than the variance 
shared between the construct and other constructs in the model (Chin 1998), and if the items load 
more strongly on their constructs. The values in Table 2.3 indicate that discriminant validity was 
attained. To assess the multicollinearity of the constructs, variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics 
was examined to ensure they are lower than the suggested 3.3 (Diamantopoulos 2006). The VIF 
values for four indicators of INT, which are PER, PRO, TRU, FAM, and SEIS are 1.14, 1.07, 1.3, 
1.26, and 1.12 respectively.   Hence, desired low multicollinearity was observed. 
To access the common method bias, we performed Harman's single factor test (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003). All the variables were loaded into exploratory factor analysis (EFA) without rotation. 
Evidence for common method bias exists if one factor accounts for most of the covariance in all 
factors. Since no single factor accounted for the majority of the covariance, this suggests that 
common method bias is not an issue. 
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Table 2.3: Exploratory Factor Analysis (Essay 2) 
Construct PRO INT FAM TRU SEIS SEV PER 
PRO1 .816 .103 -.050 .018 .067 .073 .052 
PRO2 .927 .016 -.029 -.017 .052 .093 .051 
PRO3 .931 .036 .004 -.037 .058 .100 .075 
PRO4 .933 .063 .010 -.039 .090 .083 .085 
PRO5 .936 .062 .028 -.019 .098 .108 .081 
PER1 .105 -.141 .040 -.113 .092 .139 .848 
PER2 .140 -.088 .078 -.098 .096 .197 .879 
PER3 .070 -.092 .061 -.023 .064 .237 .836 
SEV1 .090 -.042 .066 .015 -.010 .853 .141 
SEV2 .068 -.092 .123 .053 .029 .889 .108 
SEV3 .101 .036 .038 -.063 -.027 .888 .112 
FAM1 -.055 .044 .874 .171 .108 .093 .037 
FAM2 -.004 .135 .887 .106 .078 .076 .003 
FAM3 -.019 .018 .868 .238 .052 .111 .045 
FAM4 -.022 .057 .869 .241 .084 .068 .067 
FAM5 .066 .370 .704 .059 .063 -.064 .065 
TRU1 -.009 .254 .171 .778 .041 .020 -.083 
TRU2 -.035 .168 .199 .904 .080 -.028 -.058 
TRU3 -.018 .156 .202 .904 .118 -.043 -.058 
TRU4 -.033 .118 .218 .902 .120 -.021 -.065 
INT1 .026 .853 .171 .168 .006 .033 -.048 
INT2 .019 .870 .169 .173 .014 .041 -.068 
INT3 .067 .888 .105 .132 .071 .069 -.051 
INT4 .083 .831 .020 .102 .149 -.044 -.106 
INT5 .093 .847 .037 .109 .143 -.078 -.073 
SEIS1 .096 .134 .038 .093 .834 -.035 .004 
SEIS2 .079 .118 .037 .099 .878 -.036 .011 
SEIS3 .091 .087 .139 .058 .824 -.041 .073 
SEIS4 .059 .002 .111 .061 .811 .020 .147 
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Table 2.4: Reliability, Correlation, and Discriminant Validity of Constructs (Essay 2) 
Construct CR Alpha AVE FAM INT PER PRO SEV SEIS TRU 
FAM 0.953 0.935 0.835 0.913       
INT 0.947 0.930 0.783 0.225 0.885      
PER 0.927 0.882 0.810 0.103 -0.175 0.900     
PRO 0.965 0.955 0.850 -0.009 0.122 0.211 0.922    
SEV 0.898 0.829 0.745 0.151 0.026 0.388 0.249 0.864   
SEIS 0.903 0.865 0.700 0.192 0.198 0.150 0.186 -0.03 0.836  
TRU 0.956 0.938 0.845 0.409 0.367 -0.159 -0.035 -0.05 0.204 0.919 
Note: CR: Composite Reliability, AVE: Average Variance Extracted, Diagonal Elements (in bold font) are Square 
Root of AVE 
 
2.5.2 Structural Model Analysis 
The results of the structural model and hypotheses testing are presented in Figure 2.2 and 
Table 2.5, respectively. The hypotheses in the model are evaluated and interpreted using results 
from path coefficients, and t-values. The model explains 24 percent of the variance in click-through 
intention. The model also explains 18 and 17 percent of the variances in malware risk perception 
and trust respectively. Computer risk propensity has a significant effect on click-through intention 
(β = .14, p<0.01), thus rendering support for hypothesis 1. Malware risk perception has a negative 
and significant effect on click-through intention (β = -.23, p<0.001), therefore hypotheses 2a is 
supported. We also found that the moderating effect of malware risk perception (β = .02) between 
computer risk propensity and click-through intention was not significant. Hence, hypothesis 2b is 
unsupported. The relationship between computer risk propensity and malware risk perception is 
significant (β =.12, p<0.05), but surprisingly had an opposite effect; we found that the effect is 
positive rather than the hypothesized negative effect. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is unsupported. 
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Malware risk severity has a significant positive effect on malware risk perception (β =.35, 
p<0.001), hence hypotheses 4 is supported. Trust also has a significant effect on click-through 
intention (β = .27, p<0.001). Hence, hypotheses 5 is supported. Trust has a negative and significant 
effect on malware risk perception (β = -.14, p<0.05), therefore, hypotheses 6 is supported.  The 
relationships between familiarity (β =.19, p<0.01) and click-through intention, as well as 
familiarity (β =.42, p<0.001) and trust are positive and significant. Therefore, hypothesis 7 and 8 
are supported. We also found that self-efficacy of information security (β =.11, p<0.05) has a 
positive and significant effect on click-through intention. Hence, hypothesis 9 is supported. 
In the case of the control variables, gender (β = -.03) and age (β = .07) do not have 
significant effects on click-through intention. However, scenario type (β =-.13, p<0.01) was found 
to have a significant effect on click-through intention. 
Table 2.5: Results of Hypothesis Tests (Essay 2) 
Hypotheses Result 
HI: Computer risk propensity  click-through intention (+) Supported 
H2a: Malware risk perception  click-through intention (-) Supported 
H2b: Malware risk perception moderates the relationship between risk 
propensity and click-through intention Not Supported  
H3: Computer risk propensity  Malware risk perception (-) Not Supported (Contradicted) 
H4: Malware risk severity  Malware risk perception (+) Supported 
H5a: Trust  intention to click-through (+) Supported 
H6: Trust   Malware risk perception (-) Supported 
H7: Familiarity  click-through intention (+) Supported 
H8: Familiarity  Trust (+) Supported 


































Figure 2.2: Structural Model (Essay 2) 
Note: Model 1(combined model); * Significant at the 0.05, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 
0.001 level, ns not significant 
 
2.5.3 Multi-Group Analysis 
To test the generalizability of the model, we performed a multi-group analysis. To perform 
a multi-group analysis of the model we separated the groups based on the scenarios (Model 2: 
Amazon.com scenario and Model 3: the self-selected search engine site scenario). Since each 
group is analyzed separately from the other in the multi-group analysis, we did not control for 
scenario type. Table 2.6 displays the results between models 1, 2, 3, and the effect of the constructs 
on malware risk perception, trust, and click-through intention as the dependent variables in this 
study. Model 1 is the combined sample which holds both the Amazon.com and the search engine 
groups (n = 347). Model 2 is the Amazon scenario group only (n= 188), while model 3 is the search 
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engine scenario group (n= 159). To compare Model 2 with Model 3, the results of the structural 
model testing are depicted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.  The results show that the model 
constructs explained a slightly larger amount of variance of click-through intention for group 2 
(25%) than for group 3 (23%). In addition, there are interesting differences between the groups 
with respect to the strengths of the relationships between malware risk perception, computer risk 
propensity, and intention. For example, the strength of relationship between malware risk 
perception and intention is stronger in Model 3 than in Model 2. This means that in the search 
engine scenario, individuals expressed more perception of malware risk. Also, the strength of 
relationship between computer risk propensity and intention is stronger in Model 2 than in Model 
3. This suggests that in Model 3, the propensity for risk was not strongly considered in the 































Figure 2.3: Amazon Scenario (Essay 2) 

































Figure 2.4: Search Engine Scenario (Essay 
Note: ***p < 0.01 (|t| > 2.58), **p < 0.05 (|t| > 1.96), *p < 0.10 (|t| > 1.65) 
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Table 2.6: Summary of Data Analysis Results (Essay 2) 
 Trust Malware Risk Perception Click through-Intention 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Gender       
-0.03 -0.05 -0.02 
(0.52) (0.69) (0.30) 
Age       
0.07 0.05 0.08 
(1.51) (0.96) (1.15) 




PRO    
0.12**^ 0.16**^ 0.07^ 0.14 0.18** 0.12 
(2.14) (2.14) (0.84) (2.69) (2.31) (1.60) 
PER       
-0.23*** -0.18** -0.27*** 
(3.97) (2.26) (3.59) 
SEV    
0.35*** 0.30*** 0.38*** 
   
(5.67) (3.71) (4.03) 
TRU    
-0.14** -0.09 -0.11 0.27*** 0.27** 0.26** 
(2.41) (1.09) (1.48) (3.74) (2.59) (2.56) 
FAM 
0.42*** 0.49*** 0.30*** 
   
0.18*** 0.19** 0.19* 
(8.02) (6.73) (3.64) (3.16) (2.33) (1.96) 
SEIS       
0.11* 0.08 0.09 
(2.01) (1.01) (1.03) 
PRO *  PER       
0.01 0.03 0.04 
(0.80) (0.32) (0.44) 
Note: Each cell contains beta, and t-statistic in parentheses. ^ Opposite behavior. ***p < 0.01 (|t| > 2.58), **p < 0.05 (|t| > 1.96), *p < 0.10 (|t| > 1.65)
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2.6 Discussion  
The Internet and its functionalities such as e-commerce and search engine represent major 
access points endangered by cybersecurity threats such as malware distribution through URL links. 
Based on the results of this study, we argue that users form beliefs about websites with which they 
transact based on their individual characteristics, the social contexts and trust. Drawing from the 
literature in both risk based decision making and trust in online transactions, we argue that 
computer risk propensity, malware risk perception, trust, and familiarity are likely to create a 
significant influence. These factors are posited to not only have direct impacts but they are also 
related with each other in developing click-through intention. In addition, we argue that an 
individual’s belief in their self-efficacy of information security directly affects their intention to 
click-through in the face of risks.  Further, malware risk severity and familiarity are important 
antecedents to malware risk perception and trust, respectively.  
 
2.6.1 Findings of the Study 
Through empirical evaluation, we find support for most of the relationships on our 
proposed model. The results show that computer risk propensity is positively associated with click-
through intention, while malware risk perception reduces intention to click-through. Our study 
finds that the individual’ risk propensity influences how they make decisions regardless of how 
they perceive inherent malware risks. In other words, the direct link between risk propensity and 
click-through intention suggests that although individuals are aware of potential risks in clicking 
through links on the Internet, they still choose to accept the risk in clicking through URL links.  
Surprising, we find a contradictory relationship between malware risk propensity and 
malware risk perception. We hypothesized that risk propensity reduces risk perception. However, 
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we find the opposite relationship, where risk propensity seems to be significant in increasing risk 
perception. Keil et al. (2000) note that in conditions where individuals may have developed 
conservative and lower limits for risk perception, the result is that both individuals with high risk 
propensity and those with low risk propensity exhibit high risk perception. Another explanation 
for the contradictory result is the possibility that a high risk taking propensity may actually increase 
one’s perception of that risk. For example, an individual that exhibits high risk taking propensity 
and who performs high risk sports (e.g. bungee jumping), may have a higher perception of the 
risks involved in the sport (e.g. death, rope breakage, injury etc.); more so than an individual who 
is averse to the sport.  
We find evidence that malware risk severity significantly increases malware risk 
perception. We also find that the trust individuals have of the websites (Amazon.com and search 
engine) influences click-through intention. In addition, we find that trust also reduces the 
perception of malware risk that an individual has. This result supports previous studies in trust, 
risk and transaction intention (McKnight and Chervany 2001; Van Slyke et al. 2006). Familiarity 
was found to have a significant effect on click-through intention.  Such that individuals who are 
familiar with certain websites are more likely to click-through links on the sites. This result 
supports Gefen (2000) and Bhattacherjee (2002) who argue that familiarity  with the website is a 
key factor in not only trust but behavioral intention. In addition, we find evidence that self-efficacy 
of information security increases click-through intention.  
Our results show that malware risk perception does not mediate the relationship between 
computer risk taking propensity and click-through intention.  Thus, the effect of risk propensity on 
click-through intention is direct and not mediated by malware risk perception. This lack of 
mediation effect suggests that individuals’ risk propensity is not taken into consideration as 
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individuals contemplate click-through. An explanation for this result may be that click-through 
behavior is driven by the need or intensity with which the individual enters the e-commerce or 
information search environment (i.e., goal directed) (Venkatesh and Agarwal 2006) prompting 
individuals to take the risk. Wolfinbarger and Gilly (2001) note that when there is a goal-oriented 
need, individuals tend not to linger. Rather, they execute their online transactions (e.g. purchase) 
quickly. Although the individuals in this study were given a scenario, the scenario did include a 
task. Hence, we suspect their goal-orientation may have prompted the (effect observed) lack of 
consideration for risk propensity. In terms of the non-significant moderating effect of malware risk 
perception between computer risk propensity and click-through intention, a possible explanation 
may be that risk propensity does not depend on one’s perception of risk. Such that individuals tend 
to accept risks irrespective of their perception of risks.  
Considering the control variables, gender and age have little influence on click-through 
intention. A possible explanation is that the judgement of click-through intention in an information 
security domain is done irrespective of gender and age differences. Thus, consistent with prior 
findings suggesting that demographics variables explain a small amount of choice behavior (Gupta 
et al. 2004; Quelch and Klein 1996). However, scenario type was found to have a significant and 
negative effect on click-through intention.  
In terms of the multi-group analysis, we find key differences in the influences exerted by 
trust, malware risk perception, and computer risk propensity on click-through intention. In model 
2 (i.e., Amazon.com), trust is not significant in its relationship to malware risk perception. One 
explanation for this effect may be that individuals in the Amazon.com scenario have more trust for 
Amazon such that they do not care so much about the risk of malware while shopping at the online 
retailer. This result is consistent with suggestions that trust is only effective when there is high 
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concern over risks (Gefen et al. 2003; Mayer et al. 1995). In addition,  Zahedi and Song (2008) 
note that although trust is crucial in online transactions, its importance diminishes over time as 
people learn about those with whom they interact. Hence, the importance of trust as a key 
consideration decreases with experience, and changes over time.  
In model 3 (i.e., the self-selected search engine), the results show that trust is also not 
significant in its effect on malware risk perception. Given that individuals may have selected a 
search engine with which they have developed some level of trust, the relative concern for risk is 
diminished.  However, it is worth noting that the strength of the relationship between trust and 
malware risk perception (i.e., for reducing malware perception) is stronger in the search engine 
than in the Amazon.com scenario. The reason for this difference could be that individuals exhibit 
more trust in Amazon.com. This means that the need for trust as a risk reduction mechanism is 
less in the Amazon.com scenario, than the need in the search engine scenario.  We also found that 
the influence of computer risk propensity on click-through intention was significant in the Amazon 
scenario and was not in the search engine scenario. This result may indicate that an individual’s 
risk propensity trait is a more important factor in the Amazon scenario (i.e., more trusted), more 
so than in the search engine scenario.   
 
2.6.2 Contributions 
This study contributes to IS research, trust in online transactions, and risky decision making 
literature. First, we proposed a theoretical model by adopting and combining both risky decision 
making and trust frameworks to identify factors that affect how Internet users form their decisions 
to click-through URL links in a risky environment. Trust has been used extensively in e-commerce 
research to explain “how” and “why” individuals engage in e-commerce transactions, but has not 
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been used in understanding risky decision making in the information security context (click-
through intention). We believe this is the first of many studies to research click-through intention 
in information security (i.e., Internet and malware) and e-commerce contexts. Second, our study 
answers the critical question of how trust affects security-based behavioral intentions from 
cybersecurity and e-commerce standpoint (Pfleeger and Caputo 2012). It does so by integrating 
trust in the risk framework and by applying the “where” aspects of theory building (Whetten, 
1989). The hope is that this research advances information security context-related research, and 
increases the importance and specificity of trust, risk and security research. 
In addition, we successfully demonstrate that the expansion of the risk framework to 
include trust and familiarity was valuable in explaining the model. We also show the influence of 
self-efficacy of information security in how individuals form click-through intention. The model 
was also tested under different scenarios, such as Amazon.com and search engine. We found 
interesting differences in some aspects of the relationship in each scenario. These differences 
confirm the notion that individuals may behave differently under different situations of risk.     
Further, the findings portray the important role that risk propensity and risk perception play 
in risky decision making. The finding is a response to Keil et al. (2000), who argue for the 
development and relevance of computer risk propensity with respect to IS research. Our findings 
are also consistent with Chen et al. (2011), who find support for this relationship in an information 
security domain. Thus, confirming and highlighting the importance of risk propensity and risk 
perception to risky decision making.  
The current study identifies malware risk severity as an important antecedent of malware 
risk perception. Thus, capturing the influence of problem environment in creating the model that 
explains risky decision making. The importance of risk severity in consumer behavior literature 
90 
involving risks in online transactions has been established in prior literature (Grazioli and 
Jarvenpaa 2003). In addition, the findings provide evidence for the important role that trust and 
familiarity play in the risky decision making. Although prior literature has confirmed the 
importance of trust and familiarity in the presence of risks in e-commerce (e.g., Van Slyke et al. 
2006), few studies have integrated trust in the risky decision making framework. Several studies 
(e.g., Featherman and Pavlou 2003; Pavlou 2003) found empirical support for the influence of trust 
and familiarity in online transactions that involve risks. The current study provides empirical 
evidence for the impact of trust and familiarity on Internet related risky decision making behavior. 
Thus, adding value to both risky decision making literature and trust in online transaction 
literature, and allowing for a comprehensive model that predicts risky decision making under risk 
and trust in an information security and e-commerce context. Lastly, we demonstrate that self-
efficacy of information security influences one’s click-through intention. Individuals who believe 
in their capability to identify malware websites and solve issues that arise as a result will tend to 
click-through URL links. 
The current study also has a number of practical implications. Our findings indicate the 
significant impact of malware risk severity on risk perception. In order to continue the adoption 
and use of e-commerce and search engines for online transactions and information gathering 
respectively, the public needs to be aware of the severity of malware through campaigns and 
security, education, training and awareness (SETA) programs. Training is likely to enhance the 
skills individuals need to be able to detect and avoid threats in e-commerce and search engine 
environments. In addition, the results suggest that familiarity of the website significantly affects 
click-through intention. This indicates that individuals base their decision to click-through URL 
links on the extent that they are familiar with the website that they are currently on. Deception 
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using fake websites and fake URLs is based on making the sites/URL (DELL 2015) look as 
familiar as the original. Hence, it is essential that practitioners and website owners train users on 
how to detect fake websites and URLs that look familiar. Cybercriminals have been known to use 
familiarity and trust cultivated from previous experiences to try to scam individuals (DELL 2015). 
Hence, it is a good idea for practitioners to post information that lists known cybercrime scams 
and fake websites/URLs that look like the practitioner sites/URLs. Doing so may increase click-
through on sites, hence increasing revenues for organizations (e.g. search engines, social media 
advertisements) that depend on click-through for income. 
 
2.6.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
This paper is subject to several limitations that create opportunities for future research. 
First, as a scenario-based survey research, scenarios were presented to subjects about situations 
involving an Amazon.com and self-selected search. Future research can employ a lab experiment 
that requires subjects to complete tasks in similar environments (i.e., Amazon or search engine) 
and that manipulates trust and risk perception based on the environment. A lab experiment could 
also be used to evaluate the individual’s intention to click-through after ignoring a browser’s 
warning of the potentially harmful nature of the link. Second, another limitation is that we 
measured click-through intention in the context of only two scenarios. It is possible that click-
through intention results will be different for scenarios describing other security or e-commerce 
situations. 
Third, the data was based on university students. Though college students have experience 
using search engines for information gathering and have performed e-commerce transactions, 
future research can employ a more representative sample of users (e.g. professionals) in order to 
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increase external validity.  Furthermore, future research could include other determinants of 
malware risk perception to the study, such as previous malware experience, cultural differences, 
and malware susceptibility. In conclusion, by adopting and expanding risky decision making 





TOP MANAGERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERINSURANCE RISK MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Despite global growth in security investments, security breaches continue to pervade the 
industry and are adversely affecting organizations’ finances (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; 
Mukhopadhyay et al. 2013). Ponemon (2015) notes that the average cost of each stolen record to 
an organization is $217. Recently, organizations face the theft or compromise of millions of 
records following each security breach incident (e.g. Verizon, Equifax, Yahoo!). The cost of data 
breaches, which includes notification of individuals impacted by the breach, legal fees, regulatory 
fines, and the post breach cost of recovery can be financially damaging to organizations. As a 
result, security risk management has gained more importance for not only minimizing vulnerability 
to breaches, but also for recovering from losses and reducing post breach costs.  
Traditional approaches to security risk management in information systems (IS) literature 
mostly include three of the four methods: risk mitigation, risk acceptance, and risk avoidance, 
while risk transfer is least explored. These three approaches are aimed at deterrence, prevention, 
detection, and response (Straub and Welke 1998; Willison and Warkentin 2013). The approaches 
are implemented through technology such as intrusion detection systems and anti-virus software 
(e.g., Cavusoglu et al. 2005; Lee and Larsen 2009), security policy compliance and violation (e.g., 
Vance et al. 2012b) and procedures such as security training and awareness (D’Arcy et al. 2009; 
Posey et al. 2015). Scholars have argued that these approaches to security risks are rarely sufficient 
for providing an overall protection of IS assets (Herath and Rao 2009b; Ifinedo 2014; Vance et al. 
2012a) or for reducing the cost of a security breach. Therefore, it is imperative that organizations 
consider integrating other risk management approaches for minimizing the likelihood of 
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experiencing a successful cyber-attack and reducing the impact and cost of security breaches. 
Another dimension of security risk management that demands research emphasis is risk transfer 
through cyberinsurance. Researchers argue that an overall solution for cybersecurity must include 
cyberinsurance (Majuca et al. 2006; Siegel et al. 2002). Indeed, many government standards, 
financial, and regulatory initiatives encourage and sometimes demand the use cyberinsurance (e.g., 
NIST, Security and Exchange Commission, Department of Homeland Security, New York State 
Department of Financial Services etc.). For example, in 2011 the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) announced that public firms disclose the type of insurance used in their  
cybersecurity plans (SEC 2011). In addition, New York State Department of Financial Services in 
2014 expects banks to carry cyberinsurance policies (Lawsky 2014). 
Cyberinsurance is defined as an insurance product used to protect organizations from risks 
derived from the use of the internet and information systems (Böhme and Kataria 2006). It is the 
transfer of financial risk associated with security/data breaches to a third party (Böhme and 
Schwartz 2010). Cyberinsurance is seen as a promising security risk management approach used 
for reducing the impact and severity of damage through financial means (Siegel et al. 2002). 
Cyberinsurance provides first-party and third-party coverage which enables organizations to 
transfer their security risks to an insurance company (Zhao et al. 2013). Even though 
cyberinsurance is relatively new, it is arguably the fastest growing niche insurance in the US 
(Meland et al. 2015). There are about 50 insurance companies offering cyberinsurance in the U.S. and 
the estimate for cyber insurance is about $2.5 billion. This market estimate is projected to grow to $7.5 
billion in 2020 (Oltsik 2015).  
Information security has traditionally been considered a domain for technology teams. 
However, as more organizations fall victim to cyber-attacks and suffer the consequences of 
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customer churn, lost business, and reputation damage, business executives are beginning to pay 
more attention to security risks and its financial impact (Experian 2015). Coupled with the shifting 
of accountability in industry where top managers are under increased scrutiny for security breaches 
(Experian 2015), SEC currently requires organizations to disclose their risks of cyber-attacks, as 
well as the cost incurred to address cyber related issues. Because of their strong stakeholder 
responsibility and holistic influence on how organizations interpret and respond to events affecting 
their organizations’ strategies (Kettinger et al. 2013), we are interested in examining the top 
manager’s perspective. Specifically, this study is interested in understanding the top manager’s 
commitment towards cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. We seek to answer the 
research question: What are the salient factors that determine the top manager’s commitment 
towards the use cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy?  
Drawing from the valence framework, we propose a research model consisting of individual, 
organizational, and environmental risk factors. We postulate that top manager’s commitment 
towards cyberinsurance is influenced by their job security, perception of breach risk, financial risk, 
transaction cost, regulation oversight risk, and cyberinsurance ambiguity. We test the model 
through a survey of 151 top managers from a diverse set of organizations.  This study seeks to 
highlight the role of cyberinsurance as an information security risk management approach. 
Contributions to research include, theoretically identifying and outlining the factors that determine 
the top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance in a nomological network. For practice, 
we hope the results of the research spur organizations to consider cyberinsurance as a security risk 
management strategy. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Security Breach Cost  
Breaches have direct and indirect costs to organizations. In terms of direct costs, 
organizations are required to send notifications to affected individuals, which is expensive for most 
organizations. Researchers argue that the cost of notifying individuals is one of the main drivers 
for cyberinsurance (Marsh 2015). An indirect cost of sending notifications and disclosing the 
breach to the public has a potential for damaging to the firm’s reputation and market value 
(Acquisti et al. 2006; Ponemon 2015a). Ponemon (2015a) notes that organizations could reduce 
the per-record cost of data breaches with the adoption of cyberinsurance. The per-record savings 
is about $4.40, which for a small business could be the difference between staying in business and 
closing shop. The size of small businesses limit their exposure to fewer breached records, and 
therefore fewer individuals to notify. Nevertheless, the overall cost can be devastating. Especially 
since 72 percent of security breaches occur at small and medium-sized businesses ( Wall Street 
Journal 2012). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict the cost of security and data breaches. The figures reveal 
that healthcare industry has the highest per record costs, and that businesses suffer the most from 
lost business cost. The cost of data breaches include detection and escalation, post breach activities, 
notification, and lost business. Detection and escalation cost include forensics, assessment and 
audit activities. Notification cost include activities related to notification of individuals affected 
by the breach and fulfilling all regulatory requirements. Post breach cost include remediation 
activities, legal fees, customer service, and identity protection services. Although all of these costs 
seem to have reduced from 2008 to 2012, they are steadily increasing as of 2016, indicating that 
firms are investing heavily in these activities. Thus, firms may turn to cyberinsurance as a risk 
transfer strategy to help them defray the cost and stay in business. 
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Figure 3.1: Per-Record Cost of Breach by Industry between 2011 and 2016 (Essay 3) 
Note: 2012 data is not available (Ponemon 2015) 
 
Figure 3.2: Average Cost of Breach by Year and Cost Item (Essay 3) 
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3.2.2 Cyberinsurance Risk Management 
The use of cyberinsurance in information security risk management dates back to 
Medvinsky  et al. (1994) and Greer (2003) who proposed its use in the financial sector. Schneier 
(2001) introduced the topic in research by predicting that information security will be run by the 
insurance industry. Since then, a number of papers from both industry and research have proposed 
cyberinsurance as an effective risk management strategy. Gordon et al. (2003) compares 
cyberinsurance with other types of insurance products and notes the advantages of using 
cyberinsurance as a security risk management strategy. Supporting this notion, a demand-side 
explanation for why cyberinsurance is a cornerstone of security risk management programs is 
given (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2009). Mukhopadhyay et al. (2013) provides a decision model for 
effectively choosing  a cyberinsurance product. Researchers have also used economic models to 
examine interdependent risks between firms, proposing cyberinsurance as a possible solution 
(Böhme and Schwartz 2010; Öğüt et al. 2011).  
Zhao et al. (2013) examine risk pooling arrangements (RPA) and managed security 
services (MSS) as two alternative risk management approaches. They acknowledge the benefits of 
cyberinsurance as a complete risk transfer option used for reducing risk exposure and managing 
information security risks. In contrast with cyberinsurance, RPAs do not provide complete risk 
transfer and are primarily used in medical practices. MSSs provide complete risk transfer, 
however, only member firms are allowed to participate, which limits its availability to other firms. 
Also, regulatory restrictions in some jurisdictions do not allow mutual insurers like MSS/RPAs to 
carry certain types of insurance (Zhao et al. 2013). RPAs and MSSs are known to address 
interdependent risks that are inherent in security risks.  
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Organizations are taking a mixed approach to risk management by striking a balance 
between investing in security and accepting a level of loss (Meland et al. 2015). In addition to 
technical security, procedural security, and even self-insurance, organizations are purchasing 
cyberinsurance (Meland et al. 2015). In other words, risk transfer strategies such as cyberinsurance 
must be used in conjunction with other risk management options. In addition, cyberinsurance is 
increasingly being considered a method for incentivizing improved security decisions (Department 
of Homeland Security 2012; Naghizadeh and Liu 2016). The notion is that the requirements for 
obtaining cyberinsurance or enjoying continued coverage subjects organizations to security best 
practices such as encryption, backups, disaster recovery plans (Gordon et al. 2003; Young et al. 
2016). Regulatory and government initiatives are calling for the adoption of cyberinsurance. For 
example, in its cybersecurity framework, NIST proposes that organizations manage their risks 
using all risk management strategies, including risk transfer (NIST 2013).  
Even though the prevalence and severity of breaches have increased cyberinsurance 
awareness in industry, yet, only about one-third of businesses surveyed have adopted cyber 
insurance (Ponemon 2013). The numbers are smaller within small and medium sized 
organizations. A survey of small businesses revealed that even though 81 percent believe that 
cyberinsurance is a concern, only about 5 percent have adopted cyberinsurance (Experian 2016). 
In the UK, a report notes that only about 2 percent of large businesses in the U.K. have adopted 
cyberinsurance protection against damages related to a security and data breaches, while almost 
zero percent of small businesses  have (Reuters 2015).  
Cyberinsurance is a standalone product and not usually included in traditional insurance 
policies. Hence, most commercial insurance products exclude cyber related risks. Cyberinsurance 
includes first party and third party coverage. First party includes damages, loss, and cost associated 
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with a breach incurred by the organization e.g. data loss, hacking, denial-of-service, theft of 
intellectual property, forensic investigation. Third-party coverage includes services or damages 
associated with others e.g., public relations, breach notifications to customers, legal expenses, 
credit monitoring, fines and penalties imposed by regulatory organizations or business partners.  
 
3.2.3 The Top Manager 
A firm with Jeff Bezos as a top manager may behave differently from one with Elon Musk 
as a top manager. Top managers are better able to have an overarching assessment of the impact 
of cyber-related risk throughout the organization. Goodhue and Straub (1991) argue that an 
organizations’ security protective measures should require managerial careful attention. Studies 
(e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003) show that CEOs and other top level managers have an effect on 
their firms. Organizations consists of individuals that may account for the performance of 
organizations. Strategic management literature (e.g., Mollick 2012) suggest that the omission of 
individual factors in examining organizations has prevented a thorough understanding of the role 
individuals actually play in determining firm performance. It has been shown that top managers 
are considered to be important in determining firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; 
Hambrick et al. 1996; Mollick 2012). This literature have developed to explain risk-related 
behaviors at the individual and organizational levels. Specifically, the commitments of top 
managers are especially important because these executives have the authority necessary to 
influence actions in their firms (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; Weaver et al. 1999). For example, 
when matters of importance to firms such as firm performance and ethical standards are at stake, 
executive commitment towards such matters become imperative. SEC’s recent requirements 
demonstrates the rising importance of security risk management to firms’ financial wellbeing. In 
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light of this, we seek to understand the top manager’s commitment to cyberinsurance as a risk 
management strategy.  
 
3.3 Theoretical Background  
The valence framework is a motivational model derived primarily from the economics and 
organizational psychology literature (Goodwin 1996). The uniqueness of the expectancy-valence 
framework is that it relates a person’s action to the perceived benefits and risks of the expected 
outcome (Feather 1988).  It has been used in marketing, IS, and psychology to understand how the 
individual’s simultaneous assessment of risk and benefit affect behavior (Peter and Tarpey 1975). 
A valence has been described as a “measure of the degree to which an individual values a particular 
reward”, and involves the anticipated positive or negative affect associated with performing a 
certain action and experiencing outcomes. Transitioning from the motivational psychology of 
individuals to the behavior of top managers in corporations, we assume that the top manager’s 
expectancies and valence will manifest in how they respond to issues in the organization. The 
expectancy–valence model has also been used as a behavioral framework to study individual’s 
motivation and performance in an organizational context (Kren 1990). Expectancy has been shown 
to be a function of individual factors, situational factors such as perceived environmental 
uncertainty, and organizational factors (Desanctis 1982). The challenge, therefore for this study is 
to determine which variables are relevant for the commitment towards cyberinsurance as a risk 
management strategy.  
The valence refers to the agent’s utility function. In terms of the individual factors, the 
similarities between the agency theory and expectancy theory is perhaps why the economics and 
management literature usually used them together in behavioral models (Sloof and van Praag 
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2008). Using the valence framework (expectancy-valence) of risk and benefits perspective, we 
first identify factors and then model the relationship between the identified factors and the top 
manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. We seek to extend 
the valence framework, by examining dimensions of risk and benefit factors along the lines of 
situational relevant factors and product relevant factors. Furthermore, we categorize risks and 
benefits based on their relevance to the individual, organizational and environmental factors. The 
notion is that the examination of risks and benefits based on their relevance may further increase 
our understanding of how they influence the top manager’s decision-making (Lazarus and Smith 
1988).   Table 3.1 depicts a categorization of each factor, its description, relevance to the current 
study, and references. The individual factor refers to whether the top manager’s cyberinsurance 
decision is relevant to his/her personal well-being.  
Organizational factor refers to the top manager’s interpretations of the organizational risks 
that the organization stands to incur. We identify risks such as financial risk (situational risk) and 
transaction cost (product risk). Environmental factor refers to factors outside the individual’s or  
organization’s control that affect their decision making (Lazarus and Smith 1988). We identify 
regulation (situational risk) and cyberinsurance ambiguity (product risk). Figure 3.3 shows the 
research model. 
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Table 3.1: Categorization by Individual, Organizational, and Environmental Factors (Essay 
Category  Description Relevance Dimensions  Factors and their references 
Individual 
Refers to whether a 
decision is relevant to a 
person’s well-being or will 
affect the individual in any 
way (Lazarus and Smith 
1988). 
1. What personal factors 




• Job security (Adams et al. 
2011; Hsu et al. 2003; 
McKnight et al. 2009; Moore 
2000) 
• Manager’s tenure  and 
experience (Adams et al. 
2011) 
2. How does the 
manager’s personal 
perception of risk affect 




Breach risk perception (Herath 
and Rao 2009b; Sen and Borle 
2015; Straub and Welke 1998) 
Organizational 
Organizational sources of 
executive sense-making 
(Plambeck and Weber 
2010) 
What organizational 





Financial risk and economic loss 
(Srinidhi et al. 2015) 
Product risk 
Transaction cost (Ang and 
Straub 1998; Benaroch and Fink 
2016) 
Environmental 
Refers to whether there are 
factors outside the 
individual’s or  
organization’s control that 
affect their decision 
making (Lazarus and 
Smith 1988) 
How do environmental 




Regulation (Dinev et al. 2012; 
Miltgen and Smith 2015; Sen 
and Borle 2015) 


















Figure 3.3: Research Model (Essay 3) 
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
3.4.1 Individual Factors 
Personal meaning is a primary appraisal process that addresses how and whether a decision 
is relevant to a person’s well-being (Lazarus and Smith 1988) or whether it will affect the 
individual in any way. In other words, it addresses whether an individual has a personal stake in 
the matter at hand. The effect of personal relevance on motivation and judgement has been 
extensively studied in the literature (e.g., Ajzen and Brown 1996; Cacioppo et al. 1996). The notion 
is that when individuals identify the relevance of the decision to their person, they assess the impact 
of their decision and would more likely make a decision that protects their interest (Albarracín and 
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Kumkale 2003). Because individuals are exposed to many stimuli, it would be very difficult to 
really think about all of them. Hence, individuals will pay close attention to only decisions with 
high relevance and consequence (Cacioppo et al. 1996). According to the agency view, the interest 
of individuals and their organization is not always aligned. An individual could have future 
political ambitions and therefore want to avoid any form of personal litigation. A top manager, 
whose interest is to avoid any litigation, may perform necessary activities that limits the 
organizations exposure. The top manager’s decision is dictated by the relevance of the 
consequences of the decision to the manager. That is, if s/he makes the decision to forgo 
cyberinsurance, and a hacking event occurs, how will this affect the top manager’s personal life, 
job, reputation, ambitions? Hence, the personal relevance factor asks the question: how does 
committing to cyberinsurance affect me personally? The answer to this question depends on factors 
most important to the decision maker. One such factor job security. 
Top managers may be motivated to engage in risk management if it enhances their job 
security or performance (Adams et al. 2011; Doherty 2000).  The manager’s ability to tolerate risk 
or engage in actions to manage risk is affected by their perceptions of job security (Kwak and 
LaPlace 2005). If a top manager believes that engaging in risk management activities will provide 
job security, the likelihood increases that s/he will engage.  The impact of security breaches on the 
organization (e.g. loss of revenue, reputation damage, and financial loss) can cause major 
organizational changes that affect the top manager. Organizations have been known to demote or 
fire top managers for security breaches. For example, Target was advised to sever ties with 7 out 
of 10 directors for not managing Target’s systems to the best of their ability (Ziobro and Lublin 
2014). In 2014, Target CEO, Gregg Steinhafel resigned from all his position. Home Depot’s CEO 
Frank Blake announced his retirement as CEO shortly before the September 2014 breach.  Amy 
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Pascal, former CEO of Sony, was also fired as a direct result of the 2014 security breach (CSO 
2016). The agency-theoretic view suggests that managers are interested in investments that can 
protect the firm’s assets and therefore, protect their job and pay (Srinidhi et al. 2015). Hence, in 
order to have job security, the top manager may support risk management strategies that enhance 
his/her job security. Studies have found a relationship between one perception of job 
security/insecurity and their commitment to a course of action (Fox and Staw 1979).  Moreover, a 
recent survey shows that many (58%) IT decision-makers believe they will lose their jobs due to 
a security breach (Absolute 2015).  Job security is an internal and individual anchor and has been 
linked to long-term employment and financial security. Job security has been researched in IS as 
a determinant to  behavioral intention to leave (Hsu et al. 2003; McKnight et al. 2009). Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
H1: Job security is positively related to the top manager’s commitment towards using 
cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy 
Risk exposure and loss experience are important drivers that may affect the manager’s 
commitment towards cyberinsurance. Prior studies on insurance decisions include the 
determination of individual’s risk preference in the decision for insurance. Security breaches and 
their impact on organizations have motivated many studies in IS research. Prior studies have found 
that data breach events have a negative effect on firm’s market value and performance (Bose and 
Leung 2014; Goel and Shawky 2014; Gordon et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2013). The disclosure of 
security breaches resulted in 2.1 (Cavusoglu et al. 2004), 1.9 (Campbell et al. 2003),  0.58 (Acquisti 
et al. 2006) and 0.65 (Wattal and Telang 2004) percent loss of organizations’ market value within 
a few days of announcement. A top manager’s perception of the severity of a security breach will 
seek strategies that help his/her organization recover from such an event. 
H2: Breach risk severity is positively related to the top manager’s commitment towards 
using cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy 
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3.4.2 Organizational Factors 
McKinsey estimates that by 2020, the economic losses due to cyberattacks will reach $3 
trillion Financial losses due to cyberattacks can lead to the closure of the business (Newman and 
Stein 2013). Security breach is a major challenge to organizations, which must grapple with 
consequences that include reputation loss, financial loss and corporate liability (Bulgurcu et al. 
2010). Deloitte (2014) identified information security issues in the top three issues affecting 
organizations. It is expected that organizations and their top managers will attempt to signal to 
their stakeholders their concern about cybersecurity risk management approaches taken to address 
the issue.  Cyberinsurance is one important mechanism through which organizations can signal 
cybersecurity performance to stakeholders (e.g., consumers, investors, shareholders). Regulators 
and shareholders are concerned about the financial and economic loss that organizations incur as 
a result of cyberattacks. Indeed, the SEC currently requires organizations to disclose their risks of 
cybercrime, as well as the cost incurred to address cyber related issues.  Given that cybersecurity 
is seen as an important element of organization financial risk (Srinidhi et al. 2015), it is important 
to understand how the perception of financial risk affects risk management decision making. We 
define financial risk as the individual’s assessment of the potential for financial loss associated 
with security breaches. Because organizations face financial risks including penalties for 
compromised data, costs incur to cover post breach activities, and lost revenue, top managers in 
organization may look for strategies to help their organizations cover these costs. Insurance 
decisions are typically decisions about financial risk. Cyberinsurance is known to cover these 
costs. Hence, we expect that top managers will commit to using cyberinsurance as a risk 
management strategy. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: Financial risk perception is positively related to the top manager’s commitment towards using 
cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy 
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Transaction costs are related to the effort, time, and costs associated with searching, 
knowledge transfer, creating, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contract between a client 
and vendor (Benaroch and Fink 2016; Dhar and Balakrishnan 2006). Since cyberinsurance like 
other insurance products is a contract, transaction cost is considered a determinant of the top 
manager’s commitment toward cyberinsurance. Prior research considers transaction cost in the 
design of contracts (Benaroch and Fink 2016) for outsourcing (Ang and Straub 1998). Both ex 
ante transaction costs (e.g. negotiating) and ex post transaction costs (e.g. haggling) are combined 
to examine whether transaction cost affects cyberinsurance commitment decision. Inspired by 
transaction cost theory we examine the individual’s perception of the extra cost that their 
organization incurs in their commitment towards cyberinsurance. The ex-ante transaction cost 
starts at the pre-contract and contracting stages where the objective is for the parties to develop a 
general understanding of the requirements. These costs are searching, knowledge transfer 
(Benaroch and Fink 2016), and negotiating costs. It takes considerable time and effort to identify 
the insurance vendor, transfer and integrate knowledge between the organization and insurance 
provider, and negotiate the contract. Researchers note the significant challenge in integrating the 
different knowledge types (Tiwana 2003) during knowledge transfer (Benaroch and Fink 2016), 
drafting and negotiating a contract (Dibbern et al. 2008). Specifically, each of these processes 
involves both parties spending time with each other to understand and develop requirements for 
the target insurance product. Hence, we expect that costs related to searching for the appropriate 
insurance product, transferring knowledge transfer between parties, and negotiating the contract 
will influence top manager’s commitment toward cyberinsurance. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H4: Transaction cost is negatively related to the top manager’s commitment towards using 
cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy 
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3.4.3 Environmental Factors 
Lazarus and Smith (1988) argue that even though an important aspect of appraisal is 
personal relevance of a decision to the individual, there is also the importance of the relationship 
between the person and the environment. This concept postulates that personal meaning is 
meaningful only when considered in reference to the person and their environment. In other words, 
the appraisal must reconcile one’s personal goals with those of the organization or environment 
affecting the decision (e.g., regulation, laws, market conditions).Well-being is threatened when 
appraisal fails to consider the environmental requirements (Lazarus and Smith 1988). We examine 
here two aspects of environmental factors that prior research indicates may be relevant to decision-
making: regulatory oversight and ambiguity. 
The main purpose of regulatory oversight is to ensure that those to whom authority is 
delegated remain responsive (Ogul and Rockman 1990). Regulatory oversight can be used to 
correct market failures such as health safety and environmental risks (Collins and Urban 2014). 
An entity for regulation oversight is usually a centralized government agency that has the expertise 
to supervise regulated actions by organizations (Collins and Urban 2014). Hence, we define 
regulatory oversight as the degree to which a government body supervises and oversees firm's 
regulated actions. Previous research describes it as regulatory expectations, which is the notion is 
that regulators can decree certain rules that guide the relationship between merchants and their 
customers (Dinev et al. 2012). Where enforcement seems to deter violations and increases the 
likelihood of fines and a cycle of negative publicity (Collins and Urban 2014).   
The prevalence of cyber-attacks and security breaches gave rise to legislation that 
mandated breach disclosure in the healthcare sector (Kwon and Johnson 2014). The law requires 
businesses to disclose breaches involving individuals. The Department of Health and Human 
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Services and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are two main regulatory organizations tasked 
with issuing breach notification rules that apply to healthcare entities and the business associates, 
health information systems vendors, and other entities that provide non health related services 
(Kierkegaard 2012). Organizations subject to regulatory oversight tend to be more vigilant in the 
monitoring of internal controls (Boo and Sharma 2008). Not surprising, researchers suggest that 
mandated data breach disclosure laws increase the perception of data breach risk within heavily 
regulated industries such as financial, educational, and healthcare (Sen and Borle 2015). Because 
legislation for breach notification have prompted security investments (Kwon and Johnson 2014) 
and the transfer of notification costs to third parties via cyberinsurance (Marsh 2015), we expect 
that regulatory oversight will affect the top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H6: Regulatory oversight is positively related to the top manager’s commitment towards 
using cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy 
Ambiguity has been defined as the degree of uncertainty in the perceptions of the 
environmental state irrespective of its change over time (Carson et al. 2006). Ambiguity also refers 
to the “lack of clarity about the meaning and implications of particular events or situations” (Santos 
and Eisenhardt 2009, p. 644). Ambiguity is usually experienced in environments characterized by 
“novelty, complexity, or insolubility” (Budner, 1962, p. 30). Following Carson et al. 2006, we 
define cyberinsurance market ambiguity as the degree of uncertainty inherent in perceptions of the 
environmental state of the cyberinsurance market. Ambiguity includes several aspects, such as 
lack of information clarity, uncertainty related to the importance of environmental variables, and 
uncertainty about the next course of action and their possible impact (Daft and Macintosh 1981). 
Researchers have often referred to ambiguity as equivocality. Equivocality means a state of 
confusion, disagreements and lack of understanding, where managers may be uncertain about the 
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questions to ask (Daft et al. 1987). In terms of cyberinsurance market, top managers may be 
uncertain about the policies and the types of coverages. Especially since the cyberinsurance market 
is not yet mature and there is insufficient actuarial data available for insurers to properly insure 
against all losses (Naghizadeh and Liu 2016). Even though cyberinsurance policies are meant to 
close the gap, they lack standardized forms, content, and vocabulary (Meland et al. 2015). 
Researchers argue that the emergence of new technologies and markets increase the possibility 
that organizations will face ambiguous environments (Petkova et al. 2014; Santos and Eisenhardt 
2009). In other words, as newer technologies emerge and the risks they create evolve, the chances 
that organizations will face ambiguity in cyberinsurance coverage policies also increases.   Hence, 
understanding the role of ambiguity in the top manager’s commitment to adopt cyberinsurance is 
therefore of theoretical importance. We propose ambiguity as a barrier confronting commitment 
towards cyberinsurance. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H7: Cyberinsurance coverage ambiguity is negatively related to the top manager’s 




3.5.1.1 Dependent Variable 
Commitment to cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy is measured by asking 
participants to indicate the extent of their agreement to the questions.  We measured top manager’s 
commitment by adapting four items from Lewis et al. (2003). We changed the wording of the 
scales to reflect the top manager’s attitudes toward a strategic decision and not attitudes toward 
their organization. Thus, the adapted scales measured the extent to which the top manager is 
committed to the use of cyberinsurance to manage security risks in his/her organization. These 
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included questions about the commitment to a vision of adopting cyberinsurance, commitment to 
supporting efforts and resources for its adoption, commitment to encouraging the use of 
cyberinsurance for managing security risks, and the recognition of the importance of using 
cyberinsurance for managing security risks. The following sections include the independent 
variables and control variables used in the study.  
 
3.5.1.2 Independent Variables 
Though we made considerable effort to use previously validated measures, some of the 
constructs required new items that capture the content, context, and domain of the study.  Hence, 
we  systematically developed measures following the procedure suggested by Moore and Benbasat 
(1991). The instrument development is depicted in Appendix C1. We paid close attention to 
content validity of the instruments as we conducted a Q-Sort and a pretest of the survey instruments 
to ensure that constructs in cyberinsurance domains are covered by their items. Regulatory 
oversight is a new construct that assesses the extent to which a government agency has regulatory 
oversight over the organization’s activities. The items measure whether a government agency 
specifies objectives and criteria that govern the organizations operations (e.g. breach notifications), 
works with the organization to remedy and conform to regulatory actions, and can revoke licenses 
or certifications to continue to provide services.  The measures are constructed from regulatory 
provisions from the Office of National Coordinator for Health Information Technology and 
National Transportation Safety Board, which have regulatory oversight for health information and 
transportation regulation, respectively.  Though we adapted measures from Ashford et al. (1989) 
and McKnight et al. (2009) for job security, new measures were also developed. The measures 
include items measuring the top manager’s perception of whether cyberinsurance will protect ‘my’ 
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job, offer me continued long-term job security, control the undesirable events that might affect my 
job, and reduce negative events from affecting my job. Breach risk is measured by items adapted 
from Milne and Orbell (2000) that assess the degree to which the top manager believes that the 
consequences of the security breach would be severe to their organization. Hence, measures cover 
the domain of security breach consequences such as expenses to recover from and cover the cost 
of breach, disruption to business operations and customer loss. Financial risk measures the 
potential for financial loss associated with security breaches including notification costs, fines, lost 
revenue, reporting requirements. Measures are adapted from Featherman and Pavlou (2003) and 
Ponemon’s cost of data breach (2015b). Transaction cost is measured by items adapted from Jones 
et al. (2000) and transaction cost content (e.g. Choudhury and Sampler 1997) that covers the 
contracting and coordination costs of cyberinsurance related to the effort, time, and costs 
associated with searching, knowledge transfer, creating, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a 
cyberinsurance contract between the top manager’s organization and an insurance vendor. 
Cyberinsurance ambiguity measures the degree of uncertainty inherent in perceptions of the state 
of cyberinsurance market. Its measures are adapted from Carson et al. (2006) and captures the 
difficulty understanding the risks covered by cyberinsurance, the lack of common language in the 
meaning of cyber incidents covered, lack of clarity about the limits of coverage policies, and lack 
of clarity about the adaptation of cyberinsurance to technological changes. 
 
3.5.1.3 Control Variables 
Control variables in this study are prior knowledge of cyberinsurance, organizational 
tenure, industry, organization size (number of employees, revenue), experience in information 
security management, and experience in technology management. Organization tenure is 
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suggested to have an effect on outcomes and commitment (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990). Prior 
studies have used similar control variables, such as organization size,  and type  (Kankanhalli et 
al. 2003; Weaver et al. 1999) to  examine management commitment and support. Top management 
commitment to security risk may differ based on whether their organization is regulated (e.g. 
healthcare and finance) (see Sen and Borle 2015).  All control variables in the model are single 
item measures.   
 
3.5.2 Instrument Development 
The survey instrument was pretested with university students who were asked to comment 
on the questions, to raise concerns related to the questionnaire, and to describe any ambiguities. 
To address the concerns of content validity, earlier versions of the questionnaire were also 
pretested with five professionals familiar with cybersecurity risk and cyberinsurance. The survey 
questions were then modified according to the comments from researchers and professionals. The 
constructs are operationalized and adapted from established literature. The constructs are measured 
using seven-point Likert ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, differential 
semantics, and open-ended questions.  
 
3.5.3 Data Collection 
To test our model and hypotheses within the cyber risk management context, a cross-
sectional survey is administered to top managers in organizations to determine the predictors of 
commitment towards cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. Top managers in 
organizations were targeted for answering our survey because we framed our research to 
understand the factors that facilitate their commitment to cyberinsurance. Specifically, the selected 
respondents were executive-level managers and the ones who are most likely to be aware of the 
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strategic positioning of cyberinsurance to their organization. This follows the key informant 
approach, where the individual within the organization who is most knowledgeable about the 
aspects of the topic is selected (Sabherwal and Chan 2001, Wall et al. 2004). Moreover, as security 
risks ascend in its level of importance to organizations (Kappelman et al. 2017), top managers of 
firms are increasingly expected to understand the management of such risks (Experian 2014). Only 
participants who indicated that they make insurance purchase decisions were included in the data 
analysis.  The population of interest includes top-level directors or officers such as the Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, or an individual 
designated as a risk manager. Participants were recruited through a Qualtrics Panels, a service that 
attempts to match researchers in need of samples with individuals willing to complete surveys. It 
has a database of voluntarily registered survey participants. Empirical studies using data collected 
from Qualtrics have appeared in IS journals (e.g. Wang et al. 2017; Warkentin et al. 2017). We 
solicited 151 respondents to participate via a paid Qualtrics panel of CEOs in the United States. 
To decrease respondent concerns about social desirability and reporting their behavior, 
respondents were told: “there are no right or wrong answers, please answer questions as honestly 
as possible. Further, all responses are anonymous, will be aggregated, analyzed and reported 
without linking them to any single company or individual.” 




















10,000 or more 2.6 
5,000 - 9,999 9.3 
1,500 - 4,499 4.6 
500 - 1,499 10.6 
100 - 449 21.2 
50 - 99 12.6 
10 to 49 39.1 
Total 100.0 
Revenue (U.S. Dollars) 
$5 Billion or More 2.0 
$1 Billion – Under $5 Billion 8.6 
$250 Million – Under $1 Billion 4.6 
$100 Million – Under $250 Million 4.0 
$50 Million – Under $100 Million 6.0 
$15 Million – Under $50 Million 4.0 
$10 Million – Under $15 Million 7.3 
$5 Million – Under $10 Million 13.2 
$1 Million – Under $5 Million 31.8 















The survey respondents represent a broad sample in regards to the industry, employee size, 
and annual revenue (Table 3.2). 31% of the respondents indicated services as their industry, and 
17% indicated technology, while the rest belong to various areas. Respondents that indicated other 
specified tourism, nonprofit, music, agriculture, athletics, wholesale, as their industries. All the 
respondents are presidents and owners of their respective firms. 84% had knowledge of 
cyberinsurance prior to the survey, and 51% have adopted cyberinsurance.  
 
3.6 Results 
In analyzing the theoretical model, we used partial least squares (PLS) using SmartPLS 2.0 
(Ringle et al. 2005). We chose PLS rather than a covariance-based SEM technique such as AMOS 
because PLS is considered to be better suited than factor-based covariance fitting approaches when 
the primary goal is to predict, rather than to test established theory (Chin et al. 2003; Gefen et al. 
2005). Furthermore, PLS is appropriate for exploratory research (Hair Jr et al. 2016), which is 
suitable for the exploratory nature of this study. 
 
3.6.1 Measurement Model Testing 
We document the tests performed to validate our model in Appendix B2, which includes 
tests for convergent and discriminant validity and common method bias. The results of these tests 
demonstrate that our model meets or exceeds the rigorous standards expected in IS research 
(Straub et al. 2004). Since the measurement model demonstrated adequate validity, the structural 
model was evaluated next. 
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3.6.2 Structural Model Results 
In testing our structural model, we used 4,999 (Henseler et al. 2016) bootstrap iterations 
for significance testing. Specially, we used bias corrected bootstrap confidence interval. Control 
variables are examined prior to evaluating the model hypotheses. Only general experience is 
significant in its relationship to COMM, indicating that top managers’ years of experience in 
technology management may influence their COMM. The other control variables - revenue, 
employee, industry, knew, tenure - were irrelevant to COMM. All the constructs in the structural 
model is analyzed as reflective constructs.  The results of the analysis for the hypothesized 
relationships including the standardized regression weights and level of significance can be found 
in Table 3.3; Figure 3.4 provides the final model paths. The R2 value for COMM is 0.69 and 
adjusted R2 is 0.678. 
Individual, organizational, and environmental factors are associated with commitment 
towards cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. We find statistically significant relations 
between JSEC and COMM (p <0.001), supporting H1.  The individual factor of security breach 
SEV and COMM (p < 0.01) is significant, supporting H2. The organization risk factor FIN is 
significant in its relationship with COMM (p < 0.05), supporting H3. The organizational factor, 
TXNC is significantly associated with COMM (p < 0.05), supporting H4. We find that the 
environmental factor AMB is not significantly associated with COMM. Thus, H5 is not supported. 
Finally, there is a significant relationship between REG and COMM (p < 0.05). This supports H46. 
For the relationships that are significant, we assess their effect sizes. It appears that the effect sizes 
for FIN, JSEC, REG, SEV and TXNC are 0.052 0.316, 0.042, 0.069, and 0.114 respectively. 
Overall, job security has a medium high effect size (f 2 = 0.316) followed by transaction cost (f 2 = 
0.114) and they appear to be more important than the other effects.  
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Table 3.3: Path Analysis Results (Essay 3) 





JSEC  COMM 0.438 0.316 0.082 5.315 0.000 0.258 0.584 Accept 
SEV  COMM 0.214 0.069 0.080 2.680 0.007 0.062 0.372 Accept 
FIN  COMM 0.177 0.052 0.080 2.211 0.027 0.025 0.341 Accept 
TXNC  COMM -0.226 0.114 0.092 2.455 0.014 -0.365 -0.079 Accept 
AMB  COMM 0.08 0.014 0.071 1.128 0.260 -0.041 0.226 Reject 
REG  COMM 0.141 0.042 0.066 2.141 0.032 0.019 0.276 Accept 
Table Legend: COMM = Commitment towards using Cyberinsurance as a Risk Management Strategy; AMBG = 
Ambiguity of Cyberinsurance; FIN= Financial Risk; REG = Regulation Oversight Risk; TXNCN = Transaction Cost; 


















Figure 3.4: Structural Model Paths 
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3.7 Discussion  
Due to increased impact of security breaches to organizations’ financial well-being, top 
managers are increasingly held accountable for their organization’s security risk management. 
Security risk management has traditionally involved using technology, processes, and procedures 
to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to security issues. However, technology, processes, and 
procedures are not enough to help organizations deal with or recover from the effects of a breach. 
Moreover, these methods fall into only three of the four aspects of risk management: risk 
mitigation, risk avoidance, and risk acceptance.  The fourth aspect, risk transfer has received little 
attention in IS research. Hence, we explore the risk transfer aspect of risk management through 
cyberinsurance. Specifically, we investigate it through the lens of the top manager.  We seek to 
understand the top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy. 
We drew on the valence framework and argued that individual factors (i.e., job security and 
perception of breach risk severity), organizational factors (i.e., financial risk and transaction cost), 
and environmental factors (i.e., regulation oversight risk and ambiguity of cyberinsurance) will 
predict the top manager’s commitment towards using cyberinsurance as a risk management 
strategy. Our results confirm most of our predictions, and underscore the importance and the 
consideration of individual, organizational, and environmental factors in driving one’s 
commitment towards cyberinsurance. Individual factors of job security was more strongly 
associated with top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance than were organizational and 
environmental influencers.  
 
3.7.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study contributes to information security research. The work expands the valence 
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framework of benefits and risk and their influence on one’s decision, by examining dimensions of 
risk and benefit factors along the lines of situational factors and product factors. Such an approach 
explores the deeper aspects of the decision element under consideration, complements and extends 
traditional views related to decision making through valence framework lens. Whereas, traditional 
views broadly explore benefits and risks of an element under consideration, this study goes a step 
further by delineating and examined risks and benefits in terms of their situational and product 
factors.  In addition, we incorporate risk and benefit factors with relevance to the top manager 
(individual), their interpretation of organization’s risks  (organization), and their interpretation of 
factors outside the individual’s or organization’s control (environment).  We believe that this type 
of extended view provides a more comprehensive insight and evidence of the decision-making 
process. The model presented in this study complements and extends prior valence framework 
research in two ways: (1) explicitly delineates risk and benefits of top manager’s commitment to 
cyberinsurance based on situational and product aspects, and (2) goes beyond traditional 
conceptualizations of benefit and risks considerations in decision making, and examines the 
personal, organizational, and environmental relevance. Our work complements research that has 
focused on other decision outcomes such as purchase intention using a similar framework (e.g., 
Kim et al. 2009) and extends work that focuses on other approaches to security risk management 
(e.g., Zhao et al. 2013). 
Interestingly, the results of this study in terms of the individual, organizational and 
environmental factors have contributions and implications for IS research. The individual factor, 
job security significantly facilitates the top manager’s commitment towards cyberinsurance. In 
other words, the interest of the top manager to keep his/her job has the greatest impact on whether 
they commit to this risk management strategy. In terms of agency theory and expectancy theory, 
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managers are interested in investments that can protect the firm’s assets and therefore, protect their 
job and pay (Srinidhi et al. 2015). This result suggests that when considering a risk management 
strategy, top managers may be more concerned about its relevance to their continuation in their 
current position, more so than other factors. This work offers new boundary for information 
security research, highlighting the fact that just as personal relevance is important in employees’ 
motivation in pursue adaptive secure behaviors, it is pronounced in their manager’s commitment 
to the risk management approach that makes such secure behaviors possible in the first place. Thus, 
underlining the importance of understanding how and why organization leaders decide on which 
risk management approaches are use in their organizations.  
Information security research has often focused on technologies, processes, and procedures 
that deter, prevent, detect, and respond to security issues (e.g., Cavusoglu et al. 2005; Straub and 
Welke 1998; Vance et al. 2012b; Willison and Warkentin 2013). Much of this research has either 
treated information security from an employee behavior perspective (e.g., policy compliance and 
violation) or focused on few risk management approaches (e.g., risk mitigation), which does not 
provide an overall solution.  By examining the risk transfer aspect of security risk management 
using cyberinsurance, this study adds to the literature that focuses on security risk transfer 
strategies (e.g., pooling hedging, insurance).   
We examined security based decision making in terms of the top manager’s commitment 
(i.e., decision making), which is different from the employee’s security decision making 
perspective. Top managers’ commitments are important because they have the authority necessary 
to influence actions in the organization (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; Weaver et al. 1999). 
Indeed, the top manager’s commitment influences the choice of risk management strategies or 
security application that their organizations implement. Hence, not only do we add to the literature 
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on top manager’s decision making in information security domain (e.g., Lee and Larsen 2009), we 
also extend this literature by doing so in terms of a risk transfer strategy.  
 
3.7.2 Practical Implications 
Our results indicate that individual factors such as job security is most strongly linked to 
top manager’s commitment to cyberinsurance as a risk management strategy, rather than 
environmental and organizational influences. Shareholders that leverage this result to incentivize 
their organizations’ leadership towards security risk management might be more successful if more 
attention is paid to job security rather than organizational and environmental risk factors. Financial 
reporting requirements such as Securities and Exchange Commission requirement for disclosing 
cybersecurity risks and incidents, provide a strong incentive for firms to develop comprehensive 
security risk management strategies that include all dimensions (acceptance, mitigation, avoidance 
and transference) programs, so that should they get breached, they can say that they did all of the 
"right" things. 
The volatility of cyber risks and threats pose challenges to the adoption of cyberinsurance. 
This creates a problem whereby it is difficult to accurately quantify risks to adequate insurance 
premiums (Young et al. 2016). Organizations that choose a cyberinsurance insurance product may 
discover that it does not cover a new cyber security risk. Hence, organizations with this 
understanding can work with their insurers to design policies that accommodate the potential for 
such changes. It is believed that cyberinsurance can act as an incentive to increase cybersecurity 
best practices in organizations (Bolot and Lelarge 2009; Gordon et al. 2003). Insurance companies 
require that client organizations are subject to initial and periodic assessments to determine that 
minimal or certain security controls (e.g., encryption, anti-virus, backups) are in place in order to 
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be eligible for initial or continuous coverage (Majuca et al. 2006; Young et al. 2016). Insurance 
companies are known to deny cybersecurity claims when organizations renege from following 
security best practices. For example, Cottage Health System was denied insurance claim when its 
insurance company found out that the healthcare organization did not adequately perform 
encryption to protect its patients records, which was deemed a minimum required practice (Larose 
and Burke 2015).  In addition, there is a practice in the insurance industry that offers reduced 
premiums/rates in exchange for increased levels of self-protection. Home and automobile 
insurance providers may offer discounts for anti-theft and fire prevention mechanisms (e.g. smoke 
detectors, fire extinguishers, burglar alarms). Cyberinsurance carriers can promote security best 
practices by offering reduced premiums when organizations adhere to or implement security best 
practices (Gordon et al. 2011). Put together, cyberinsurance coverage requirements and discounts 
offered for self-protective measures serve to encourage continuous security best practices in 
organizations. Considering this, organizations should take advantage of cyberinsurance to 
motivate sustainable security best practices. 
Cyberinsurance is usually offered as a standalone product since traditional commercial 
insurance excludes cyber related risk from policies. Hence, organizations that depend on 
traditional lines to cover their security risks may be in for some surprises. For example, Sony’s 
insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Co had filed suit against Sony alleging that its policy 
did not cover damages due to the security breaches, but only covered tangible loses from property 
damages (McNicholas 2013). Considering that cyberinsurance covers information security risks 
such as denial-of-service attacks, extortions, malware, legal, breach notification costs, and forensic 
activities, organizations should actively adopt standalone cyberinsurance policies to protect 
against such exposure. 
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3.7.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations to the study that warrant consideration. Even though the 
survey participants (Presidents and CEOs of their respective firms) were ideal as participants for 
this research, some variance in their positions may have provided different insights. Another 
possible limitation is that respondents to this study self-reported their commitment towards 
cyberinsurance. Even though the respondents are executive level leaders in their organizations and 
were informed that there no right or wrong answers, it is possible that some concealed their true 
commitments because they wanted to be perceived as socially desirable (Trevino 1992). In this 
paper, risk perception is conceptualized as breach risk severity. Risk decision-making literature 
has argued that risk severity and risk susceptibility are important factors in determining the 
individuals risk perception. Since we did not consider these factors, future research could 
investigate how risk susceptibility influences the top manager’s commitment to cyberinsurance. 
Finally, this study focused on some individual, organizational, and environmental factors, but 
future research might investigate the impact of other organizational factors (e.g. sanctions, 
litigation, and tax benefits) and individual factors (e.g., executive litigation, good image, 
reputation).  
Building on the findings, a critical future research direction is to incorporate job security 
as a personal relevance factor in security motivation research to increase our understanding of its 
impact on employee secure behaviors. Another avenue for further research is to investigate the 
relationship between the adoption of cyberinsurance and implementation of security best practices 
in organizations. Finally, future research could examine how organization choose which risk 
management approach to engage in the organization.  
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APPENDIX A  
SUPPLEMENTAL ITEMS FOR ESSAY 1
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A.1 Severity Coding 
This paper follows for the most part, the Q-sort procedure suggested by Moore and 
Benbasat (1991). Seven students from a combined master’s and undergraduate level information 
security class judged the topics and severity placement. The judges were informed of the topic 
categories extracted through text-mining. Then, there were asked to sort the extracted topics 
according to their severity on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 being not at all severe and 5 being extremely 
severe. The scaling of severity are based on Ransbotham and Mitra (2009). To assess the reliability 
of the sorting conducted by the judges, Cohen’s kappa was referred to. A kappa score of 0.65 or 
larger is considered acceptable. The inter-rater reliability (IRR) using Cohen's kappa (Cohen 1960) 
was .80, indicating adequate agreement. Table A.1 shows the topics extracted. Table A.2 shows 
IRR statistics, computed using AgreeStat, a VBA macro program available from 
http://agreestat.com/. 
Table A.4 reports the correlations between the social capital variables. Though the network 
measures are highly correlated, we note that social capital measures tend to be highly related 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In addition, there are no collinearity issues with the independent 
variables considered for our models (highest VIF is 3.24). 
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Table A.1: Topics 
Extracted Topic Terms Docs Description Severity 
member, post, hh, forum, topic 164 402 Rules and norms 1 
hidden, login, content, register, hidden content 12 230 Rules and norms 1 
download, file, attach, kb, rar 58 336 Download links 5 
found, virus, antivirus, security, scan 118 190 Test antivirus 4 
key, value, function, char, int 232 288 Key generators 4 
crack, version, update, delphi, install 125 399 Crack software 3 
pm, jabber, price, buy, btc 127 298 Bitcoin purchase 1 
work, great, x64, test, fine 97 505 Test code 4 
server, ip, problem, proxy, check 217 410 Connectivity 1 
clean, antivirus, internet, want, result 107 120 Anti-virus test 4 
source, code, rat, sell, source code 153 454 RAT source code 5 
help, file, dll, look, exe 137 538 Connectivity 2 
code, api, help, function, vb6 190 448 Connectivity 2 
file, exe, windows, x64, section 201 505 Test code 4 
link, post, edit, download, remove 129 360 Download links 5 
learn, program, language, section, code 200 458 Programming 1 
 
Table A.2: Inter-Rater Reliability Coefficients and Associated Standard Errors 
  Conditional/Rater  Sample 
Conditional/Subject  
Sample Unconditional 
Method Estimate Std Error 95% C.I. Std Error 95% C.I. Std Error 95% C.I. 
AC1 0.809763 0.129359 (0.517 : 1) 0.01478 (0.776 : 0.843) 0.129766 (0.516 : 1) 
AC1C 0.811111 0.126652 (0.525 : 1) 0.01438 (0.779 : 0.844) N/A N/A 
Kappa 0.800799 0.127753 (0.512 : 1) 0.01730 (0.762 : 0.84) 0.128377 (0.51 : 1) 
KappaC 0.7993 0.134286 (0.496 : 1) 0.01777 (0.759 : 0.84) N/A N/A 
BP 0.808036 0.129053 (0.516 : 1) 0.01524 (0.774 : 0.843) 0.129496 (0.515 : 1) 
Conger 0.801294 0.131818 (0.503 : 1) 0.01712 (0.763 : 0.84) N/A N/A 
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Table A.3: Social Capital Factors on PostCount and PostSeverity (Whites and Newey) 


























































Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. p-value < 0:01; *** p-value < 0:001 
 
Table A.3: Correlations of Endogenous Regressors 
 DegreeCentrality ThreadCount ThreadStarted 
DegreeCentrality 1   
ThreadCount 0.3081 1  
ThreadStarted 0.4496 0.2671 1 
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Table A.4: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients 
 Betweenness  Degree Norm  Status Tenure  BoundarySpan 
Betweenness 1.0000       
Degree 0.8766*   1.0000     
Norm 0.6513*   0.6315* 1.0000     
Status 0.6216*   0.6234* 0.5579*   1.0000   
Tenure 0.4394*   0.4766* 0.4188*  0.5483* 1.0000   
BoundarySpan -0.1582*  -0.3746* -0.1507*  -0.2414* -0.1031*   1.0000 
Note: * P <0.001
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Please indicate your tendency to accept these risks in using the Internet and computers: 
Construct Measure Mean SD Source 
Computer risk 
propensity 
Your computer may be altered accidentally 3.59 1.63 
(Chen et 
al. 2011) 
Your computer may be exploited for malicious purpose (e.g. hackers 
control and use your computer for spreading worm) 3.39 1.75 
Your personal identity may be stolen (e.g. Social Security Number SSN) 3.18 1.95 
Your financial account information (e.g. account/PIN) may be stolen 3.14 1.93 
Your service account information (email account/password) may be stolen 3.25 1.92 
It is likely that I will lose sensitive information due to a malware attack 4.34 1.54 
Malware risk 
severity 
I believe that information stored on my computer is vulnerable to malware 




I believe my personal information (e.g. SSN, password, financial 
information) stored on my computer is threatened by malware attacks 4.28 1.57 
My decision to click-through to website links from [Amazon.com/ the 
source] is risky 4.09 1.57 
Malware risk 
perception 
There is a high potential for loss involved by clicking through to website 
links from [Amazon.com/ the source] 4.07 1.46 
(Chen et 
al. 2011)  Clicking through to website links will lead to considerable risks of malware 4.40 1.45 
I am familiar with searching for product information on the [Amazon.com / 
source] website 5.38 1.46 
Familiarity 
I am familiar with clicking through to product information from the 
[Amazon.com / source] website 5.22 1.46 (Gefen 
2000) (table continues) 
I am familiar with the [Amazon.com/the source]  website’s search results 5.44 1.40 
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Construct Measure Mean SD Source 
I am familiar with clicking through to websites suggested on the 
[Amazon.com/the source website] search results 5.43 1.35 
I am familiar with [Amazon.com/the source website]’s search results 5.04 1.54 
Even if not monitored, I'd trust [Amazon.com/the source website] to do the 
job right 4.80 1.48 
Trust 
I trust [Amazon.com/the source website] 5.05 1.38 
(Gefen 
2000) 
[Amazon.com / the source website] is trustworthy 5.09 1.36 
[Amazon.com / the source website] is reliable 5.19 1.29 
I intend to click-through to [websites/target website] suggested to me by 
[Amazon.com / source site] 3.81 1.62 
Intention to 
click-through 
I am likely to click-through to [websites/target website] from [Amazon.com 





I plan to click-through to website results from [Amazon.com / the source]  3.84 1.60 
I would use my credit card to purchase from the suggested [websites/target 
website] 3.82 1.74 
I am very likely to buy from the suggested [websites/target website] 3.73 1.72 





I feel confident getting rid of malware 3.71 1.79 
(Rhee et 
al. 2009) 
I feel comfortable in my abilities to identify malware files/programs that 
may be masked 4.16 1.66 
I feel confident in my abilities to identify websites that are authentic based 





Two different scenarios are used to access the behavioral intentions of individuals towards click-through over two seemly 
different sites: a highly trusted website such as Amazon.com and the subjects’ self-selected search engine site. In so doing, we access 
whether their behavioral intentions towards click-through will differ based on the trust of the sites. Thus, we measure the variations in 
the dependent variable which is a critical requirement for statistical testing of hypotheses Bhattacherjee (2002).  The questionnaires 
were mostly identical baring the difference in the source sites. The first scenario entails the explicit use of Amazon.com as the source 
site.  The second scenario is similar to the first, the difference entails a search engine site as the source site. ComputerWorld (2010) 
describes a situation similar to the search engine scenario, in which users perform a search on Google, and the search result includes 
links to malicious sites. Also, Im et al. (2016) examine the behavior of online consumers who seek “great deals” in the form of low 
prices (e.g. bargain hunters). 
 
Scenario A: Amazon.com 
Assume that you have logged into Amazon.com to find and purchase a wedding gift for a friend. You type in the name of the wedding 
gift item, and the search results are displayed. In the results you notice that the item you want is sold only by sellers linked to Amazon. 
This means that there are links on the product information indicating that you click through to the sellers’ website in order to purchase 
the product.  
 
Scenario B: Self-selected search engine site 
Assume that you performed a search on a search engine (e.g. Bing, Google, Yahoo!, Ask etc.) to find and purchase a wedding gift for 
a friend. You type in the name of the wedding gift item in a search engine, and the search results are displayed. In the results, you 
notice a link with a fairly good price. The link indicates that you click through to the seller’s website in order to purchase the product.  
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Survey Instruments and Questions 
Table C.1: Items for Constructs and CFA Factor Loadings 
  Loading STD p-value Mean STD 
Ambiguity   1–7: Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree 
AMB1  
It is difficult to understand 
what risks are being insured 
through cyberinsurance 
0.881 0.152 0.000 4.62 1.806 
AMB2  
There is often a lack of 
common language in the 
meaning of cyber incidents 
covered in cyberinsurance 
0.959 0.147 0.000 4.96 1.645 
AMB3  
There is difficulty in fully 
understanding the risk and 
appropriate cyberinsurance 
coverage 
0.93 0.133 0.000 4.91 1.675 
AMB4  
There is a lack of clarity about 
the limits of coverage on 
cyberinsurance policies 
0.932 0.131 0.000 4.94 1.690 
Commitment   1–7: Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree 
COMM
1 
I am committed to supporting  
efforts in adopting 
cyberinsurance for managing 
security risks 
0.951 0.011 0.000 5.56 1.508 
COMM
2 
I encourage the use of 
cyberinsurance for managing 
security risks 
0.934 0.015 0.000 5.56 1.436 
COMM
3 
I am committed to a vision of 
adopting cyberinsurance for 
managing security risks 
0.954 0.01 0.000 5.48 1.544 
COMM
4 
The use of cyberinsurance for 
managing security risks is 
important to our organization 
0.922 0.02 0.000 5.55 1.473 
Financial Risk  1–7: Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree  
FIN1  
Lead to a financial loss due to 
notifying affected individuals, 
public relations, fines etc. 
0.885 0.025 0.000 5.25 1.693 




  Loading STD p-value Mean STD 
FIN3  
… Lead to a financial loss due 
to reimbursing customers for 
fraudulent charges 
0.884 0.026 0.000 5.24 1.780 
FIN4  
… Expose our organization to 
suffer financial loss due to 
reporting requirements or legal 
fines 
0.869 0.025 0.000 5.09 1.803 
FIN45* … Lead to a financial loss due to lost revenue 0.821 0.051 0.000 5.55 1.522 
Job Security   1–7: Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree 
JSEC1 Cyberinsurance protection will protect my job 0.937 0.016 0.000 5.26 1.610 
JSEC2 
Cyberinsurance protection will 
help control the undesirable 
events that might affect my 
job 
0.926 0.015 0.000 5.60 1.524 
JSEC3  
Cyberinsurance protection will 
offer me continued long term 
job security 
0.952 0.012 0.000 5.26 1.636 
Regulatory Oversight Risk  1–7: Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree  
REG1  
… Defines specific 
operational activities that must 
be followed by our 
organization 
0.884 0.03 0.000 4.69 2.001 
REG2 
… Oversees and supervises 
our organization’s operations 
and actions 
0.907 0.02 0.000 4.24 2.172 
REG3 
… Specifies objectives and 
outcome criteria that governs 
our operations (e.g. data 
breach notification) 
0.945 0.011 0.000 4.44 2.045 
REG4 
… Takes action to hold our 
firm accountable for the 
performance and safety of our 
products and 
0.878 0.028 0.000 4.87 2.001 
REG5 
… Works closely with our 
firm to remedy and conform to 
regulated actions (e.g. data 
breach notification) 
0.908 0.018 0.000 4.28 2.143 
(table continues) 
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  Loading STD p-value Mean STD 
Security Breach Perception 1–7: Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree  
SEV2  
If our organization's business 
operations were to be 
disrupted from a security 
breach, it would be severe 
0.897 0.021 0.000 5.35 1.524 
SEV3  
If our organization were to 
lose customers from a security 
breach, it would be serious 
0.858 0.054 0.000 5.86 1.414 
SEV4  
If our organization were to 
cover the costs of a security 
breach incident, it would be 
significant 
0.943 0.01 0.000 5.67 1.436 
SEV5* 
If our organization's security is 
breached, it would be 
expensive to recover 
0.895 0.02 0.000 5.52 1.469 
Transaction Cost   1–7: Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree  
TXNC1 
The cost of negotiating a 
cyberinsurance contract would 
be too much 
0.894 0.215 0.000 4.13 1.812 
TXNC2 
The cost of monitoring and 
verifying the cyberinsurance 
contract details would be too 
much 
0.835 0.226 0.000 4.21 1.913 
TXNC3 
The cost of transferring 
knowledge about our 
organization's security to the 
cyberinsurance company 
would be too much 
0.76 0.255 0.003 4.13 1.812 
TXNC4 
In general, it would be a hassle 
contracting with a 
cyberinsurance company 
0.974 0.254 0.000 4.14 1.929 
 
Table C.2: Questionnaire Items for Demographics and Control 
  Mean STD 
InfoSec 
Management 
How many years experience  do you have in 
information security management? 7.91 6.23 
Technology 
management 
How many years experience do you have in 
technology management? 8.78 6.16 
Tenure How many years have you been in your current position? 10.47 7.69 
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Instrument Design and Development 
This paper follows the Q-sort procedure suggested by Moore and Benbasat (1991). Four 
Ph.D. students sorted items for the regulatory oversight risk construct. To assess the reliability of 
the sorting conducted by the judges, we referred to Cohen’s kappa was referred. A kappa score of 
0.65 or larger is considered acceptable. The inter-rater reliability (IRR) using Cohen's kappa 
(Cohen 1960) was 0.93, indicating adequate agreement. Table C.3 shows IRR statistics, computed 
using AgreeStat, a VBA macro program available from http://agreestat.com/ 
Table C.3:  Questionnaire Items for Demographics and Controls 
  Conditional/Rater Sample 
Conditional/Subject 
Sample Unconditional 
Method Estimate Std Error 95%C.I. Std Error 95% C.I. Std Error 95% C.I. 
AC1 0.933 0.0706 (0.766 : 1) 0.0679 (0.773 : 1) 0.07775 (0.75 : 1) 
AC1C 0.933 0.0669 (0.775 : 1) 0.0677 (0.773 : 1) N/A N/A 
 
 
Reliability and Validation 
Prior to examining the structural model, we evaluated general information (means, standard 
deviations, correlations, variance inflation factor, and its tolerance index) about the model (see 
Table C.4). The variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to ensure there were no issues with 
multicollinearity. The values were below the most conservation thresholds 3 (Diamantopoulos 
2006). The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.94, which is between 1.5 and 2.5 and therefore the data is 
not autocorrelated. Given that this study is an exploratory, we performed an exploratory factor 
analysis (see Table C.5). For the exploratory factor analysis, we used principal components 
analysis with varimax rotations. We removed any item with low factor loading and high cross 
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loading (Job Security). The item is noted in Appendix A with an asterisk and was deleted prior to 
performing the subsequent measurement analysis. 
We performed reliability analysis and its results are provided in Table C.6. Cronbach’s α 
for each construct are above the recommended value of .70 (Hair et al. 2006) and ranges from 
0.908 (FIN) to 0.9564 (COMM). Composite reliability ranges from 0.9246 (TXNC) to 0.9684 
(COMM). Average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct exceeds 0.50 (Chin 1998; Fornell 
and Larcker 1981), and ranges from 0.7305 (FIN) to 0.8845 (COMM), which fulfils the 
requirement for convergent validity. 
To evaluate the discriminant validity of the constructs, we followed two approaches. First, 
we used the approach recommended by Fornell and Larcker (1981). The results of the analysis is 
provided in Table C.7 and indicates that each construct’s AVE is greater than the squared 
correlation between each pair of constructs in the model. In addition, we assess discriminant 
validity using the heterotrait–monotrait ratio (HTMT) approach suggested by Henseler et al. 
(2014). There are two ways of assessing discriminant validity using the HTMT method. First, 
compare whether the HTMT value is below a recommended threshold. Second, using a confidence 
interval, we test a HTMT null hypothesis of equal to or more than 1. The results of the first test 
shows that the highest absolute value for our measures is 0.79 (see Table C.8) and satisfies a 
conservative threshold of 0.85 (Henseler et al. 2014). In the second test, all upper confidence 
intervals are below the value of 1, suggesting that the HTMT values are significantly different 
from 1 (see Table C.9 ). Therefore, we conclude that discriminant validity of the measurement 
model is achieved.  
To address potential common methods bias in the survey design, we use methodologically 
separate measures to crease a psychological separation by using different response formats such 
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as sematic differential, Likert scales, and open-ended questions. The benefit of using the different 
formats is that it tends to reduce response biases in by “eliminating the saliency of contextually 
provided cues” (Podsakoff et al. 2003, p. 888).  In addition, Podaskoff et al. (2003) note that the 
cover should inform participants that the survey is anonymous and that there are no right or wrong 
answers. Hence, respondents were informed in the cover of the anonymous nature of the survey 
and that there were no right or wrong answers. 
We assessed the extent of common methods variance (CMV) in the data using two 
methods. First, we performed Harmon’s one factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2011) by including all 
reflective items in a principal components factor analysis. The results revealed six factors with no 
single factor accounting for a majority of variance (i.e., the largest factor variance was 38.5%). 
Furthermore, researchers suggest that a factor based PLS-SEM full collinearity test  can be 
used to assess common method bias  (Kock 2015; Kock and Lynn 2012). Factor based PLS-SEM 
algorithm differs from classic PLS-SEM algorithm. Because classic PLS-SEM algorithm 
maximizes variance, it tends to minimize model collinearity. Variance maximization happens 
because classic PLS-SEM algorithm does not model measurement errors. Since factor-based PLS-
SEM incorporates measurement errors, it is less of a problem. Performing a factor based full 
collinearity test shows that the highest VIF of all latent constructs is 3.78. This is below the 
threshold of 5 (Kline 1998; Kock 2015) and suggests that CMV is not a major problem in this 
study. 
Finally, we used Stone (1974) and Geisser’s (1974) cross-validated redundancy measure 
Q², to assess the  model’s predictive relevance. The Q-squared coefficient is a nonparametric 
measure used for assessing the predictive validity related to each variable in a path model and the 
endogenous dependent variable in the path model (Kock and Gaskins 2014). Q-squared 
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coefficients that are greater than zero suggest an acceptable predictive validity in the relationship 
between the variables and the dependent variable. Our model presents acceptable predictive 
validity since the Q-squared coefficients in the model are greater is 0.565. 
Table C.4. Descriptive Statistics (n = 151) 
 COMM AMB FIN REG TXNC SEV JSEC 
COMM 1       
AMB 0.093 1      
FIN 0.598** 0.211** 1     
REG 0.485** 0.137 0.442** 1    
TXNC -0.066 0.555** 0.135 0.252** 1   
SEV 0.629** 0.243** 0.645** 0.337** 0.155 1  
JSEC 0.752** 0.068 0.486** 0.529** 0.023 0.580** 1 
Mean 5.5868 4.8874 5.3523 4.5706 4.1507 5.6269 5.3753 
SD 1.36287 1.55307 1.40565 1.83540 1.72749 1.31427 1.49235 
VIF  1.519 1.915 1.623 1.560 2.135 1.941 
Tolerance  0.658 0.522 0.616 0.641 0.468 0.515 
**Correlation Significant at .01 Level. Table Legend: COMM = Commitment towards using Cyberinsurance as a Risk 
Management Strategy; AMBG = Ambiguity of Cyberinsurance; FIN= Financial Risk; REG = Regulation Oversight 
Risk; TXNCN = Transaction Cost; SEV = Breach Risk Severity; JSEC = Job Security 
 
Table C.5:  Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 COMM AMBG FIN REG TXNC SEV JSEC 
COMM1 0.778            
COMM2 0.827            
COMM3 0.808            
COMM4 0.848            
COMM5 0.776            
AMBG1   0.869          
AMBG2   0.882          
AMBG3   0.876          
(table continues) 
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 COMM AMBG FIN REG TXNC SEV JSEC 
AMBG4   0.906          
AMBG5   0.841          
FIN1     0.724        
FIN2     0.771        
FIN3     0.774        
FIN4     0.727        
FIN5     0.784        
REG1      0.879       
REG2      0.866       
REG3      0.871       
REG4      0.844       
REG5      0.828       
REG6      0.738       
TXNC3         0.827     
TXNC4         0.894     
TXNC5         0.853     
TXNC6         0.821     
SEV2           0.705   
SEV3           0.825   
SEV4           0.728   
JSEC1             0.719 
JSEC2             0.700 
JSEC3             0.728 
Note: Loadings less than 0.5 are omitted from the table for clarity 
 
Table C.6. Convergent Validity Summary and Construct Reliabilities 
 Average Variance Extracted Composite Reliability Cronbach’s Alpha 
 AMB 0.8163 0.9568 0.9483 
COMM 0.8845 0.9684 0.9564 
 FIN 0.7305 0.9313 0.908 
 JSEC 0.8803 0.9566 0.932 
(table continues) 
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 Average Variance Extracted Composite Reliability Cronbach’s Alpha 
 REG 0.8181 0.9574 0.9444 
 SEV 0.7836 0.9353 0.9084 
 TXNC 0.7556 0.9246 0.944 
Table Legend: COMM= Commitment towards using Cyberinsurance as a Risk Management Strategy; AMBG = 
Ambiguity of Cyberinsurance; FIN= Financial Risk; REG = Regulation Oversight Risk; TXNC = Transaction Cost; 
SEV = Breach Risk Severity; JSEC = Job Security 
 
Table C.7: Correlations Among Latent Constructs 
     AMB COMM FIN JSEC REG SEV TXNC 
 AMB 0.9035 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COMM 0.1234 0.9405 0 0 0 0 0 
 FIN 0.2151 0.5994 0.8547 0 0 0 0 
 JSEC 0.1046 0.7521 0.489 0.9382 0 0 0 
 REG 0.1438 0.4933 0.4219 0.5137 0.9045 0 0 
 SEV 0.253 0.6733 0.6502 0.6069 0.3341 0.8852 0 
 TXNC 0.5163 -0.1639 0.0509 -0.0683 0.1646 0.0636 0.8693 
Note: The diagonals are the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor. Table Legend: 
COMM= Commitment towards using Cyberinsurance as a Risk Management Strategy; AMBG = Ambiguity of 
Cyberinsurance; FIN= Financial Risk; REG = Regulation Oversight Risk; TXNCN = Transaction Cost; SEV = Breach 
Risk Severity;JSEC = Job Security 
 
Table C.8: Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio of the Correlations (HTMT) 
 AMB COMM FIN JSEC REG SEV 
COMM 0.119      
FIN 0.221 0.638     
JSEC 0.102 0.795 0.521    
REG 0.156 0.516 0.445 0.549   
SEV 0.274 0.675 0.72 0.639 0.361  
TXNC 0.586 0.091 0.15 0.075 0.274 0.17 
 
Table C.9: Confidence Intervals of HTMT 
 Original Sample Sample Mean 2.50% 97.50% 
COMM  AMB 0.119 0.145 0.05 0.296 
FIN  AMB 0.221 0.238 0.086 0.423 
FIN  COMM 0.638 0.639 0.463 0.793 
JSEC  AMB 0.102 0.127 0.04 0.284 
(table continues) 
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 Original Sample Sample Mean 2.50% 97.50% 
JSEC  COMM 0.795 0.794 0.69 0.885 
JSEC  FIN 0.521 0.522 0.344 0.678 
REG  AMB 0.156 0.169 0.057 0.331 
REG  COMM 0.516 0.518 0.393 0.629 
REG  FIN 0.445 0.444 0.259 0.62 
REG  JSEC 0.549 0.55 0.416 0.674 
SEV  AMB 0.274 0.281 0.105 0.478 
SEV  COMM 0.675 0.675 0.561 0.779 
SEV  FIN 0.72 0.726 0.588 0.858 
SEV  JSEC 0.639 0.639 0.498 0.765 
SEV  REG 0.361 0.363 0.179 0.529 
TXNC  AMB 0.586 0.585 0.447 0.698 
TXNC  COMM 0.091 0.119 0.061 0.217 
TXNC  FIN 0.15 0.178 0.073 0.331 
TXNC  JSEC 0.075 0.114 0.055 0.225 
TXNC  REG 0.274 0.277 0.121 0.447 
TXNC  SEV 0.17 0.182 0.068 0.351 
Table Legend: COMM= Commitment towards using Cyberinsurance as a Risk Management Strategy; AMBG = 
Ambiguity of Cyberinsurance; FIN= Financial Risk; REG = Regulation Oversight Risk; TXNCN = Transaction Cost; 
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